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ROMANTIC COMMON LAW, ENLIGHTENED CIVIL LAW:
LEGAL UNIFORMITY AND THE HOMOGENIZATION
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Vivian GrosswaldCurran*
[Lia grandeurdu ginie ne consisterait-ellepas ...
b savoir dans quel cas ilfaut l'uniformiti et dans quel cas ilfaut des diffdrences?
-

Montesquieu'

INTRODUCTION
The main thrust of this article is to suggest why the European Union may succeed
in its objective of legal uniformity despite encompassing the two highly distinct legal
traditions of the common law and the civil law. My theory is that the defining
characteristics of the civil-law legal culture, although in stark and profound contrast
with those of the common-law legal system, nevertheless appear prominently and
pervasively in the non-legalspheres of common-law nations; and vice versa, such that
common-law legal characteristics correspond closely to elements often excluded from
civil-law legal cultures, but which are included in the non-legal domains of the civil-law
European Union Member States.
Conversely, the defining characteristics of civil-law legal culture not only are
largely absent from common-law legal systems, but, as Peter Goodrich has
demonstrated, they consciously and repeatedly were rejected by England. 2 Nevertheless,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. University of Pennsylvania; M.A.,
M.Phil., Ph.D., J.D. Columbia University. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine. I am grateful for
financial support in the form of generous grants from Dean David Herring of the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law and Professor Alberta Sbragia, Director of the European Union Center at the University of
Pittsburgh. I also thank the Deutsch-amerikanische Juristenvereinigungfor the opportunity to present my
ideas in their formative stages to German audiences; Professors Joachim Hermann and Thomas Mollers for
their kind assistance in procuring research resources in Augsburg; Professors Christian Joerges and Karlheinz
Muscheler for assistance with respect to research on Hermann Kantorowicz; Professor Bernhard GroBfeld for
his thorough reading of an earlier draft of this article, and helpful comments, as well as for his inspiring vision
of comparative law; Professors Volker Behr, Martha Chamallas, Jules Lobel, George Taylor and James Q.
Whitman for their insightful readings of this article and helpful comments; Ulrich Paul Ronald, for the
information about Esperanto I have used in these pages (and for having introduced me to Esperanto as a
child). Finally, I would like to express heartfelt thanks to Mr. Peter Kent, of Fort Meyers, Florida, a
descendant of the legal theorist, Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz. Mr. Kent has shown a generosity beyond
description in offering me information about his ancestor, including valuable German legal research of which
I had been unaware. I am deeply grateful to him for sharing reminiscences and documents relating to
Professor Kantorowicz, Professor Radbruch, and the turbulent world in which those two eminent scholars and
close friends lived and wrote and which Mr. Kent also experienced during his childhood in Germany. Portions
of this article were presented at the Sixth Biennial International European Community Studies Association
conference, in June 1999; and at the law faculties of the Universities ofAugsburg (June, 1999) and Hannover
(July, 1999).
(1990)
' Montesquieu (Charles de Secondat, baron de), De I'Esprit des Lois, livrexxix, chapitrexviii
("[Does not the greatness of genius consist in knowing in which case uniformity is needed, and in which case
differences?")
2
See Peter Goodrich, (Edipus Lex (1995). See also Mackay Cooper, The Common and the Civil Law A Scot's View, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 468, 471-72 (1949) ("The Anglo-Saxon is instinctively hostile to
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they are prominently and pervasively present in the non-legalspheres of common-law
European Union Member States. Consequently, lawyers from all of the Member States
have an intimate understanding of the fundamentals of both the common-law and civillaw mentalities, although they have learned to apply only one of those mentalities to
legal discourse and analysis.
The progression towards legal uniformity is spawning a hybrid, homogenized legal
culture from the systems of the civil and the common law that encounter each other in
the new Europe. The resulting homogenization in turn fortifies uniformity, as the two
distinct legal cultures are altered by their mutual encounters, adapting to the imperatives
of coexistence and coalescence, and in turn reinforcing homogenization, as their
acquired adaptive characteristics contribute to a further breakdown of distinctive legal
attributes by processes of reciprocal influence and blending.
I propose to support this thesis by signaling the striking resemblances between the
common-law mentality and Romanticism; and between the civil-law mentality and the
Enlightenment. The renditions of Romanticism and the Enlightenment that I apply to
the common and civil law in these pages are based principally on Isaiah Berlin's
analysis and discussion of Romanticism and the Enlightenment throughout the course of
his life's work. 4 This article both analyzes Berlin's discussion of Romanticism and the
Enlightenment in terms of the common and civil-law legal methodologies and
mentalities, and explores the implications of this analysis within the context of the
European Union.
Because all of the European Union's Member States were influenced by both
Romanticism and the Enlightenment, lawyers from both the common-law and civil-law
legal systems are adept at both conceptions of the world and of life that underlie the
legal systems. Thus, the process of Europeanization is reduced to re-learning to apply
the "other," "un-learned" system's tenets and methodology to the legal sphere of
reasoning, thinking, arguing and conceptualizing. This process of skill re-acquisition for
European lawyers and judges is greatly facilitated by their preexisting intimacy of
acquaintance with the "other" perspective in the non-legal domains of their lives.
Before I proceed with this analysis, I want to be very clear that I am not suggesting
that Romanticism was itself a cause of the common-law legal system, or the
Enlightenment a cause of the civil-law legal system. Both legal systems predate
Romanticism and the Enlightenment by many centuries. Rather, Romanticism and the
Enlightenment are useful to my argument to the extent that they are emblematic of
different modes of intellectual discourse, outlook, thought and focus that have long
coexisted in western society. For complex reasons, one or the other of those discourses
dominates the legal institutions of Europe's Member States.
The last two sections of this essay discuss the challenges to Europe's future posed
by the fusing of legal cultures and by the coalescence of a wider range of cultural
codification.") But see Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Code or Civil Law? - Towards aNew European Private
Law, 20 Syracuse J. Int'l. L. & Com. 217, 220 (1994) ("the prevailing idea of the English common law as
constituting an entirely autochthonous achievement is a myth").
Cf. J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 Nw. J.
Int'l. L. Bus. 354,354 (1997) ("European Community law is not a different species of law, but is a mutation
of the same species.")
4 See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, The Age of Enlightenment: The 18 'h Century Philosophers (1984); Four
Essays on Liberty (1969); Vico and Herder (1976); Concepts and Categories (Henry Hardy ed., 1978); The
Crooked Timber of Humanity (Henry Hardy ed., 1992); The Sense of Reality (Henry Hardy ed., 1996); The
Power of Ideas (Henry Hardy ed., 2000).
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characteristics in Europe, not all of which are attributable solely to the effects or acts of
the European Union. The European Union's increasing unicity and univocality may

threaten some of its most cherished goals. The very means by which the European
Union increasingly becomes capable of effectuating its goals paradoxically also may
undermine the ideals it seeks to promote. My conclusion is that economic and legal
uniformity simultaneously may be both necessary to the European Union and
destructive of it inasmuch as economic and legal uniformity may be incompatible and
irreconcilable with cultural pluralism. Unmasking and lucidly examining this
fundamental incompatibility lodged in the innermost structures and objectives of the
European Union is called for, even if it may entail the burden of recasting institutional
aspirations. Conscious recognition of the paradox embedded within the depths of the
European Union should be undertaken as part of a reassessment as to which steps will
be likeliest to realize the most desirable progression possible of the European Union
into the future.
CHALLENGES TO UNIFORMITY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
From the perspective of legal uniformity, the European Union's judicial system

would seem to invite comparison with federalist systems such as the one that exists in
the United States. Like the European Union's Member States, each of the United States'
fifty states has its own legal system. For each state in the United States, however, a state
supreme court has the final word on issues of state law, and even within the federal
court system, lack of legal uniformity persists among the federal circuit courts where the
United States Supreme Court has declined to hear issues appealed from the circuits.5
A still greater incommensurability between the European Union and the United
States persists in that the European Union's judicial system encompasses the very
different traditions of the common and civil law. 6 With this problematic in mind, a more
' See Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided Power System: The United States' Experience.
61 Wash. L. Rev. 1081, 1087 (1986). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, see Cass R.
Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 39-41 (1999). For discussions of
both inter-circuit and intra-circuit conflicts in the United States, including former Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court Burger's idea to create an intercircuit tribunal, see Arthur D. Hellman, Light On a
Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 247
(1998); Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit
Conflicts, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693 (1995); Michael J. Broyde, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived
Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White's Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 610 (1987); Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for
Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 805 (1993); Carl Tobias, The New
Certiorari and aNational Study of the Appeals Court, 81 Comell L. Rev. 1264 (1996). For the early historical
evolution of the federal court system in the United States, see Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The
Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System (1928).
6 1 do not consider the presence of Louisiana in the United States to present acomparable presence of a
different legal mode of operation, although the extent to which Louisiana law's civilian origins have eroded
into common-law characteristics and modus operandi may well be an illustrative portent for the European
Union. See Gordon Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 585, 591 (1937) (how
Louisiana"was affected by ... osmosis from the common law jurisdictions that surrounded her on three sides
.... "). On the common-law methodology of Louisiana's judiciary, see also James L. Dennis, Interpretation

and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 La. L. Rev. 1 (1993). For an
overview of the controversy about whether Louisiana should be classified as a common-law, civil-law or
mixed jurisdiction, see Kenneth M. Murchison, The Judicial Revival of Louisiana's Civilian Tradition: A
Surprising Triumph for the American Influence, 49 La. L. Rev. 1(1998). For the arguments, contrary to my
conclusions, that (1) generally, legal uniformity issues in the European Union are comparable to those in the
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fruitful comparison in terms of the European Union's judicial challenges might be with
an international convention, such as the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (hereinafter, the "CISG"), whose Article 7 (1) mandates
that, "[iln the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to ... the need to
promote uniformity in its application ... ,,7 Similarly to the situation in the European
Union, the national courts of the CISG signatory States must apply the convention in a
uniform manner, and even, if necessary, "against their own statal public authorities." 8
Legal uniformity of application seems destined to remain unrealized for the CISG.
Briefly, the numerous courts in the CISG's over fifty signatory States encounter
manifold impediments to uniformity of application. 9 First, there are inevitable problems
of judicial interpretation itself. Even within a given legal system, legal uniformity may
be said to remain an unrealized ideal rather than an achievable practice. Second,
tensions often exist between what judges may perceive to be an objective interpretation
of the CISG text, and what they consider fairness and justice to require in a pending
case. Third, problems surround the mythology that the CISG itself is a single text, when
in fact in all of its versions it is a translated text, published in more than one official and
unofficial language translations, with both intentional and unintentional substantive
disparities appearing in its different language versions.10 Fourth, differences in legal
traditions, cultures and practices are such that concepts of legal phenomena as basic as
"trials" and "contracts" fail to denote the same concepts in different languages, despite
the ease with which a translator may pick an allegedly equivalent word in a different
language." Finally, differences abound in what the national courts consider to be
United States, see Mathias W. Reimann, Towards a European Civil Code: Why Continental Jurists Should
Consult Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 73 Tul. L. Rev.1337, 1341 (1999) ("The Europeans can learn much
[from observing the United States' experience] about the advantages and disadvantages of different roads to
legal uniformity"); and (2) specifically, Louisiana is relevant as a mixed jurisdiction comparable to the
European Union in its admixture of civilian and common-law characteristics, see id. at 1343. Accord, Carl
Baudenbachcr, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 Tex. Int'l. L. J. 333, 335 (1999). For a
fascinating description of a legal system that truly appears to be mixed, namely, the Israeli system, see Alifredo
Mordechai Rabello & Pablo Lemer, Remarques sur le droit compard en Israel, 4 Revue intemationale de droit
compart 963, 971-77 (1999).
7 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Final Act, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 97/18 (1980), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 98 'h Cong., 1" Sess., app.B (1980), and in 19
I.L.M. 668 (1980).
s Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 376. See generally Claude Witz, Les premieres applications
jurisprudentielles du droit uniforme de la vente internationale (1995).
9 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Interpretive Challenge to Uniformity, 15 J. L. & Com. 175, 175179(1995).
10 See Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on
Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J. L. & Com.
187 (1998). Professor Flechtner writes persuasively about what he calls the "many CISGs," and predicts that
ultimately uniformity of application of the CISG will result within distinct geographic regions.
1 On the untranslatability of legal concepts, see, e.g., Bernhard GroBfeld, The Strength and Weakness
of Comparative Law (Tony Weir trans., 1990); Bernhard GroBfeld, Kernfragen der Rechtsvergleichung
(1996); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law,
46 Am. J.Comp. L.43 (1998). See also Gustav Radbruch, Der Geist des englischen Rechts 8 (1946) (stating
that "[duie beiden Rechiskulturen der zivilisierten Welt sind voneinander so verschieden, daft sogar die
adaquate Ubersetzung der Rechtsworte des einen in die Sprache des andern Rechtsgebietesfastunmoglich
ist;" translated by and quoted in James E. Herget, Contemporary German Legal philosophy 104 (1996): "The
two legal cultures of the civilized world are so different from one another that even the adequate translation of
the legal words of one into the language of the other is almost impossible'); Jtlrgen Habermas, Between Facts
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of law and Democracy, 194 (William Rehg trans., 1996)
("Different legal orders not only represent different ways of realizing the same rights and principles; they also
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primary and secondary sources of legal authority. These differences are particularly
vivid between civil-law and common-law legal systems.
For example, where a U.S. judge striving to apply the CISG uniformly would be
prepared to consult prior CISG case law, a French judge would expect to consult
scholarly commentary rather than the judicial decisions themselves. Moreover, a U.S.
judge would be perplexed by a French judicial application of the CISG, because the
French court opinion might well consist of one sentence without any clear description of
the case's underlying factual scenario, and essentially be inaccessible without the
explanatory scholarly commentary that French lawyers seek when trying to understand
French judicial decisions.
Conversely, a French judge assessing United States CISG case law instinctively
would look for la doctrine,the scholarly commentary that occupies a privileged position
of influence on French court adjudications, but which, to a common-law trained legal
mind, may be perceived as tainted by the scholar's interpretive subjectivity, not to speak
of by the lowly status of American scholars in terms of their influence on court
decisions. 2 Given these significant differences across legal cultures in the
reflect different paradigms of law"); Anna DaVita, Aperqu comparatif, 3 Revue intemationale de droit
compart 809, 809 (1998) ("La d~cision Uuridique] est i~e au systme auquel elle appartient: elle le
caractiriseet est caractdrisdeparlui... ") ("Thejudicial opinion is linked to the system to which it belongs: it
[the opinion] characterizes it [the system], and is characterized by it"); Rudolf von Jhering, Geist des
romischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung 29 (1953) (how the answers we get
depend on the questions we ask: "Wir werfen die Frage auf und mit der Frage ist auch die Antwort, die
Erkenntnis da."); E. Allan Farnsworth, The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles, 72 Tul. L.
Rev. 1985, 1990 (1998) (civilian UNIDROIT drafters receptive to UCC principles because oftheir codified
appearance, but reluctant to accord source of law status to any common-law decisions: "No decision of a
common law tribunal - not even the House of Lords - was as persuasive as a bit ofblackletter text"); Franco
Ferrari, CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?, 17 J. L. & Corn. 245 (1998); Michael Beloff,
Giving Effect to Community Law, in Mads Adenas & Francis Jacobs, European Community Law in the
English Courts 26 (1998) (discussing "the danger in trying to translate a tightly drawn directive into different
language'); and Annelise Riles, Models and Documents: Artefacts of International Legal Knowledge, 48 Int'l.
& Comp. L. Q. 805, 818-21 (discussing various forms of translation that transpire at UN global conferences).
2 On the status of law professors in civil-law states, John Henry Merryman has said that "[t]he teacherscholar is the real protagonist of the civil law tradition. The civil law is a law of the professors," and Andrt
Tune similarly has described the civil law as "a law of law teachers." John Henry Merryman, The Civil law
Tradition 59-60 (1969); Andrd Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 459, 469
(1976). Accord, James Q. Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era: Historical
Vision and Legal Change, xiii - xiv (1990). Foran excellent historical account ofthe civil-law heritage, and in
particular how "learned men," rather than judicial decisions, came to embody legal authority in fourteenthcentury Italy, see John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 138-147 (1968). Dawson notes that the Roman
legal system seemed poised for case-law methodology, but that this possibility was deflected by increasingly
dictatorial emperors whose power might have been usurped by judges operating in a system of stare decisis.
Dawson also explains that, in the medieval period, the Roman tradition of legal experts was transmuted to
judicial reliance on experts, which in turn became the influence of the sapiente, or "learned men": "The
Roman tradition of a legal elite, detached from any public office, was transferred to a group of academicians,
whose authority mounted with the mass of their writings, leaving the judges wholly submerged." Id. at 146147. See also Whitman, supra, at 58 (detailed discussion of problem of identifying Roman ius publice
respondendi);and at 86-90 (role of legal scholars in Roman republican versus imperial period). One sees in
the Roman legal experts the origins of the civilian reliance on scholarly work. See Whitman, supra, at 28-40;
101-199. More generally, see Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals (1944-1956) 202 (1992)
(discussing "the insignificance ofthe intelligentsia in the public life ofthe [United States]. In marked contrast
to their French homologues, American intellectuals are marginal to their own culture ... the intellectual in
America has no purchase upon the public mind, not to mention public policy. There was (and remains)
something profoundly inimical and alien to the European and French conception of the intellectual and his or
her role." Judt does not view the elevated role of the intellectual in France as an unalloyed benefit to society,
however, concluding that France gave "to the thoughts and deeds of its postwar intellectual elite a
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understandings even of what a judicial decision is, uniform application of the CISG
based on prior judicial decisions of necessity is compromised by the inevitable variety
among judicial interpretations and manners of interpretation of prior case law, much of
which is a consequence of the legal methodology used in each signatory State.13
Even at first glance, it is apparent that some of the challenges to a uniform
application of the CISG have been resolved in the European Union context. Perhaps the
most dramatic and visible differences between the CISG and the European Union are,
on the one hand, the significant disparity, arguably amounting to a difference in order of
magnitude, between the number of CISG signatory States (listed at 54 as of April,
1999),14 in contrast to the European Union's smaller number of Member States; coupled
with, on the other hand, the use of a single court to interpret European Community law,
as opposed to the use of the panoply of the national courts of signatory States for the

CISG. 5
The remarkable success in the European Union of the referral process from national
courts to the European Court of Justice has been analyzed at length in recent years. 16 By

disproportionate importance and resonance." Id. at 274. For an empirical study as to the sources of legal
authority the United States Supreme Court cites, including the extent to which the Court cites works oflegal
scholars, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70
Tex. L. Rev.1073 (1992).
'3 Accord, Christian Kirchner, A "European Code": Potential, Conceptual, and Methodological
Implications, 31 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 671, 676 (1998) ("Lawyers who have been trained in their own legal
culture and tradition and who are accustomed to thinking within their own legal system must apply and
interpret the new law.") For a more theoretical analysis of the constitutive elements of judgment, see
Immanuel Kant, First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment 9 (James Haden trans., 1965) (stating that
"judgment is such a peculiar, in no wise independent cognitive capacity that itneither gives concepts as does
understanding, nor ideas of any object whatsoever, as does reason, because it is merely a power ofsubsuming
under concepts given from elsewhere.") See also Camille Jauffret-Spinosi, tlaboration de laddcision de
justice, 3 Revue intemationale de droit compard 755,756 (1998) (describing the experience for a Frenchjurist
of reading foreign court opinions as "alienating" ("ddpaysant")). On the different substantive results reached
by different judges, Jauffret-Spinosi pointedly asks, id. at 757, whetherthis indicates that the issues have been
judged badly, or merely differently: "Est-ce du maljug6 ou de l'autrementjugd?")
14See Michael Will's updated "The First 555 or so [CISGI Decisions" (1999).
'5 It should be noted that international arbitration tribunals adjudicate many disputes arising under the
CISG, benefitting at least in part from the advantages of some degree of uniformity, although perhaps less so
than a single court with a discrete body of case law. On the other hand, in addition to the 54 signatory States,
each ofwhose courts adjudicate CISG issues, one of those signatory States; namely, the United States, may be
viewed as including another 51 courts at least, inasmuch as each state has its own legal system, with a parallel
federal court system. Nor is the United States' federal system univocal. On the contrary, substantive legal
conflicts persist among different federal circuit courts, due to the small number of cases the United States
Supreme Court agrees to hear, as discussed supra note 5.
16See, e.g.,
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation ofEurope, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991); J.H.H. Weiler,
Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective ofthe European CourtofJustice in the
Arena of Political Integration, 31 J. Common Mkt. Studies 417,417-18,421-25 (1993); and R.0. Keohane &
S. Hoffinann, Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980's, in The New European Community:
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change 11-12 (R. 0. Keohane & S. Hoffmann eds., 1991), cited and quoted
in Weiler, supra; Lenore Jones, Opinions of the Courts of the European Union in the National Courts, N.Y.U.
J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 275 (1997); Carl Otto Lenz, The Preliminary Ruling Procedure and the United Kingdom, 19
Fordham Int'l. L. J. 844 (1996); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward aTheory ofEffective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273,290-93 (1997); and David Vaughan & Fergus Randolph, The
Interface between Community Law and National Law: the United Kingdom Experience, in Constitutional
Adjudication in European and National Law: Essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T. F. O'Higgins 219-69 (Deirdre
Curtin & David 0' Keeffe eds., 1992). See also Imelda Maher, National Courts as European Community
Courts, 14 Legal Studies 226, 227 (1994) (Ironically, the European Court of Justice has been so hugely
successful in obtaining national referrals that it is overwhelmed by them, and is trying to redirect individuals
back to their national courts.)
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all indications, the readiness of domestic courts to participate actively in referring cases
to the European Court of Justice appears to have become a tradition in the national life
of the Member States, with national judges abstaining from referral generally where the
European Court of Justice has made its position on the relevant legal issue clear.' 7
The referral structure operates successfully by funneling a multitude of legal issues
towards a single European court, so long as they ostensibly fall within its sphere of
competence.la However cacophonous the languages of origin may be, however stubborn
the problems of translation may be that persist on numerous levels between referring
Member State court and the European Court of Justice, the adjudication of issues
deemed European is univocal, issued and uttered by the European court, and, moreover,
based on that court's body of precedents.
The European Union's structural remedy to the CISG problem of adjudication by
diverse courts in numerous nations need not, however, mean that legal convergence,
either substantive or methodological, would be realized at a substructural level.
Scratching the surface of the European Union's legal system might bring into view a
juridical Tower of Babel, due to the clash of discordant legal cultures between the two
principal, divergent legal systems coexisting in the European Union: namely, the
common-law and civil-law systems.
Certainly, the European Union Member States do suffer from some of the same
barriers to legal uniformity as the CISG, such as the use of numerous different
languages, with inevitable attendant imperfections of translations that go beyond the
realm of language, extending to profound conceptual differences, to conflicts between
disparate understandings in common-law and civil-law systems as to the defining
characteristics of law itself.19 These obstacles to legal uniformity are very real and will
persist in diminishing the extent to which legal uniformity can be achieved or perfected.
The European Union may, however, be overcoming critical obstacles to legal
uniformity. It may be developing a kind of homogenization of the two judicial traditions
it encompasses - in other words, a new and different product may be emerging, a
byproduct of the unique composition of the European Union's legal institutions.
A EUROPEAN INTERSECTION OF SETS
To those of us who believe that law is part and parcel of the larger society in which
it emerges, develops and thrives, and which, in turn, it affects in a dynamic process of
mutual influence, the most likely situation one might imagine would be that, to the
extent law reflects the larger society, common-law characteristics should permeate the
17 See Lord Slynn of Hadley, Critics of the Court: a Reconsideration in European Community Law in
the English Courts, in Adenas & Jacobs, supra note 11, at 3; Beloff, supra note 11, at 13.
's See Treaty Establishing the European Community [EC Treaty], art. 234. (as amended through

December 2000).
'9 See generally, Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, supra note 11; more specifically, see
Giuseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Language, Culture and Politics in the Life of the European
Court of Justice, I Colum. J. Eur. L. 397, 397- 403 (1995) (evolving cultural-linguistic discrepancies
impeding communication, although also quoting Advocate General Jacobs' view that "unlike the English and
the Americans, who are divided by a common language, language differences in Europe do not prevent a
common way of thinking," quoting F. G. Jacobs, The European Court of Justice: Some Thoughts on its Past
and Future, The Eur. Advoc. 2, 7 (1994-95)); see also James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal
Cultures of Europe, 30 Law & Soc'y Rev. 55 (1996) (exploring different national attitudes towards law among
Member States and differing cultures within Member States).
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larger society of nations with a common-law legal system, as civil-law characteristics
should permeate the larger society of nations with a civil-law legal system. While that
statement in and of itself is not inaccurate, the point I hope to develop is that its
converse is inaccurate: namely, the larger cultures of common-law nations are not
devoid of civil-law attributes, and vice versa. Both common-law and civil-law attributes
abound in the larger social, political and intellectual cultures of all of the European
Union's Member States. Each Member State has myriad non-legal characteristics that
correspond to the defining characteristics of both the common-law and civil-law
mentalities.
Precisely because law is embedded in the larger society, and because the
fundamentals of both common-law and civil-law mentalities are pervasive in all of the
European Union's Member States, lawyers come to the law with an understanding, an
instinctive grasp, of both mentalities, and proceed to learn to "un-learn" one of those
mentalities when dealing with legal analysis. Indeed, the process of becoming a lawyer
involves repressing the "other" mode of thinking, "un-learning," when engaging in legal
thought, its manner of reasoning, ofperceiving and analyzing the world. The conception
of the world, the method of reasoning, that lawyers are "un-learning" for the purposes of
their legal training, nevertheless remains valid for the non-legal domains of intellect and
discourse. This formative process applies to lawyers trained in both the common and
civil-law legal systems.
Thus, for example, because of the profound influence of Romanticism in Germany,
and Romanticism's embodiment of common-law characteristics, a German lawyer
should have the capacity to understand the common-law mentality. Its foreignness will
reside in its application to the legal domain. The extent to which Romanticism has been
an influence in a civil-law nation's general culture should correlate with the degree of
ease its lawyers and judges face in adapting common-law concepts and conceptions in
the sphere of law. Consequently, the penetration of common-law attributes should be
easier, quicker and deeper in Germany than in France, a country in which the
Enlightenment played a20more dominant role in intellectual discourse and development
than did Romanticism.
The influences of the Enlightenment and Romanticism in Europe are the subject of
countless commentaries, and have been amply documented. To the extent that my thesis
is valid, because Romanticism is kindred to the common-law mentality in many ways,
and because the Enlightenment is kindred to the civil-law mentality in many ways,
examining Romanticism and the Enlightenment will make visible the presence of the
common-law perspective in the general cultures of Europe's civil-law States, as it will
the presence of the civil-law perspective in the general cultures of Europe's commonlaw States. My use of Romanticism and the Enlightenment is thus as a tool to
demonstrate my thesis, but there also should be areas beyond the residues of the
Enlightenment and Romanticism that evidence the admixture of common-law and civillaw attributes in the non-legal spheres of the European Union States' cultures.
My categories and correspondences are not impregnable. Romanticism and the
Enlightenment have considerable overlap. Although often contrasted with each other,
o See Denis Richet, The Ideological Origins of the French Revolution 163, in Histories: French
Constructions of the Past (Jacques Revel & Lynn Hunt eds., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1995) (defining the
French Revolution as "the Revolution of the Enlightenment"); but see Albert Soboul, Classical Revolutionary
Historiography and Revisionist Endeavors, in id., at 166 (Richet's definition of the Revolution is simplistic,
given the complexity of the Enlightenment).
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each also is greatly indebted to the other. Moreover, as Isaiah Berlin has put it, today
"[wie are children of both worlds.' Similarly, the legal sphere of societies is not
distinct and separable from the rest of society: on the contrary, each exists in a dynamic
interrelation of mutual influence with the other. Nevertheless, it still is possible to
discern attributes characteristic of legal culture that are not equally characteristic of the
larger culture.
My theory is sustainable to the extent that one can distinguish some attributes as
characteristic of Romanticism, but uncharacteristic of the Enlightenment, and vice
versa; that one can distinguish some attributes as characteristic of legal institutions, but
uncharacteristic of non-legal institutions, and vice versa; and that one can distinguish
some attributes as characteristic of common-law legal systems, but uncharacteristic of
civil-law legal systems, and vice versa. Each of these binary oppositions is far from
absolute in validity, however. A helpful way to envision them is as elements in
mathematical sets, where the sets overlap, such that their intersection covers some area,
but where there is not a union of sets, and the areas of complement, the non-intersecting
areas of the sets, also are appreciable.
The homogenization of law and legal methodology in Europe increasingly will
effect an expansion of the area covered by the intersection of the two sets representing
the common law and the civil law. If one were to imagine the set representing the
common law as a circle of red paint, and the set representing the civil law as a circle of
white paint, European legal homogenization would be the pink area of overlap, with its
dimensions increasing in jagged lines and a range of shades from white to red, as paint
seeps unevenly beyond the circles' circumferences.
I do not want to overstate the case, or, worse, to appear to minimize the critical
differences between the common and civil-law legal systems. Many flaws, especially in
comparative legal analysis, have resulted from an unfortunate tendency to overlook the
profound and fundamental nature of those differences. 22 Indeed, in Bulmer v.
Bollinger,3 Lord Denning of Britain's House of Lords seemed almost to despair of
reconciling those differences. In an opinion that has been reproduced in part by Claire
24
; and, still more recently,
Kirkpatrick in her recent article in the EuropeanLaw Journal
by Anthony Amull in EuropeanCommunity Law in the English Courts,2 Lord Denning
expressed the collision of the two legal traditions in terms of a common-law court's
dilemma as it attempted to deal with European legislation drafted in the civil-law style.
His opinion brings to light the alien aspect to the common-law legal perspective of
what, ultimately, is the civil-law idea of law itself, of the law as text, and of the function
and nature of legislation. Lord Denning signals how ill-equipped the common law is to
assimilate and process texts drafted and conceived in the civil-law mentality, legal texts
21 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots ofRomanticism 141 (Henry Hardy ed., 1999). The extent of differing and
even mutually contradictory theses concerning Romanticism and the Enlightenment renders them susceptible
as P.N. Furbank refers to the Enlightenment in his recent
to attack as "desperately flabby concept[s] .....
review of Daniel Roche, France in the Enlightenment (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2000). See P. N. Furbank,
Brave New World, The New York Review of Books 40 (Feb. 24,2000).
2 See Curran, supra note 11 (tracing the development ofcomparative law in the United States in terms
of its dmigrd leaders' reluctance to acknowledge the fundamental nature of differences among legal cultures).
23 Bulmer Ltd. v. Bollinger S.A., 2 All. E.R. 1226 (1974).
24 Claire Kilpatrick, Community or Communities of Courts in European Integration? Sex Equality
Dialogues Between UK Courts and the ECJ, 4 Eur. L. J. 121, 131-32 (1998).
25 Anthony Arnull, Interpretation and Precedent in European Community Law, in Adenas & Jacobs,
supra note 11,at 117.
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that do not fit into the pre-existing common-law grids and categories; in other words,
legal texts that can not be decoded and deciphered by using the common law's habitual
tools of interpretation:
The Treaty is quite unlike any of the enactments to which we [are] accustomed. The
draftsmen of our statutes have striven to express themselves with the utmost exactness.
They have tried to foresee all possible circumstances that may arise to provide for them.
They have sacrificed style and simplicity. They have forgone brevity. They have
become long and involved ... How different is this Treaty! It lays down general
principle. It expresses its aims and purposes ... but it lacks precision. It uses words
without defining what they mean. An English lawyer would look for an interpretation
clause but would look in vain. There is none! 2...It
is the European way. Seeing these
6
differences, what are the English courts to do?

Finally, Lord Denning answered his own question: "We must follow the European
pattern. 27
It is not just the English who are obliged to embark on a foreign way. Although the
homogenized European legal product has a stronger strain of civil- than of common-law
mentality, and may be criticized as allowing the former to dominate the latter, civil-law
methodology is not remaining unchanged in the European context. The very prevalence
of the European Court of Justice as a source, if not, as many would say today, as the
most important source, of legal authority in the European Union, has created a system
with an increasingly common-law-like component of staredecisis.28 European judges,
like their common-law brethren, and, unlike their civil-law brethren (at least in the
latter's official role), create law, fashioning it with each judicial decision, such that legal
26 Bulmer, supra note 23, at 1236. It should be noted in this context that, according to Professors Atiyah
and Summers, Lord Denning has an "inclination for radical innovation," and is the only judge in several
centuries of English judicial history to have repudiated the peculiarly English strictures on stare decisis. See
P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of
Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions 349 (1987). For further reference to Lord Denning's
ideosyncratic judicial outlook, see id., at 122, 133, 287, and 290-91.
27 Bulmer, supra note 23 (emphasis added). See also Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law,
State and Nation in the European Commonwealth 98 (1999) ("the price of [British] judicial loyalty to
integrationist doctrine in Community law [is] a high one, but the House of Lords [is] ready to bite the bullet").
On the difficulty in statutory interpretation for a civil-law judge interpreting common-law statute (the
converse of Lord Denning's dilemma), see Wolfgang Oehler, Working With a Code: Is There a Difference
Between Civil-Law and Common-Law People?, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 711,714 (1997) ("when approaching
statutory law of a common-law jurisdiction, a lawyer educated and trained in a civil-law country will find
herself forced to muddle through what appears to her a troublesome, if not superfluous, verbosity of
explanatory sentences and definitions in her attempt to gain knowledge of it in the way she has been used to
back at home."). On the basic approaches to distinguishing common-law from civilian interpretive
methodology, see generally, Law-Finding and Procedure inCommon Law and Civil Law, in Konrad Zweigert
& Hein Kftz, Introduction to Comparative law 256-275 (Tony Weir trans., 1998). For Professors Zweigert
and Kotz's account of Lord Denning, see id. at 267.
" But see Katja Langenbucher, Argument by Analogy in European Law, 57 Cambridge L.J. 481,506
(1998) (arguing against viewing the European Court ofJustice as implementing a common-law methodology,
"since the European Court of Justice does not recognise binding precedents as a source of law."). To the
extent that the precedents are "binding" in practice, however, one might wonder whether their being
unrecognized as a source of law will suffice to prevent a doctrine ofstare decisis from developing defacto, if
not de jure. Indeed, Langenbucher's attempt to distinguish between the European Union's attitude to
precedents and the common law's overlooks the fact that staredecisis is not strictly applied in common-law
jurisdictions, at least by the highest courts. See id. at 507-08. Langenbucher's analysis nevertheless reflects
many pertinent differences between the European and the common-law effect ofjudicial precedents. See id.
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norms are judicially created for future application to similar future cases.29
This phenomenon is not totally like the common-law's stare decisis, however,

inasmuch as the European Court of Justice's decisions have a civil-law flavor in the
style of their composition, such that the European judicial decision itself resonates with
familiarity and significance to civil-law citizens in ways alien to their common-law
counterparts. 3 Moreover, Paolo Mengozzi points out that decisions of the German and
Italian national Constitutional Courts accord a status to European Court of Justice
decisions that not only meets the common-law standard of legally binding precedents,
but in fact exceeds it, inasmuch as European Court of Justice decisions, in his words,
"transcend ... the limits of the common law concept," because they simultaneously
constitute binding precedents, along the lines of common-law methodology, but yet are
deemed applicable even to factually dissimilarfuture cases.3'
What Mengozzi describes as "transcending" common-law concepts is not so much
going beyond the common law, as though the German and Italian national

Constitutional Courts were becoming more common-law in methodology than the
national common-law legal systems' courts themselves. It is, rather, a civil-law twist on
common-law methodology that we are seeing today in the European Union. The

common-law recognition of precedents as a binding source of law is blending with the
civil-law custom of norm-formation for general prospective deductive application. The
manner of applying the norms derived from European Court of Justice precedents is
emerging in the civil-law style of privileging the deductive process from norm to
application, and departing from the common-law insistence on limiting the applicability
of norms derived from precedents to factually analogous future cases. Thus, although
precedents are being accorded legally binding stature, absent are the common law's
privileging of the process of analogizing in its methodological hierarchy, and the
common law's pervasive attribution of legal significance to the discrete facts of each
case.
The common law also is affecting the civil-law Member States' Europeanization in
the form of national legislative enactments that are progressing in a manner reminiscent
.9The European Court of Justice's preeminent role as the source of European Community legal
authority predictably has discomfited civilian Member States, causing them to seek alternatives which would
relegate the Court to an inferior status. See Paolo Mengozzi, European Community Law 84-85 (Patrick Del
Duca trans., 1992). For the civil law's opposition to "plrecedent-justice [as] not only illogical but
pernicious," and attributing to "Rome's high legal culture ...
its [i.e., precedential justice's] systematic
prohibition," see Dawson, supra note 12, at 100, quoting Woldemar Engelmann, Die Wiedergeburt der
Rechtskultur in Italien 29 (1938); Frangois Gdny, Mdthode d'interprdtation et sources en droitprivd positif91
(1919) (in two volumes), for the French revolutionary jurist Chapelier's statement that case law was the most
hateful of all institutions and Robespierre's that case law ("[cle mot dejurisprudence des tribunaux") had to
be erased from the French language ("doittre effacdde notre langue'3. See also Whitman, supra note 12, at
56, for the specific terms of Justinian's prohibition against reliance on precedents. As Maurice Adams points
out, however, the use ofprecedents in the absence of the common-law's full-fledged methodology diminishes
the extent to which a civil-law court's acknowledging precedents approximates the common-law judicial
approach. See Maurice Adams, The Rhetoric ofPrecedent and Comparative Legal Research, 62 Mod. L. Rev.
464 (1999). See also Dawson, supra note 12, at 323 ("The citations by [French] lawyers to past decisions gave
the judges some clues but not much help, for the lawyers' ignorance of the reasons for past decisions often
made their citations irrelevant."). For a comparative analysis of the methodology of the European Court of
Justice and the United States Supreme Court, see Larry CatA Backer, Fairness as a General Principle of
American Constitutional Law: Applying Extra-Constitutional Principles to Constitutional Cases in Hendricks
and M.L.B., 33 Tulsa L. J. 135 (1997).
'0 The Court's reasoning is deductive, from principles of enacted law.
31 Mengozzi, supra note 29, at 190.
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of common-law processes. In order to remain compliant with European standards,
Member States pass legislation as new European Union directives necessitate. 32 This
method of national legal reform goes against the grain, however, of the civil-law
concept of law as the codified embodiment of the national legal spirit, written down
from a point of departure that foresees an organic legal system, a coherent whole.
Accordingly, the process has been the subject of criticism by jurists from civil-law
Member States. Reinhard Zimmermann has decried the ongoing process of national
legal evolution in Europe as follows:
This way of 'Europeanizing' our private law has been highly unsatisfactory so far. We
are dealing with no more than fragments of uniform law, inserted rather inorganically,
and in a 'higgledy-piggledy' fashion, into the various national legal systems. Rather
than gain in coherence, rationality, and predictability, the law has tended to become
disjointed.33
Similarly, Friedrich Ktlbler refers to the "pointillistecharacter" of this new way of
creating legal norms, a way that he criticizes for being in a relation of confrontation
with the "ideal of codification of the established understanding of law., 34 Gustav
Radbruch described such "neglect" towards the elegant, symmetrical and fitting
ordering of law as typifying English, as opposed to German, law.35 Indeed, what appears
to Professors Zimmermann and Ktlbler to be a distressingly haphazard legal evolution
because of its piecemeal progression, is the very image of the common law's pattern of
progression. The Member States' "higgledy-piggledy" enactments in response to
European Union directives are alterations based on particulars rather than on the
coherent whole.
Professor Kilbler's reference to pointillisme is even more illustrative of the
common-law production of law, whose meaning, like that of a pointilliste painting,
derives from the combined effect of its multifarious elements. In the European Union's
Member States, this arouses the skepticism and mistrust of the civil-law jurist because it
32See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, part 1, art. 10.
33 Zimmermann, supra note 2, at 218. Accord, Kirchner, supra note 13, at 674 (describing the goal of
European legal unification as the creation ofa "new legal order'). Where Zimmermann regrets the "higgledypiggledy fashion" of European law-making, Gustav Radbruch similarly described the English legal system as
proceeding on a "zigzag course" ("einO-unsch6ne[r]Zickzackkurs"). Radbruch, supra note 11, at 9. See also
Guido Alpa, Les nouvelles fronti~res du droit des contrats, 4 Revue intemationale de droit compard 1022-23
(1998) (noting the difficulty of comparing European Union law to UNIDROIT or other contract principles
because, with the exception of the Lando Commission's work, European Union law comes piece-meal, in the
form of individual directives, frustrating attempts to come to coherent conclusions as to its principles). But see
Reiner Schulze, A Century of the Bargerliches Gesetzbuch: German Legal Uniformity and European Private
Law, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 461, 467-72 (generally endorsing the current process, although hoping for more
systematization). Schulze suggests that the Europeanization of law is a process of"de-codification." Id. at
472.
34 Friedrich KIlbler, Traumpfade oder Holzwege nach Europa? Oder: Was wir uns von der
Rechtsgeschichte wtlnschen sollten, 12 Rechtshistorisches Journal 307, 307 (1993) ("derpointillistische
Charakter dieser Nomnsetzung konfrontiert ein aufdas KodifkatsionsulealgegrandetesRechtsverstindnismit
wachsenden Schwierigkeiten").
" See Radbruch, supra note 11, at 9 (" Vernachldssigungdersymmetrischen undgeschicktenAnordnumg
"), quoting and presumably translating Macaulay. Radbruch's description of the English legal system is
highly complimentary. It should be noted that his book was published in 1946; one senses in Radbruch's
glowing portrayal of the English legal spirit and people, their law-abiding nature, propensity for self-criticism,
and indomitable commitment to freedom, an often unspoken contrast with the authoritarian Nazi period
Radbruch had just gone through in Germany. See, e.g., id. at 13-15.
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is an evolution proceeding inversely from the civil-law norm, for the European legal
progression taking place today is occurring law by law, rule by rule, in reaction to new
circumstances imposed by the European Union. The Member States' law is thus
evolving in response to the particular new needs of the ever-evolving society. This is
how the common law develops, including the particular statutes that legislatures enact
in order to change the course ofjudicial trends.36
This manner of legal evolution now occurring within the European Union Member
States marks a profound alteration in the conception of law and the propriety of legal
change for the European Union's civil-law Member States. It also marks a profound
contrast with Enlightenment ideology, inasmuch as the latter sought to apply scientific
methods to all areas of study, including the social and political sciences, with an
approach that was, like the civil-law state's approach to law, "organic" and "antiatomic", 3 7: i.e., which privileged the whole, the coherent, and the interrelatedness, as
opposed to the component part, the particular, and the isolated.38
ROMANTIC COMMON LAW; ENLIGHTENED CIVIL LAW
The common law is a law defined in terms of past judicial decisions. The resulting
methodology is such that the common law perpetually is in flux, always in a process of
further becoming, developing, and transforming, as it cloaks itself with the habits of
past decisions, tailored to the lines of the pending situation. The common law evolves
with the ongoing derivation of legal standards from prior judicial decisions, but it is
defined by continuous motion. This means that the common law is that which cannot be
crystallized, frozen or ever entirely captured. It is fluid, with a suppleness that resides in
its inseparability from each discrete, concrete set of facts, the facts of the lived
experiences 39 which formed the basis of the litigation that led to the prior relevant court
adjudications. 4°
The common law is the analysis of the particular because common-law legal rules
derive from a series of unique life experiences, by definition not amenable to exact
repetition. The common law signifies by way of the courts' assessments of the legal
significance attributable to unique events, to facts in the unicity of their particular life
contexts.4' By virtue of their inextricable connection to the factual life scenarios that
",
36 See Justice Frankfurter's characterization of United States law as an "instrument ofadjustment ...
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 5, at 59-60.
37See Berlin, Age of Enlightenment, supra note 4, at 20.
" See id. For the argument that Continental Europe's reception of Roman law was predominantly the
adoption of rationalism in legal methodology, rather than the incorporation of foreign substantive legal
principles, i.e., that it signified the "Verwissenschafilichung" or scientization of law, see Michael Stolleis, The
Law Under the Swastika: Studies on Legal History in Nazi Germany 58-61 (Thomas Dunlap trans., 1998).
" Throughout this article, I use the expression "lived experience" to denote the experience-in-life of a
party before that experience becomes encoded in a court narrative that inevitably involves transformation and
reduction, including experiences omitted entirely from the judicially forged rendition of events.
40 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, L'enseignement du droit aux Etats-Unis: un reflet oblique de la

methodologie "common-law," 13 Cahiers de mthodologiejuridique 1543 (1998).
41 See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 2 (1985) (1930) ("the concrete instance, the heaping up of
concrete instances, the present, vital memory of a multitude of concrete instances, is necessary in order to
make any general proposition, be it a rule of law or any other, mean anything at all") (emphasis in original);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 160 (1999) (1988) ("the test for determining the law
must turn on factual criteria"); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging 45 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 52 (1996) (discussing the common law's focus on the factual and contextual, concluding,
however, that convergence of the common and civil law traditions within the European Union is a virtual
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lead to litigation, common-law legal issues also must be unique. It is thus clear that
reasoning by analogy from a prior adjudicated case to a pending case never can attain
scientific precision. The comparison must at best remain simile; it never can reach the
exact equivalence of metaphor.42
The common law's analogical reasoning is defined in terms of the pending case's
outcome - in other words, common-law legal reasoning consists of arguments, some of
which succeed in practice, and others of which fail. Those arguments destined for
success join the ranks of a hierarchy of legal axioms, the springboard for future
analogies to meet the needs of future arguably similar cases. Thus, each legal standard is
linked irreducibly to the factual context from which it emerged, rendering both legal
standard and legal argument inextricably bound to factual context.43
The common-law twin concepts of holding and dictum illustrate the inseparability
of fact from law. A common-law court's holding is defined as that part of the judicial
opinion consisting of the court's resolution of the precise legal issues in their factual
contexts that the parties asked the court to resolve. Under the doctrine of staredecisis,
only the holding has binding precedential authority on future similar cases. By contrast,
dictum is any other pronouncement contained in the court's opinion. Prototypical
dictum is a court's expression of how it would have resolved the case had one or more
of the facts been different from what they were. Dictum is particularly instructive in
revealing which facts were influential in and dispositive of the court's final resolution of
the legal issues. Dictum legitimately may be persuasive authority to a future court
dealing with the hypothetical situation the earlier court
discussed, but even then,
44
technically, it does not have binding precedential effect.
Common-law lawyers therefore fashion their arguments from a close study of prior
cases. Their success as lawyers depends on persuading the judge in each case of the
accuracy of the analogies they suggest between their client's situation and that of the
precedents they cite. Similarly, common-law lawyers must persuade the judge that their
client's situation is different from situations that arose in the precedents they hope to
distinguish. The common-law lawyer's task also is to persuade the judge that the
lawyer's interpretation of existing case law accurately reflects prevailing
contemporaneous legal standards, and that the accumulated body of relevant precedents
impossibility). For an analysis of the common law's defining legal issues in terms of associated facts, and the
inextricability of the common-law legal issue from its defining facts, see Vivian Curran, Common-Law
Methodology: The Four-to-Five Step Procedure for Legal Reasoning and Some Important Aspects of the
Bluebook (unpublished manuscript, 1992) (this manuscript represents my attempt to implement the "unlearning" of civil-law thought processes and perceptions that common-law law students must undergo in order
to grasp common-law legal methodology. I have used it both for United States J.D. students and for foreign
LL.M. degree candidates.)
" See Edward Levi's excellent analysis of common-law legal reasoning, in which he concludes that
common-lawjudges are obliged to classify things as equal which at least are somewhat different, by virtue of
the common law's composition of rules that change even as they are applied Levi calls this phenomenon a
"moving classification" system. Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 3 (1949).
13 See id. See also Llewellyn, supra note 4 1; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law & Other
Writings 120-125 (1982). Cf. Claus Luttermann, Dialog der Kulturen: Vergleichendes Handels- und
Kapitalmarktrecht im Sprachspiegel, in Festschrift fUr Bernhard Grollfeld zum 65. Geburtstag 771, 779
(Ulrich Hubner& Wemer F. Ebke eds., 1999) ("Mit Goethe diirfenwirdasWortzwarnichtiberschdtzen,da
im Anfangnicht das Wort war, sondern die Tat') (quoting Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust 35 et seq.

(1867)).
4' Cf. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 5 ("courts should follow prior holdings but not necessarily prior dicta");
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature ofthe Judicial Process 29 (1921) ("obscuring dicta... must be stripped off
and cast aside").
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obliges the judge to rule in favor of the lawyer's client. The lawyer's reasoning does not
consist merely in bringing to the judge's attention precedents favorable to the lawyer's
client. It is equally important for the common-law lawyer to show the judge why
unfavorable cases are irrelevant to the pending case. Thus, common-law lawyers engage
in complex factual triages, distinguishing as factually different and distant those cases
whose outcomes would militate against their client's interests; and, conversely,
presenting as analogous the facts of cases whose outcomes militate in favor of their
clients.
Facts thus are central to the very meaning and concept of law in the common-law
legal system. This centrality of the particular facts to the common-law legal system is
conveyed to United States law students through the casebook method of education.
From their first day of studies, law students read series of cases that provide the data
from which they are to deduce governing legal norms. The task of formulating legal
principles by extracting them from individual cases is a task never wholly achievable to
the extent that the factual baggage is a constant and necessary companion to commonlaw legal principles.
The difficulty beginning law students frequently experience and express is the
difficulty inherent in adjusting to common-law lawyers' freedom and room for leverage,
to their room for interpretive creativity. It also reflects the uncertainty embedded in the
common law. 45 Along with the freedom and adventure of crafting innovative new legal
arguments derived from prior court decisions, common-law lawyers may hope not just
to win their case, but also to forge new legal standards by persuading the judge to adopt
their arguments, however novel and original. The lawyer more ingenious at seeing how
prior case law can be analogized and distinguished according to the needs of the client's
case may make law by dint of presenting the more persuasive of the
two conflicting
46
interpretations of precedents that the adversaries argue to the court.
This very freedom implies an absence a priori of any single correct result in an
absolute sense. It implies substantive law's flexibility and dependence on
argumentation. Thus, at the heart of the common law lies an exaltation of methodology,
of argumentation that not only rivals, but also determines, substantive law.47 Justice
Scalia has written that "[t]he rule of law is aboutform." 48 Indeed, according to H.L.A.
Hart, in the United States, there is "a concentration, almost to the point of obsession, on
the judicial process ....
' On the importance of legal education as a reflection of national legal culture, see John Henry
Merryman, Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 859 (1974).
' See Levi, supra note 42, at 1-19 (for how law is created by arguments initially asserted without
success, often repeatedly so, until eventually a court accepts them.)
47 In a statement that provides a stark contrast to the civil law, Judge Posner has written of the commonlaw legal system that "[I]egal training and experience equip lawyers with a set of essentially casuistic tools ...
but not with the tools they need in order to understand the social consequences oflaw." Richard A. Posner,
Overcoming Law 90 (1995).
" Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 25 (1997) (emphasis in
original).
49 H.L+A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: the Nightmare and the Noble
Dream 11
Ga. L.Rev. 1169 (1977), quoted in James R. Maxeiner, U.S. "Methods Awareness" (MethodenbewuBtsein) for
German jurists, in Festschrift flir Wolfgang Fikentscher zum 70. Geburtstag 121 (Bernhard GroBfeld et al.
eds., 1998), (emphasis added); reprinted in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 123 (1983).
Accord, Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional
Values, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 200,201 (1984). The common law's emphasis on procedure was noted also by the
German comparatist Wolfgang Fikentscher ("Fikentscher notes that Anglo-American legal thinking focuses
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The common law's methodology or process may be said to be its "grammar," in the
sense that semioticians speak of grammar as the underlying network of signs creating

significance.5 0 Consequently, common-law legal education emphasizes to students how
to formulate argument. It seeks to transmit its methodology as much or more than
positive law, conveying the doubtful status of positive law in a system whose selfunderstanding is one of flux.
The case law method also highlights the procedural, allowing students to observe
the manifold ways in which substance is linked to procedure, in which facts are subject
to the court's optic or prism of perception, and in which the procedural context is a
primordial, defining aspect of judicial perception."' According to John Dawson, the
doctrine of stare decisis, the common law's cornerstone, originally applied principally
to matters ofprocedure:5 "The
binding force of precedent was chiefly felt on points of
2
procedure and practice.,
As Professor Merryman has put it, "to read a case is a very inefficient way to learn
a rule of law ... . One studies cases in order to become familiar with the process, to
learn how the legal system operates ... the emphasis is not on substance but on method
... ."4 Judge Posner remembers his first day in law school as follows: "[W]e were asked
to read for each course not an overview or theoretical treatment of the field but a case -a case, moreover, lying in the middle rather than at the historical or logical beginning of
on procedure and and dealing with legal problems, that is, on methods, whereas Continental-European
treatment of legal questions is concerned with finding the immediately just solution, that is, its focus is in
legal philosophy.") Maxeiner, supra, at n.44 (citing to Wolfgang Fikentscher, 2 Methoden des Rechts 3
(1975)). It is interesting to note in the context of categorizing process as the hallmark of the common law, in
contradistinction to the civil law, that the German legal philosopher, Jtrgen Habermas, advocates the primacy
of process in his theory of communicative action. See generally Jorgen Habermas, A Theory of
Communicative Action (1984).
" See Bernard S. Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory 3 (1997) (1995); Vivian Grosswald Curran,
Semiotics and Law, in Hi-Fives: A Trip to Semiotics 219 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1998). Cf. Wittgenstein's
conclusion that "[g]ramrnmar tells us what kind of object anything is." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations para. 373 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1967), quoted in Sabina Lovibond, Realism and
Imagination in Ethics 26 (1983).
s1 The case law method also serves to develop the independence ofthinking necessary for common-law
lawyers to play a primordial role in law creation. According to Learned Hand, a preeminent American judge,
"the strongest element of the case system [of legal education] ... was 'a method which offers to the student a
chance to do his own thinking, in preference to [teachers] working out his own conclusions for him.'" Gerald
Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 46 (1994), quoting Learned Hand, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 65, 66
(1894). For a discussion of the initial reception in the United States to the case law method of instruction,
introduced by Harvard Law School's Dean Langdell, see id at 46-47. See also Paul D. Carrington, Moths to
the Light: The Dubious Attractions of American Law, in Htbner & Ebke, supra note 43, at 135 ("The case law
method of instruction ... provided a form ofintellectual rigor uniquely relevant to the form taken by American
law.")
52 Dawson, supra note 12, at 73. Another tradition that served to hone the common law's focus on both
the concretely factual and the procedural was the original need for common-law complaints to meet the
strictures of writs, a process that increasingly gave rise to legal fictions, but that always necessitated intensive
scrutiny, and potentially also a recasting, of the facts alleged by the plaintiff. Vestiges of this system have
survived in both England and the United States. More importantly, the writ system's measurement of a case's
validity and viability in terms of the extent to which its facts came within the purview of specific writs,
constituted an important influence in privileging the factual and the procedural in the common law's processes
and conceptualizations of law.
13 Merryman, supra note 45, at 872.
Id. at 873. Accord, Arthur Taylor von Mehren, The Judicial Process in the United States and
l4
Germany: A Comparative Analysis, in I Festschrift fir Ernst Rabel 77 (1954) ("Legal education in the United
States, conducted by the case method ... directs attention at a very formative stage in the lawyer's career
towards the functional nature of the judicial process.'); Scalia, supra note 48, at 5.
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the field., 5 5 By contrast, "[i]n the civil law world, the educational focus is primarily on
substance; method is deemphasized. '' 6 Accordingly, in The Bramble Bush, Karl
Llewellyn advised his students at Columbia University as follows: "You must read each
substantive course, so to speak, through the spectacles of procedure. For what
substantive law says should be means nothing except in terms of what procedure says
that you can make real.""
Justice Frankfurter also recognized the role of procedure as primordial to the
common law: "[Tihe history of the Supreme Court, as of the Common Law, derives
meaning to no small degree from the cumulative details which define the scope of its
business, and theforms and methods o/performing it - the Court 'sprocedure, in the
comprehensive meaning of the term."8 This does not mean that the accumulation of
details does not produce a body of principles, as Richard Posner suggests, but it means
that the formation of law, whether of case rules or established principles, is derived
from the common law's focus on the particular, and this tradition underlies the
common-law psyche, its conception of law. 9
The common law's focus on the procedural has deep historical roots. Describing
the development of the common law from twelfth-century England, James Herget notes
that, "[flor the early English barristers the law consisted of discrete sets of rules and
61
6°
arguments related to specific procedural devices." In Between Facts and Norms,
Jtirgen Habermas, steeped in the common-law theoretical legal analysis of Dworkin,
Rawls, Ely, Sunstein, Ackerman, Michelman and Hart, among others, 62 proposes what
he presents as a new legal paradigm based on procedure:
I intend to sharpen the contours of a third legal paradigm, which provides a specific
interpretation of the other two and goes beyond them. I start with the assumption that
the legal systems emerging at the end of the twentieth century in mass welfare-state
democracies are appropriately understood in proceduralist terms.63
Habermas turns to procedure as to a universal alternative to, or substitute for, substance,
seeing in procedure a solution to the problem that differing legal cultures and societies,
and differing sub-populations within modem democracies, are likely never to be able to
harmonize on a substantive level.
In this I believe Habermas to be mistaken. Not only is the procedure of each society
interpreted differently, as Habermas recognizes,64 but the procedure of each society also
33Posner, supra note 47, at 173-74.
Merryman, supra note 45, at 871.
Llewellyn, supra note 41, at 9. For the influence of German Romanticism on Llewellyn and on the
UCC, see James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources
for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L. J.156 (1987). Cf. by contrast the published version of Italian
56

"

Supreme Court decisions: "Procedural features of the specific case are not included." Michele Taruffo &
Massimo La Tone, Italian Precedent inInterpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 141, 150 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).
'a Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 5, at vi (emphasis added).
39 See Posner, supra note 47, at 171-97.
60 Herget, supra note 11, at 112. Accord, Dawson, supra note 12, at 56.
61 See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 11.
62 See

id.and notes therein.

63 Habermas,

Between Facts and Norms, supra note I1,
at 195. See also id. at 296 ("Our reflections
from the standpoint of legal theory revealed that the central element of the democratic process resides in the

procedure of deliberative politics.")
64 See id.at 311.
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is different in its most fundamental sense, and precisely because it is not capable of
demarcation or isolation from substance. A blending of procedure and substance, a

blending certainly incomplete, ineffable and ultimately elusive to exact definition,
characterizes each legal culture as well as the larger society, such that procedure is not
an alternative to substance. 6 5 Rather, one imbues the other with its presence, each

marking the other with its traces. Procedure and substance, although not equivalent,
nevertheless ultimately are inseparable, and will be misunderstood if analyzed as
distinct.66 The struggle to separate procedure from substance
is itself a complex
67
phenomenon, and is not unique to the field of legal analysis.

My view is closer to that of Stuart Hampshire, inasmuch as he has signaled the
local and traditional bases of procedure." Although more pessimistic than Habermas,
Hampshire nevertheless believes that there is one universal, human-wide rule of
procedure on which an edifice of justice may be constructed or at least attempted:
namely, "that contrary claims [must be] heard." 9 I differ from Hampshire, however, in
that I suspect he too is overly optimistic. The divergences among procedures which he
himself signals seem to me likely to preclude any effectively reliable uniformity or

universality in the concept of hearings. Moreover, as Isaiah Berlin has demonstrated, the
idea that conflicting sides deserve an impartial
hearing, far from being universal, is a
70
culturally and historically contingent value.
63 It is perhaps of interest in this context to reflect on the evolution ofjudicial interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause in the United States Constitution. What began as judicial
examination of procedure transmogrified into substantive judicial scrutiny. See Gunther, supra note 51, at
119-23 for a discussion ofthis issue, including the following relevant cases: Allgeyerv. State ofLa., 165 U.S.
578 (1897); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adairv. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Muller v. State of
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); and Hart, supra note 49, at 124-25, including an additional case reference, with
respect to the Fifth Amendment's expanded interpretation from the procedural to the substantive, to Adkins v.
Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). More generally, for the view that
substance and procedure exist in a mutually influential and dependent dynamic, see Mirjan Damalka,
Evidence Law Adrift (1997).
66 See Harry M. Flechtner, The U.N. Sales Convention (CISG) and MCC. Marble Ceramic Center, Inc.
v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.P.A.: The Eleventh Circuit Weighs in on Interpretation, Subjective Intent,
Procedural Limits to the Convention's Scope, and the Parol Evidence Rule, 18 Journal of Law and Commerce
259,284-86 (1999) (suggesting through the example of market price damages that legal rules often can be
characterized as either substantive or procedural). The interdependence of form and substance emerges clearly
in literature, where the more the two are melded, the greater the work of art. Habermas' treatment of
procedure as distinct from substance may also be related to his overall, Socratic-style focus on debate as the
crucial sine qua non of democratic society. Cf. Maher, supra note 16, at 243 (noting "glaring injustices caused
by differing national procedural rules" in the European Union Member States). But see Pierre Roseren,
Review by French Courts of the Conformity of National Provisions with Community law, in Constitutional
Adjudication in European Community Law: Essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T.F. O'Higgins 268 (Deirdre
Curtin & David O'Keeffe eds., 1992) (National rules of procedure are not implemented so as to thwart
Community law).
67The mathematician Abraham Robinson's invention of infinitesimals within the field of calculus
engendered a dispute as to whether the nature of his invention was of new substantive objects or, rather, of
new procedures to facilitate deductive reasoning. See Robert Kaplan, The Nothing That Is: ANatural History
of Zero 173 (1999).
" Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict 17-18, 97 (2000).
69 Id. at 17.
70 See Berlin, Roots of Romanticism, supra note 21, at 9-13. Hampshire's corollary point is that all
humans are familiar with the practice of according a hearing to conflicting sides because all humans
experience inner conflicts. See Hampshire, supra note 68. The idea is arresting, but its validity would depend
on human-wide experience in the consciousweighing of conflicting sides to issues, such that the practice
would be able to form a basis for extrapolation and application to courts of law and other adjudicative bodies.
If in fact the rational weighing of pros and cons is undertaken either unconsciously, or simply isnotahuman-
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The common law's focus on the procedural, the pervasive importance of the
procedural in the common law, merely render more visible the dynamic of fusion that
characterizes substance and procedure in the civil-law legal systems as well, but often
imperceptibly. In the intertwining of the threads of substance and procedure, the strands
of procedure are more prominent and obtrusive in common-law legal systems than they
are in civil-law legal systems. Common-law legal cultures have a stronger flavor of the
procedural in their aftertaste, a starker, more vivid tint of it in their coloring.
Perhaps it is because the overlap and connections between procedure and substance
in the Continental European systems are not always visible that Habermas approaches
procedure as a separable element that can be valorized independently of, and in
contradistinction to, substance, so that, following his plan, it can be reinfused into the
realm of the substantive, elevated by conscious will to the level of a substantive value,
and even to primacy among substantive values.' In my view, the differing roles of
procedure in the civil and common-law systems are sufficiently embedded in their
respective legal cultures as to make a change of stature for procedure in civil-law legal
culture likely either to be profoundly upsetting to substantive civil-law legal tenets, or
else likely to overlook much of what might be categorized as procedural. As a result,
what will be wrested for refashioning into the newly elevated category will be incapable
of achieving Habermas' goal of creating a uniform turf of procedure on which disparate
cultures and subpopulations can meet and which can produce enduring harmonious
coexistence. 72
By way of contrast to the prominence of the procedural in common-law legal
culture, Continental European legal culture traditionally has focused on a less flexible
hierarchy of legal authority, on what Professor Thomas Fleiner refers to as a
"hierarchical order of legal norms."" According to Professor Fleiner, civil-law legal
culture de-emphasizes procedure: "It is not the procedure which guaranties legitimacy,
74
the higher instance which is close to the roots ofjustice."
good law and justice, but ...
The civil-law focus on that "higher instance" of authority, once a king who ruled by

wide habit, Hampshire's theory would be invalid. See also Hart's criticism of Dworkin ("the procedural
fairness of a voting system or utilitarian argument which weighs votes and preferences equally is no guarantee

that all the requirements of fairness will be met in the actual working of the system in given social
conditions"). Hart, supra note 49, at 218. Hart's criticism of Dworkin applies in part to Habermas and in part
to Hampshire as well, particularly (with respect to Habermas) Hart's concern with the possibility that large
segments of populations may be "impervious to [rational] argument," id., and (applicable to both Habermas
and Hampshire) noting more specifically that "the moral unacceptability of the results in such cases is not
traceable to the inherent vice of the decision procedure ... ").
n See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 11.
72 Habermas' underlying premise, which I also find difficult to accept, is that there are human-wide
common conventions of communication. See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 11, at19;
JUrgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking 138 (William Mark Hohengarten trans., 1992), quoted in
George H. Taylor, Metaphor as the Origin of Meaning: The Challenge of Ricceur's Hermeneutics (1998)
(manuscript on file with author).
7 Thomas Fleiner, Continental European Public Law in the Tradition of Hobbes and Napoleon,"
Address at the Georgetown Law Center Comparative Constitutional Law Conference (Sept. 17, 1999)
(manuscript on file with author).
'4Id.at 2. Accord Peter G. Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: A Historical Interpretation, 46 La.
L. Rev. 241,249 (1985). Accordingly, the powerful French Parlements in pre-Revolutionary times "claimed
from the outset to have inherited the rights of the medieval ruler to decide according to equity." Vernon
Valentine Palmer, From Embrace to Banishment: A Study of Judicial Equity in France, 47 Am. J.Comp. L.
277,282 (1999). This de-emphasis of procedure in civil-law legal cultures may explain Habermas's ideathat
it is separable from substance and consists of a terrain in which everyone can agree.
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divine right, and more recently a legislature empowered by the State's most organic
law, its Constitution, to pass laws, has had as a consequence, according to Professor
Fleiner, that civil-law states have "a different understanding
of democracy as legitimacy
75
of the legislature and not as legitimacy of the courts.
Perhaps the most frequently expressed complaint on the part of beginning law
students in the United States isthat their professors don't tell them what the law is.This
discomfort stems from their not yet having "un-leamed" their still civil-law mentality,
imported from the domain of their prior life experience and prior intellectual training,
from their still equating law with immutable governing principles that, once learned,
should, they believe, serve to solve and resolve all questions of law. They enter law
school committed to the concept that law school will teach them the discrete guiding
principles that resolve all legal disputes. This conception of law does not tally with the
common law, however. Common-law legal education in the United States thus begins a
process of teaching law students to "un-learn" this approach when thinking of legal
issues, to re-conceptualize law as a process of argumentation, as a body of cases which
form a point of departure for reasoning by analogy and distinction.
Even where a statute governs an issue, such that one might think that deductive
reasoning is required, common-law reasoning retains the need for analogizing. As
Justice Frankfurter put it, "the final rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of
judgment, 76 and "[w]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the
person who first wrote and spoke them."" In keeping with Justice Frankfurter's insight
that statutes have meaning through court interpretations, we can see how, in commonlaw systems, statutes too are subject to reasoning by analogy: the courts will resolve a
statutory issue by analogizing to the precedents that involved the same statutory
provision and a similar legal issue.
Indeed, practicing lawyers know that even when a statute is new, such that there are
no precedents to analogize to the pending case's facts and issues, judges in the United
7

Fleiner, supra note 73, at 2. Cf. The comment of Portalis, drafter of the Code NapoIdon: "Nous

raisonnons comme si les ligislateurs itaient des Diew; et comme si lesjuges n taient meme pas des

hoimnes. "("We reason as though the legislators were Gods and as though the judges were not even men."),
quoted in Palmer, supra note 74, at 277. For English translations of Portalis, see M. Shael Herman, Excerpts
from a Discourse on the Code Napoleon by Portalis and Case Law and Doctrine by A. Esmein, 18 Loy. L.
Rev. 23,24-28 (1972); and Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 762,767-74
(1969) [hereinafter Portalis Excerpts].
76 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Readings of Statutes, 47 Colum. L.Rev. 527, 532
(1947)(referring with approval to Holmes). I owe the discovery of this article to the reference inScalia, supra
note 48, at 23. Accord, John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 164 (1909), quoting 0.
Bulow, Gesetz und Richteramt 6-7 (Dunker & Humblot eds., 1885), quoted in James E. Herget & Stephen
Wallace, The German Free Law Movement As the Source ofAmerican Realism, 73 Va L. Rev. 399,426-27
(1987) ("the power of [Case] Law is stronger than the power of legislation, a legal judgment maintains itself
even if it contradicts a statute. Not by its legislative, but by its judicial determinations, the law-regulating
power of the State speaks its last word.")
77 Frankfurter, supra note 76, at 533, quoting Gray, supra note 76, at 102, 125, 172 (2d ed., 1921). For a
similar view as to the analogical reasoning used when courts apply the rules, or norms, of precedents, see
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 96. The right of the common-law judge to reject statutes as invalid because
contrary to natural law may be the origin of common-law constitutional review. See Roscoe Pound, Common
Law and Legislation. 21 Harv. L. Rev.383,389-91 (1908). See Lon Fuller, The Law inQuest of Itself4O-41
(1940) ("The judge makes law even when he states that he is refusing to make it ... ."). For a discussion of
Gray's views on the subject, see William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 21-22
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson eds.,1973).
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States will entertain arguments based on what is called "foreign law:" i.e., the law of
another state. Foreign law in principle has an extremely low precedential value, but
United States judges are so loath to apply any legal norm, even one statutorily codified,
unless it is embedded in a factual context, and can be understood by analogizing the
facts of the case at bar to facts of prior cases, that, for practical purposes, the "foreign
law" of other states takes a giant leap in precedential stature where "foreign" case law
alone can offer a history of judicial decisions of cases governed by similarly worded
statutes.7"
Common-law judges' skill and habit are in reasoning by analogy and distinction
between a particular confluence of factual circumstances and legal issues, to an
accumulated body of arguably similar and dissimilar prior cases. Consequently,
statutory norms are lain on a Procrustean bed of precedents, even when they have never
yet been subject to adjudication in the relevant jurisdiction. Accordingly, common-law
lawyers arguing cases governed by statutory authority will argue based on analogies to,
and distinctions from, precedents. The significance of the common law thus resides in
the case law, even where the common-law court is applying a statute, and even where
the statute is new.
In his criticism of American legal realism, Hermann Kantorowicz made some
excellent arguments. He may not have apprized the common-law situation correctly,
however, when he protested, "[b]ut every statute was once a new statute, 79 contesting
the American legal realist view that judicial opinions always dominate legislation.
Kantorowicz argued that statutes trump case law in common-law legal systems at the
very least when a governing statute is newly enacted, because even common-law judges
must apply new statutes without assistance from precedents, inscribing their statutory
interpretation and application on a tabularasa.80 Despite appearances to the contrary,
however, even when U.S. judges are applying new statutes, they generally still are
operating defacto, if not de jure, under stare decisis.
The reason for this is not that common-law judges intend to flout legislative
supremacy, but, rather, that they naturally gravitate to case law, in a phenomenon
reminiscent of the regressions to the mean typically observed in many other fields. Nor
do common-law judges' reversions to the case law of other jurisdictions, when no
precedents exist within their own jurisdictions, proceed from abstract common-law
interpretive theory. They proceed, rather, from the common-law judge's conception of
legal analysis as inseparable from the detailed analogizing that precedents enable, and
78 See, e.g., Matter of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1993) (New York state court
adjudicated a statutory construction issue of first impression under New York state statute by analogizing to
Minnesota state case law construing identical term in a Minnesota state statute); State v. McDonald, 352 P.2d
343, 351 (Ariz. 1960) ("Although we are not bound to follow the [case law] interpretation placed on a statute
by a state from which our statute was adopted, it is persuasive").
79Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 Yale L. J.1240, 1251 (1934).

Professor Merryman notes that the American legal realists were not comparatists. See John Henry Merryman,
Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 Hastings Int'l &Comp. L.Rev. 771, 781 (1998). This may go along way
towards explaining the extent to which American legal realism altered, perhaps unintentionally, the German
sources of its inspiration, resulting in the features of American legal realism with which Kantorowicz

disagreed, many of which seem attributable to me to underlying differences between common and civil-law
perceptions. For a British echo of Kantorowicz's criticism ofAmerican legal realism, see Hart, supra note 49,
at 128. At least one line in Hart's essay, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, id. at 123,131, even is reminiscent of Kantorowicz's title; namely, Hart's query, "But in

what did the realism of the Realists consist?"

goSee Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79.
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that statutory interpretation precludes if conducted in a factual vacuum, as when it is
decontextualized by the absence of prior case law.
This need for precedential analogy is so strong that judges will entertain foreign
cases as persuasive authority for purposes of determining the application of a new
statute even when the foreign precedents were adjudicated pursuant to merely similarly
worded statutes, rather than to identically worded statutes.8' Indeed, as Justice Cardozo
observed, the fact that an applicable norm is of statutory provenance does not alter the
process of judicial reasoning: "[T]he work of deciding cases in accordance with
precedents that fit them is a process similar in its nature to that of deciding in
accordance with a statute. It is a process of search, comparison, and little more. '8 2 Judge
Posner concurs: "[R]easoning by analogy [is] the standard judicial technique for dealing
with novelty - [i.e., reasoning] from existing cases."8 3 H.L. A. Hart similarly noted that,
"when deciding cases left unregulated by the existing law ... [courts] proceed ... by
analogy .... ,84 Judge Posner further writes that there is judicial "antipathy to legal
novelty because a genuinely new case is not continuous with precedent... 85
Thus, where Habermas comments that "[j]udges decide actual cases within the
horizon of a present future," 160ne might note that the common-law judge decides the
normative import even of a brand new statute by drawing from its past incarnations in
cases, however tenuously analogous, because the common-law judge etches into a
present future by means of preexisting, judicially created cues. Indeed, in a passage that
criticizes judicial power over statutory legislation in the United States, Roscoe Pound
complained that, when judges decide statutes, they do so in accordance with case law,
and they ultimately contort and constrict legislative enactments to comply with existing
common law, despite the putative domination of statutes over case law:
The proposition that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed
SI See.eg., Murray v. McCann, 658 A.2d 404,442 Pa. Super. 30 (1995) (lower state court did not err in
following case law of Michigan where the Pennsylvania statute it was interpreting had been inspired by a
similar Michigan statute); State of New Jersey v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 225 (N.J. 1987) ("Despite the
differences in language, cases under New Jersey's (relevant statutory provision] and under the Model Penal
Code's form share common problems of definition and application as well as common goals. As is apparent
from the discussion that follows, attempts by the judiciary to clarify and make those provisions
constitutionally definite significantly displace the actual language of the statutes. The similarity of those
clarifications makes cases decided under one form ofthe statute [i.e., in one state] persuasive in cases decided
under another form [i.e., in another state]").
u Cardozo, supra note 44, at 20. Accord, John W. Salmond, Introduction, in The Science of Legal
Method lxxxii (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B. Register trans., 1969) (1917). See also Sunstein, supra note 5, at
43 ("Even rule interpretation has a large element of case analysis.") Cf. Gustav Radbruch's somewhat
idealized description of statutes' being incorporated into a unified, seamless web of case law in the English
legal system. Radbruch, supra note 11, at 28. ("Die Statutes werden... bald umsponnen von einem dichten
Gewebe maflgeblicher Preijudizenund mit ihm untrennbarhineinverwoben in das einheitliche Gewebe des
Common Law.") In terms of democratic theory, Guy Scoffoni argues that the ultimate "last word" in the
United States resides with the people, not the judiciary, because of the people's power to amend the
Constitution and thereby modify the judges' referential bases. See Guy Scoffoni, La Idgitimitt du juge

constitutionnel en droit compard: Les enseignements de l'expdrience amdricaine, 2 Revue intemationale de
droit compard 243, 265 (1999) ( "Le pouvoir de derniermot peut ainsirevenirau peuple chaquefoisque
nicessaire,au moyen d'une modificationpar le constituant,des bases de refirence dujuge.'3

g' Posner, supra note 47, at 13.

" Hart, supra note 49, at 7.
Posner, supra note 47, at 76. Posner describes the legal practitioner as having a similar "aversion to
any but incremental changes." Id. at 83.
"6 Habermas, Postmetaphysica Thinking, supra note 72, at 198.
'5
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strictly ...
assumes that legislation is something to be deprecated. As no statute of any
consequence dealing with any relation of private law can be anything but in derogation
of the common law, ... [one] must always face the situation that the legislative act ...
will find no sympathy in those who apply it, will be 8construed
strictly, and will be made
7
to interfere with the status quo as little as possible.

Pound's point continues to remain relevant in a context of judicial recognition of
statutory supremacy, because the common-law courts, even when doing their utmost to
effectuate statutory norms, can do so only by way of analyzing precedents, thus
perpetuating the triumph of precedents, and certainly of precedential reasoning. One
thinks in this context also of the "Aristotelian insight that no rule is able to regulate its
own application."88
The common-law legal systems, unlike their civil-law counterparts, have developed
a highly sophisticated methodology for interpreting case law, but they have no
methodology of comparable sophistication, depth or refinement to civil-law
methodology in statutory interpretation. The common law's comparatively primitive
approach to statutory interpretation is reflected in and by an ongoing debate surrounding
even the most fundamental and primary aspects of statutory interpretation. 89 Conversely,
the civil-law systems, which have honed their methodology of statutory interpretation to
a high level of refinement, are at a comparatively primitive stage in terms of case law
methodology. The active and ongoing nature of the debate about case law interpretation
in civil-law legal cultures reflects the more tentative methodological status of case law
interpretive theory in the civil-law world, especially in comparison to civil-law theory
concerning statutory interpretation." °
The common law is a law of almost boundless potential for both judge and lawyer,
but the measure of its potential, the measure of the opportunities for ingenious
creativity, is also the measure of its inherent uncertainty, fluidity and capacity for
transformation. In these attributes, the common law corresponds to the ethos of
Romanticism. Romanticism as a movement has been defined in endless, often mutually
contradictory ways. Yet, as Henry Hardy, editor of The Roots ofRomanticism, Isaiah
Berlin's posthumous book, and of other Berlin works, suggested, "[t]o say of someone
that he is a romantic thinker is not to say nothing." 91 Berlin himself was the first to
observe that "[tihe word 'romanticism' is vague, and like most terms of its kind, tends
to be too general to be of use." 92 Yet use it he did, because

s7Pound, supra note 77, at 387 (1908). Accord, Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour
Day, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495 (1908). See Pound, supra note 77, at 388, for acontrast with Roman law tradition.
Itshould be noted that the propriety of having judges make law remains a matter of heated debate in the
United States. See Scalia, supra note 48; and Zeppos, supra note 12. Cf. Scoffini, supra note 82, at 264 ("'La
Constitution appartient aupeuple, non aujuge' .... "T

8 Habermnas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, supra note 72, at 199.
9 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 77; Kent Greenawalt, Legislation: Statutory Interpretation: 20 Questions
(1999); Eisenberg, supra note 41. For references to recent scholarly work on statutory interpretation in the
United States, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 1-4, and citations
therein (2000).
' See Baudenbacher, supra note 6, at 349 ("In recent years there have been considerable efforts inthe
literature to develop a doctrine of precedent in civil law.").
" Berlin, supra note 4, at xii. For an excellent discussion of the problem of terminology in historical
analysis, see Jerome Frank, Fate and Freedom (1953) (Simon & Schuster eds., 1945), especially Twistory, at
18-27. Like Henry Hardy, Frank concludes that even "leaky words" are not "entirely valueless." Id. at 26.
92The Essence of European Romanticism, in Berlin, Power of Ideas, supra note 4, at 200.
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during the period that begins in the late Renaissance and ends with the full development
of industrial capitalism, a vast transformation of ideas, language, attitudes, ways of
thinking and acting took place. Any student of the eighteenth century is bound to notice
that towards its end the beliefs of two millennia were, if not destroyed, at any rate
challenged on an ever-widening scale .... 93
Over the course of his life's work, Isaiah Berlin himself gave what is probably the
most nuanced, subtle and penetrating rendition of both Romanticism and the
Enlightenment in existence in the English language. One sees through Berlin's portrayal
and commentary the fissures Romanticism wrought in the masonry of the
Enlightenment, as well as the rich diversity in thoughts that has influenced and enriched
Romanticism and the Enlightenment, and the peripatetic paths those influences followed
through the history of ideas.
Describing the young Goethe in his early Romantic period, Berlin cites Hamann as
a major influence on Goethe's Romantic
reaction [against] ... the tendency on the part of the French [Enlightenment] to
generalise, to classify, to pin down, to arrange in albums, try to produce some kind of
rational ordering of human experience, leaving out the dlan vital, the flow, the
individuality, the desire to create, the desire, even, to struggle, that element in human
beings which produced a creative clash of opinion between people of different views,
instead of that dead harmony
and peace which, according to Hamann and his followers,
94
the French were after.

Lest one think that the capacity to generalize and classify are banal because they are
human universals, it is of interest to note that, about five millennia ago, the Sumerians
developed a complex society, including a bicameral Assembly which had decisionmaking, but not necessarily legislative power, and numerous written laws, yet were
incapable of what Samuel Kramer, the eminent Sumeriologist who devoted much of his
life to decoding and translating Sumerian texts, called "the methodological tool of
comprehensive generalization." 95 According to Professor Kramer, "[t]he Sumerians
96
compiled numerous law codes ... but nowhere is there a statement of legal theory."
Berlin proceeds from Hamann, whom he characterizes as "the first person to
declare war on the Enlightenment", to discuss Herder, one of the fathers of
Romanticism. 97 Berlin focuses on Herder's view that the particular is significant as the
expression of the general. 9 In this we see an important attribute that Romanticism
9
9

Id. at 201.

96

Id.

Id. at 46. For a discussion of Hamann's contributions to Romanticism, see Johann Georg Hamann, in
Berlin, supra note 37, at 271-75. On the lack of systematization typical ofthe common law, see infra note 139.
" Samuel Noah Kramer, From the Tablets of Sumer Twenty-Five Firsts of Man's Recorded History 33
(1956).
97 Berlin, supra note 37.

9 See id. at 58. Berlin's rendition of Herder's thought is in my opinion without comparison. See Isaiah
Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas (1976); J.G. Herder, in Isaiah Berlin, The First
and the Last 42-45 (1999). Also very illuminating and thought-provoking is Charles Taylor's presentation of
Herder in Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments 79-99 (1997). For an application of Herder's views in the
context of comparative law, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Herder and the Holocaust: A Debate about
Difference and Determinism in the Context of Comparative Law, in The Holocaust's Ghost: Writings on Arl,
Politics, Law, Education (F. C. DeCoste & Bernard Schwartz eds., 2000). But see Thomas D. Barton,
Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment Culture, 47 Emory L.J. 163 (1988) (linking
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shares with the common law. As we noted above, it is from the particular case, from
each decision of each court, that the common law is derived. The common law's focus
on the particular tallies with Romanticism's focus on "the irreducible variety of human
self-expression .... ,99, and its rejection of purely scientific aspirations and methodology:
"We have recourse to purely scientific methods of displacement only when
communication breaks down .... 00
The common law espouses Vico's method of "imaginative insight," 101 and
Herder's idea of empathy through immersion in the "other's" world and standards, what
02
he called "sich einfiahlen,"'1
for common-law courts assess legal issues in the context
of the parties, the parties' lives, and of the parties' experiences as situated in the
particular society in which they live. Accordingly, Von Mehren describes United States
case law as "a vast collection of human experience."'' 0 3 By contrast, he views German
case law, and describes its self-understanding, "less as a collection of human experience
and judicial experimentation than ...judicialapplicationsof the written law."' 104
In her recent book, Jutta Limbach, a former law professor who currently serves as a
judge on Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, describes the German judicial
decision's failure to attend to the concrete facts of cases, noting specifically that the first
pages of German judicial decisions refer neither to the defendants nor to their particular
offenses, and that the remainder of court opinions, although generally lengthy, pays
scant attention to the particulars that transpired. 0 5 According to Limbach, German
judicial decisions' references to the concrete particulars of cases consist of no more than
"isolated/scattered indications" ("eingestreuten Hinweise").106
The civil-law judicial tradition of neglecting facts in court decisions traditionally
has been still more pronounced in French court decisions than in German ones, although
particularization in law to Enlightenment individuation, but contrasting the Enlightenment only to a
modernism he calls "post-Enlightenment," and not discussing Romanticism).
" Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History ofIdeas 61 (Henry Hardy
ed., 1992) (1959).
100Id. In this passage, Berlin is explaining the thought of Vico as a generative force in Romanticism.
'01Id. at 62. For asuperb account of Vico's thought and ties with Romanticism, see Berlin, Vico and
Herder, supra note 97.
102Johann Gottfiied von Herder, 5 Slimtliche Werke 502 (Bernhard Suphan ed., 1877-1913).
103Von Mehren, supra note 54, at 79. For Learned Hand's scrupulous attention to facts in hisjudicial
decision-making, not just while atrial court districtjudge, but also as an appellate judge, see Gunther, supra
note 5 1,at 291 ("whatever the subject - patents and copyrights, maritime law, bankruptcy, corporate and
commercial law, citizenship and aliens' deportation, criminal law, problems of evidence and jurisdiction Hand unflaggingly sought to get to the bottom of the facts ... He would skillfully dissect and explain the
technical data about acomplex mechanical or chemical patent, for example, or, as if he were an experienced
seafarer, the hows and whys of aship collision." ) See also id. at 311 (discussing Hand's "intense absorption
in the factual
'04Von Mehren, supra note 54, at 79 (emphasis added).
105Jutta Limbach, Im Namen des Volkes: Macht und Verantwortung der Richter 30 (1999) ("Denn die
RichterbetreibenGeschichtsschreibung in ihrem Sinne, nichtaberRechsanwendungin einem konkreten Fall.
Aufden ersten Seiten des Urteils ist weder von den Angekiagien noch von den ihnen vorgeworfenen Vergehen
die Rede. Und auch auf den folgenden zahireichen Seiten wird ihnen nur gelegentlich Aufmerksamkeit

zuteil.") In asimilar vein, German legal theorists generally pay scant attention to case law. See Herget, supra
note I1, at 12 (1996). Although German case law refers to precedents, the references tend to be cursory. See
Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 24 (1997).
'06 Id. at 31. Accord, Radbruch, supra note 11, at 35. ("Derenglische Richter ist an dem Sachverhalt,
welcher der Eintscheidungzugrundeliegi, viel weitergehend interessiert als der deutsche Richter.") Cf James

Herget's reference to "German tradition [as] emphasiz[ing] an ... abstract legal order ... ,"Herget, supra note
11, at29.
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the French judiciary also is sparing in its discussion of law, leaving much of the
significance of its decisions to be explained by la doctrine, scholarly commentary.
Dawson aptly described the French judicial opinion as noteworthy for "extreme
parsimony" in its references to facts.107 The great paradox embedded in French judicial
discourse is that, on the one hand, it must include the court's reasoning or motivations,
in order to enable the public to prevent the judiciary from sliding into any semblance of
the pre-Revolutionary corruption, arrogance and arbitrariness that had aroused the
public's antipathy against France's judges. On the other hand, however, the very
humility that France's judiciary adopted after 1789, in its zeal to demonstrate its
republican loyalty, also acts as a restraint against judicial engagement in lengthy
discussion of any kind, for fear that such a practice might look discomfitingly similar to
a judicial usurpation of a formative role in law, rather than a passive application of
legislative intent. 108
The Italian tradition of massime perhaps represents the epitome of the civil-law
tradition of inattention to facts. According to Professors Taruffo and La Torre, decisions
of Italy's Court of Cassation generally are not published in full. 1° Rather, the published
versions of Italian supreme court cases recast the cases as abstract propositions of law.
Thus, the potential influence of a precedent on future cases is adapted to a framework of
deductive reasoning from normative propositions:
In Italy there is a rather peculiar institution that was created in 1941 and is annexed to
the Corte di Cassazione. It is called the Ufficio del Massimario and is composed of
judges. Its main function is to analyze all the judgments delivered by the court inorder
to extract from them the so-called massima. This is a short statement (usually five to ten
lines) concerning the legal rule that has been used in the decision considered: it is stated
in very general terms, usually without any express referenceto the facts ofthe specific
case, and it takes into account only the legal side of the decision." 0
Italy's decontextualization of its Corte di Cassazione decisions is of particular
significance because, according to Professors Taruffo and La Torre, the Corte di
Cassazioneis distinguished from other courts by the unusually strong precedential value
107

Dawson, supra note 12, at 411. It should be noted that France has been edging away from its aversion
to reporting facts and analysis in court decisions. See Lyndell V. Prott, A Change of Style in French Appellate
Judgments, 7 Etudes de logique juridique 51 (1978), reprinted in part in Mary Ann Glendon et al.,
Comparative Legal Traditions 214-17 (1994). See also Baudenbacher, supra note 6, at 352-53 (review of
judicial treatment of facts in France, Germany and Italy).
'08On the post-Revolutionary French judiciary as a reaction against common excesses by judges before
1789, see Dawson, supra note 12, at 374-431; John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: the French and
German Judiciaries, 61 S.Cal. L.Rev. 1865,1873 (1988). Forthe negative consequences to France's judiciary
ofFrench post-Revolutionary anti-judicial zeal, see John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 Am. J.
Comp.L. 109, 116 (1996). All groups in French legal life traditionally have agreed on the primacy of the
legislature, including the influential legal scholars: "The academic profession inFrance ...
admitted only one
proper subject for its attention - the text of the law. It was there that one could discover the only authentic
source of law, the will of'the legislator.'" Dawson, supra note 12, at 393. Professor Schwarz-Liebermann von
Wahlendorf quotes the great French theorist, Francois Gny, as saying that the French judges' obedience to

the sovereign takes the form of their extracting from the law that which everyone well knows is not within it
("tirant... 'de la loi
ce dont tout le monde sailt que cen 'estpasdedans").Hans-Albrecht Schwarz-Liebermann
von Wahlendorf, Le juge lgislateur: I'approche anglaise, 4 Revue intemationale de droit compard 1109, 1110
(1999).

109
Michele Taruffo &Massimo La Torre, Precedent inItaly, in Interpreting Precedents: AComparative
Study 141, 148 (D.Neil MacCormick & Robert S.Summers eds., 1997).
"oId.
(emphasis added).
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accorded its decisions."'
Although the common law, by contrast, highlights the concrete facts, the privileged
position the common law grants to the concrete facts and events that transpire in each
case does not mean that common-law courts are adept at capturing and representing the
lived experience. Indeed, the rules of evidence and the variety of factors that determine
the court record may result in a narrative of the case events that ultimately bears no
more than a remote resemblance to the lived experiences of the parties that the court's
rendition purports to recount. 1 2 Yet even a wildly inaccurate common-law court
account of facts reflects the court's attention to the parties in their own environment,
since the court is situating legal significance in the context of what the court has defined
as constituting the lived experience. 113 As Judge Posner put it, referring to the judicial
focus on the particular facts as they unfold at trial, "[f]or the judge, as for Hamlet, the
play's the thing.""14 Thus, where Habermas signals "the tension between facticity and6
validity,""l5 one may describe the common law as a fusion of validity with facticity."
Whether the facts as transmogrified by common-law judicial institutions are close
to, or distant from, the facts as the parties experienced them, the common law remains
focused on concrete, temporal facts, and this is in contrast to the isolated, timeless,
acontextual abstraction of rules that civil-law societies apply to govern the lived
experiences of parties. The common law is a formalized undertaking to institute
Herder's idea of understanding the general by listening to the particular, by listening to
the individual, and by trying to feel as the "other" does in the environment in which the
"other" dwells." 7 A civil code, on the other hand, in the words of Portalis, the chief
drafter of France's Civil Code, "governs everyone; it considers men en masse, never as
individuals ...
Were the situation otherwise, ... [i]ndividual interests would besiege
legislative power; at each instant, they would divert its attention from society's general
interests."""

.. See id. at 151.

.2 Cf. Habermas' discussion of the non-existence of facts outside oftheir representation, in Habermas,
Between Facts and Norms, supra note 11, at 10- 11. To conceive of this problematic at a more abstract level,

see id., at 12 ("Once meanings and thoughts have been hypostasized into ideally existing objects, the relations

among the worlds pose stubborn questions. It is hard to explain how sentence meanings and thoughts reflect
events in the world and how they enter persons' minds. Formal semantics has slaved away in vain on these
questions for decades.")
1 Some civilians see the common law's attention to the concrete as coexisting with an inferior ability to
engage in abstract thinking. See Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendort supra note 108, at 1116 ("une
mentalitM maniantdifficilement 1'abstraction,pour nepasdireplus"). See also Wittgenstein, supra note 1, at

19 (explaining that "[t]he contempt for what seems the less general case in logic springs from the ideathat it is
incomplete").
": Posner, supra note 47, atl30.
1 5Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 11, at xi (inner quotation marks omitted).
"6'Metension between facticity and validity is a central theme of his book, Between Facts and Norms,
and the phrase recurs throughout it. See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 11. Habermas'
corollary focus on "the transition from the internal justification of a verdict that relies on given premises to the
external justification of the premises themselves," id. at 199, is a fascinating issue that, like the tension he
signals between facticity and validity, in my opinion also would have benefitted from a comparative analysis
of results in civil-law versus common-law legal systems.
11
See Herder, supra note 102.
8
' Levasseur, supra note 75, at 772. See Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79,
at 1246 ("the language of the legislator ...
is chiefly related to classes of things, not to individual objects"). But
see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, note 11, at 405, categorizing the "individual," "concrete," and
"personal, as characterizing a liberal paradigm, which he contrasts to opposing characteristics ofa welfarestate legal paradigm. Interestingly, Habermas does not appear to consider the differences separating common-
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In this context, Marianne Constable's work on the history of English jury trials is
instructive.119 Constable notes that the original jury of peers was designed to bring to the

court people who spoke the defendant's language, at a time when the dwellers of
different English counties generally spoke mutually incomprehensible languages.
Language in the Romanticist doctrine is the expression of myriad intangibles that

characterize its speakers' world view and mode of thought, sensation and reaction.' 20 At
a time when England encompassed a multitude of languages, the common-law juror was
the person entitled to assess the significance of the defendant's act, because that act, in
tandem with the defendant's words, came from a world whose distinctive attributes

were comprehensible to the juror who "spoke the same language," a phrase whose
meaning extends beyond the realm of the linguistic.12 ' Thus, historically, the common
law has been receptive institutionally to the particular as the key to unlocking the
meaning of the general.
Perhaps most importantly of all, Romanticism represents a reaction against the
absolute, against the belief that truth is perpetual and of the same form throughout time.
As Berlin puts it, the Romanticist, unlike the Enlightenment thinker, was the
opponent of unhistorical doctrines of natural law, of timeless authority, of the
assumption made by, for example, Spinoza, that any truth could have been discovered
by anyone, at any time, and that it is just bad luck that men have stumbled for so long in
darkness because they did not or could not employ their reason correctly.1 2
law legal cultures from civilian legal cultures to be significant. Throughout Facts and Norms, he tends to refer
to the United States and German legal systems as though either interchangeable or so similar as to render
systemic differences insufficient to warrant comment. It should be remembered that his enterprise is an
examination of political theory rather than a study ofthe legal cultures confronting each other in the European
Union, yet one can only wonder how his analysis might have been affected had he considered and examined
the distinguishing features of the civil-law and common-law legal cultures, both of which he discusses at
length in an undifferentiated manner.
"9 See Marianne Constable, The Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury and Changing Conceptions of
Citizenship, Law, and Knowledge 112-27 (1991).
' Herder and Humboldt were among the most influential Romantic thinkers to capture and convey the
significance of language as the expression of a distinctive world view. Isaiah Berlin believes Johann Georg
Hamann to have been one of the greatest influences on Herder, and describes Hamann's "greatest discovery
[as being] that language and thought are not two processes but one.... Berlin, Age of Enlightenment, supra
note 4, at 273. According to Berlin, "Hamann showed 'how language enters into the non-linguistic elements
of our total experience, and how it modifies our language."' Id. at 274. In our time, the contemporary
philosopher of language, George Steiner, has best captured the multivalent richness and significances of
language. For the particular understanding of law as language, see GroBfeld, The Strength and Weakness of
Comparative Law, supra note 11; Grollfeld, Kernifragen der Rechtsvergleichung, supra note 11. For the
semiotic applications of law as a language or as a system or network of'signs, see, e.g., Jackson, supra note 50.
For an excellent analysis of common-law analytical development in terms of language in common-law legal
reasoning, see Levi, supra note 42. But see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 11, at 11 ("if we
want to explain the peculiar status that distinguishes thoughts from mental representations, we must turn to the
medium of language.") Habermas posits that thoughts can "transcend the individual consciousness," id. at 12,
and have "identical meanings," id. at 11 (emphasis added), at least within a given "language community." Id.
at 11.
121See Constable, supra note 119.
122
Inthis passage, Berlin is explaining the thought of Vico. For more on Vico as a precursor of
Romanticism, see Berlin, Vico and Herder, supra note 97; and Berlin, Power of Ideas, supra note 4, at 53-67.
Lon Fuller makes the opposite comment about naturalism, but his definition of natural law differs from
Berlin's. The contrast Fuller emphasizes is between natural law, which he associates with judicially created
law, and positivistic law, which he associates with legislation. If one keeps Fuller's definitions in mind, his
perspective is compatible with the one expressed in these pages: "[Ihe work of the positivists is essentially
timeless; by abstracting law entirely from its environment and defining it not in terms of its content, but of its
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In contrast to this ahistoricity embedded in the civil-law mentality, Romanticism
and the common law share a profoundly historical nature. The common law is historical
inasmuch as it privileges the present - the particular set of facts surrounding the case at
bar, in the" context of the present, the actual (in both French and German, "actuel" and
"aktuell, respectively, connote both of these concepts), what Llewellyn so aptly calls
"livingfacts,' 123 connected to the current situation of the people who are the parties,
with differences in facts sufficient to allow the court to determine that a prior case is not
a valid "precedent" if it is distinguishable on its facts. But what are the "facts" if not
historically bound, ifnot part of the life context of the parties who arrive in court from
an evolving, ever-changing society? 124 By contrast, as Zippelius put it, in his
a
Introduction to [German] Legal Methodology, "[t]he [civil-law] legal order is ...
articulation
of
their
structure/compilation ["ein Gefige"] of ought-norms. The purpose
25
is not to describe facts, but, rather, to prescribe behavior."'
The common law's heightened use ofjuries also illuminates its historical focus, as
does the common-law concept of the "reasonable person." Jurors are meant to evaluate
parties according to the particular moment and place in which the events at issue
occurred. Similarly, the "reasonable person" is defined in terms of the momentary. It is
a concept that bespeaks of transience, and of grasping significance through the
contemporaneous particulars of time and place. Moreover, the common-law judicial
resolution in England traditionally was rendered orally, rather than in writing, in
contrast to its civil-law counterpart.1 26 As Justice Cardozo put it, "the judge in shaping
the rules of law must heed the mores of his day;"'127 and "the juristic philosophy of the
common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism. Its truth is relative, not

form and sanction, they run no risk of either being outdated or of ever contributing anything to the
development of the law except restraints and inhibitions." Fuller, supra note 77, at 103. Elsewhere, Fuller
states that "[t]o my mind nothing is more preposterous than [the] argument that natural law is inherently
static," id. at 114. To the extent that he is referring to judicial law, as opposed to legislation, my perspective is
similar to Fuller's. For a critical view of Fuller's use of the term "natural law," see Contemporary Uses of the
Phrase "Natural Law," in Frank, supra note 91, at 296. On the German legal tradition's espousal of natural
law, see Whitman, supra note 12, at 47-48 ("As early as 1669 Leibniz had declared that fully halfofRoman
law was 'natural law.' A generation later, natural law had thoroughly established itself in the language of
could chastise lawyers of earlier generations for devoting
German legal arguments; indeed, leading lawyers ...
too much attention to Roman law and too little to natural law.") See also id. ("The only true universal law was

natural law.")
'2 Llewellyn, supra note 41, at 17 (emphasis added).
124See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 3 (emphasis added)

(the common law "consists of the rules that
would be generated at the present moment by application of the institutional principles that govern common
law adjudication.'); ef.id. at 17 ("thejudge may properly employ a norm that isstill emerging inthe society,
if he believes that the norm will soon attract substantial social support, and he is ready to pull back if that
belief proves incorrect.")
12 Reinhard Zippelius, Einfilhrung in die juristische Methodenlehre 12 (1980), quoted in Maxeiner,
ein Gefiuge von Sollensnormen DerSim ArerAussagen
supra note 49, at 114, 117 ("Die Rechtsordnungist...
ist
es nicht,Tatsachen zu beschreiben,sondern Handlungenvor=chreiben.")For a discussion of the Critical
Rationalist school of thought, of which Zippelius is a proponent, see Critical Rationalism, in Herget, supra
of
note 11, at 30-43. Cf. Hans Kelsen's distinction between prescriptive "legal norms" and descriptive "rules
law." Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 45 (1949).
126 See Dawson, supra note 12, at 86. See also Jauffret-Spinosi, supra note 13, at 758 (contrasting the
importance of oral testimony in English legal procedure with the written nature of legal process in the civillaw legal systems).
117
Cardozo, supra note 44, at 104. Similarly, James Whitman links the English legal system's historicity
to its emphasis of custom. See Whitman, supra note 12, at 71-72.
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absolute."' 128 Accordingly, the common law refers to court opinions, a word that
typically refers to
connotes the possibility of valid disagreement, while the civil law
129
decisions: "ddcision" in French and "Entscheidung" in German.
Herder wrote that "[tihere is not a man, a country, a national history, a state which
resemble each other, hence truth, goodness and beauty differ from one another....
This Romanticist view is at the core of common-law legal methodology which seeks
truth and justice for particular individuals in the context of their own events, fashioning
from those events, as the court filters and defimes them, a new legal rule. The commonlaw legal rule or standard, then, derives from the scrutiny of particulars. Its rule cannot
be absolute, however, because its formation is inductive in nature, rather than deductive.
The crafting of the common-law legal standard inductively; i.e., reasoningfirom the
to a legal norm, is a method that dictates a contestable
accumulated body of precedents
3
nature to the outcome.1 '
In other words, induction by definition cannot produce certainty of result, since any
rule reached by means of assembled examples or particulars, no matter how numerous
they may be, is vulnerable to defeat by counterexample. Induction is like thepointilliste
technique evoked by Kilbler.132 One additional dot of color can alter the entirety of the
painting, just as one additional case can alter the accumulated body of case law, because
the new dot of paint, like the new case, jogs a totality that has no cohesion independent
of the particulars. The cohesion of the pointilliste painting is a function of a vision
derived from connecting the dots, and is inseparable from the act of connecting, from
the process of linkage, undertaken by the spectator as interpretant, independently of the
creator. Similarly, the cohesion of the common law is a function of how the individual
cases are united analytically by the interpretants, lawyers and judges, arguing and
deciding future pending cases.
The pointillisteanalogy also illustrates the relativism embedded in the common
law, its logically inconclusive nature, for each spectator creates the painting anew, by
bridging the dots of paint left unconnected by the painter, according to the spectator's
individual vision and genius. Similarly, each lawyer and judge envisions a body of case
law anew, from the selective perspective of the case at bar, and by means of the
individual, unique conceptual abilities that both limit the resulting interpretation and
open hitherto unknown potentialities for novel analytical reconfigurations. As Kant put
'2Cardozo, supra note 44, at 102.
12 Another term used in French for court decisions, particularly those of the Cour de cassation, is
"arrdt," aword with the same etymology as the English word "arrest," and with the same connotations of
finality. By contrast, the "avis" (literally, "opinion") of the Cour de cassation is devoid of finality or
decisional power. For an analysis ofthe legal effect of the modem French avis, see Andrd Perdriau, Les avis
entre chambres de laCour de cassation, La seniainejuridique, Dec. 22, 1999, no. 51-52, at 2287-91. Compare
Radbruch, supra note 11, at 9, asserting that "perhaps" is aword beloved to the English common-law legal

ein englisches Lieblingswort ... -).
system ("'Perhaps, 'vielleicht, ' ist

130Berlin, Roots of Romanticism, supra note 21, at 84, n.3, paraphrasing Herder.
3' Michael Ansaldi identifies the separate judicial opinion of common-law legal culture as reflective of

the common law's rejection of an absolutist, scientific perspective even at the level of factual determinations.
See Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 Brook. L. Rev.705, 729 (1992) ("The intimation that 'facts'
are not susceptible to scientific treatment is borne out by the Anglo-American phenomenon of the separate
opinion, amajor key to Llewellyn's repudiation ofthe deductive theory. Among their many virtues, dissents
and concurrences often spotlight the refractory complexity and factual richness lying just below the smooth
surface of many amajority opinion").
apodictic
32
1 See Ktlbler, supra note 34, at 307. For a critical analysis of the use of the term "induction" to describe
common-law reasoning, see Hart, supra note 49, at 102.
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it in his FirstIntroductionto the Critique ofJudgment, if
the variety and diversity of the empirical laws [are] ... great,... while it would be in part
possible to unify perceptions into an experience by particular laws ... , it would never be

possible to unify these empirical laws themselves under a common principle, were it the
case ... that the variety and dissimilarity of these laws ... were infinite and that we were
confronted by a crude, chaotic aggregate totally devoid of system....
Conversely, the civil-law court begins with the general, universal legal norm that
applies to the particulars, such that a case is defined as "a particular state of affairs
falling under a rule ... .,,y34

positing legal norms that govern particular cases, the civil

law offers the possibility of absolute truth to the extent that its axioms are valid. While
both systems observe particular humans in the context of their problems, the common
law exalts the particulars, which, as the court encodes them in its narrative, become a set
of givens, enabling the formation of the legal standard or proposition for which the
pending case will stand in the future, for others to claim as legal precedent.
The civil law, on the other hand, scrutinizes that which is above the factual context.
It embodies the Enlightenment perspective of truth as univocal and absolute. This view
does not suppose that every judge will identify the correct resolution to every case, or
will at the right solution to the legal issues and dilemmas presented. In other words,
Enlightenment ideology would not suggest that judicial decisions necessarily are
correct. Enlightenment ideology suggests, rather, a concept also embedded in civil-law
mentality: namely, that a correct answer exists if only the judge is clever enough to find
it, and that it is in principle deducible from the applicable legal authority, whether that
authority is the Code or another governing textual source of law: "The Germans will, of
opinions may differ
course, admit the occurrence of the 'hard' case; in such instances
' 35
over which is the right solution, but in theory one exists. "
By the nineteenth century, Jhering in Germany, and Geny and Saleilles in France
signaled the necessary inability of legal systems to account for the situations judges
must decide, allegedly in keeping with pre-existing law.136 Professor Joerges notes that
nineteenth-century German legal theorists recognized that "statutes program the law
only in a highly incomplete manner, that elements of a pre-positive practical reason
enter into interpretation."'' 3 7 Civil-law legal systems nevertheless emanate from, and are
'1

Kant, supra note 13, at 14. Cf. Hart, supra note 49, at 67 ("Logic is silent on how to classify

particulars...").
3

'1 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 11, at 199.
13 Herget, supra note !1, at 118 (emphasis added). As Herget also suggests with respect to Germany, the
traditional civilian ban against dissenting opinions derives from the problem that "a dissenting opinion would
imply that the judge [had] not reach[ed] 'the' solution." Id. See also Taruffo & La Torre, supra note 109, at
146-47 ("The normal structure of the [Italianl higher courtjudgment is deductive, since the opinion aims at
showing that the final decision isa conclusion stemming from a chain ofconsistent logical steps, moving from
given premises and arriving at a 'necessary' end.') Cf. Murchison, supra note 6, at 28 (characterizing as a turn
away from the civilian to the common-law perspective the willingness ofLouisiana's courts "to subordinate
for legal certainty to the achievement ofjust results').
the desire
36
1 See, eg., Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht (1887) (1883) (the motto of this work was "Der
Zweck ist der Schdpfer des ganzen Rechts"(The purpose/goal/intent is the creator of all law"));Rudolfvon
Thering, Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz (1964) (1884); Geny, supra note 29; and Raymond Saleilles,
Prdface, in id.
137Christan Joerges, Politische Rechtstheorie and Critical Legal Studies: Points of Contact and
Divergencies, in Politische Rechtstheorie in Germany 597, 604 (Christian Joerges & David M. Trubek eds.,
1988).
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structured in accordance with, an underlying principle of the possibility of correct
judicial decisions. 138 The civil-law legal structure corresponds to the Enlightenment
tenet that, in Berlin's words, "a true answer must be discoverable inprinciple,though I
may not happen to know it....
The Enlightenment sought to universalize the scientific methods that had furthered
knowledge greatly in the seventeenth century. Thus, according to Enlightenment
philosophy, just as to the underlying civilian conception of law,
[tjo every genuine question there were many false answers, and only one true one,
once discovered it was final - it remained forever true; all that was needed was a
reliable method of discovery. A method which answered to this description had been
employed by 'the incomparable Mr. Newton'; his emulators in the realm of the human
mind would reap a harvest no less rich if they followed similar precepts. If the laws
were correct, the observations upon which they were based authentic, and the
inferences sound, true and impregnable conclusions would provide knowledge of
hitherto unexplored realms, and transform the present welter of ignorance and idle
conjecture into a clear and coherent system of logically interrelated elements - the
theoretical copy or analogue of the divine harmony of nature... 4
Alexander Pope, inveterate eighteenth-century optimist of the Enlightenment, put it
more poetically:
All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good:
And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
See Jhering, Geist des romischen Rechts, supra note 11; Jhering, Scherz und Ernst, supra note 136;
Gtny, supra note 29 (including Saleilles, supra note 136). For an account of the contemporary status of case
law in Germany, see Rheinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in Introduction to
German Law I (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996). For the influential role inGermany ofthe
view that logic is systematically applicable to law, see Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes' Common Law and
German Legal Science, in The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.72, 84 (Robert W.Gordon ed., 1992).
139
Berlin, Roots of Romanticism, supra note 2l, at 181 (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Herget notes
that "[c]ommon lawyers, typified by Edward Coke, have been traditionally distrustful of generalization and
abstract theory." Herget, supra note 11, at 70. See also id. at 71 ("It issignificant that in the whole period from
Thomas Aquinas through the Spanish natural law, there was no common lawyer who attempted to systematize
or theorize about English law.") For Dworkin's variant on the idea that a single correct judicial resolution
exists for every case, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81 (1977); and forpersuasive criticism of
Dworkin on this point, see Hart, supra note 49, at 138-40.
'40
Berlin, Age of Enlightenment, supra note 4, at 16. Cf. Kant's description of the scientific method:
"[T]he principles according to which we perform experiments must themselves always be derived from the
knowledge ofnature, and hence from theory." Kant, supra note 13, at 6. Newton has been described as "the
first thinker of the Age of Reason." Kaplan, supra note 67, at 155. According to John Maynard Keynes,
Newton aspired to "decode the secrets of the universe from the starry cryptogram in which God had hidden
them." Id. Hart described the later work of Wittgenstein and Waismann in showing that the unforeseeable
poses a challenge to the very idea of definitions in science as much as in law. Hart, supra note 49, at 275
("there can be no final and exhaustive definitions of concepts, even in science"). Berlin also clarified that
"[wlhat was common to all the [substantive doctrines] -incompatible enough for wars ofextermination to have
been fought in their name- was the assumption that there existed a reality, a structure ofthings, a renim natura,
which the qualified enquirer could see, study and, in principle, get right. Men were violently divided about the
nature of the wise - those who understood the nature of things - but not about the proposition that such wise
men existed or could be conceived ....This was the great foundation ofbeliefwhich romanticism attacked and
weakened." Berlin, Power ofldeas, supra note 4, at 202.

2001]

ROMANTIC COMMON LAW, ENLIGHTENED CIVIL LAW
4
One truth is clear: Whatever is, is right.' '

Horkheimer and Adorno extend this concept of the Enlightenment: "To the
Enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one,
becomes illusion .... Their concept may be compared to what Kant describes as a
"principle of finality."' 143 This "principle of finality" also may be seen in the civil law's
adoption of legislative enactments as axiomatic points of departure for deductive
reasoning, for without axioms, in the words of the mathematician Robert Kaplan, "the
kind of certainty demanded by deductive thought.is unattainable because of the nature
of deductive thought. To stop the infinite regress, we have to say at some point: 'we
hold these truths to be self-evident." 44 Those "self-evident truths" or axioms
correspond in the civil law to legislation taken to be true for purposes of reasoning from
their application to the facts of a pending case. 145 Significantly, the word "axiom"
derives from the Greek for "what is thought worthy."14
The other great bedrock of Enlightenment thinking that Berlin attributes to western
thought from the time of classical antiquity until the advent of Romanticism is the belief
that all truths are mutually reconcilable, that no two truths can be contradictory. 47 So
entrenched is this assumption that Berlin calls it a "philosophiaperennis." 148
The civillaw mentality also mirrors this view inasmuch as it presents its Code as a coherent and
complete representation of law, all of its parts mutually reconcilable. As Kant has
argued, to the extent that we view "[t]he unity of nature under a principle of the
thoroughgoing connection of everything contained in th[e] sum of all appearances...
[t]o this extent we are to regard experience in general as a system under transcendental
laws ...
and not as a mere aggregate." 149 Along these lines, what codes lack in
1' Alexander Pope, Epistle I: Of the Nature and State of Man, With Respect to the Universe, in An
Essay on Man, in The Norton Anthology of English Literature 1046 (M. H. Abrams ed., 1968). It was Pope
who also wrote, in lines Isaiah Berlin often quoted as emblematic of the Enlightenment, "Nature, and Nature's
laws lay hid in night. God said, Let Newton be! and all was light" Alexander Pope, Epitaph: Intended for Sir
Isaac Newton (1730), quoted in, e.g., Berlin, Power of Ideas, supra note 4, at 40; Berlin, Age of
Enlightenment,
supra note 4, at 15.
2
14 Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment 7(John Cumming tans., 1997)
(originally, Dialektik der Aufllldng (1944)). This assessment of the Enlightenment is excessively negative in
my view, but illustrates the Enlightenment's tendencies towards scientizing and univocality. In the context of
the Enlightenment faith in science, see Dawson's characterization of German reception of Roman law: "[T]he
lasting effect of the reception was that German law was 'scientificized' [verwissenschaftlicht]"). Dawson,
supra note 12, at 238.
11 Kant, supra note 13, at 23.
Kaplan, supra note 67, at 140. For a succinct presentation ofWittgenstein and Quine's analysis of the
problem of infinite regress in the domain of language and concept, see Sabina Lovibond, Realism and
Imagination in Ethics 102-03 (1983).
5See H.R. Hahlo, Here Lies the Common Law, 30 Modem L. Rev. 241,246 (1967) ("The belief in
codification as a cure for the uncertainties, illogicalities and inconsistencies of the law harks back to the
eighteenth-century rationalism when philosophers and lawyers believed that it was possible to construct out of
the strands of pure reason a system of legal principles from which the solution for every legal problem could
be derived with near-mathematical certainty by a process of logical deduction."); H. Patrick Glenn, The
Grounding of Codification, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 765, 765 (1998) ("Codification, as we have known it, is a
product of the enlightenment"); Whitman, supra note 12, at 104 (describing codification as "the great
Enlightenment ideal ... ").
'" See Kaplan, supra note 67, at 140.
47
See Berlin, Roots of Romanticism, supra note 21, at 184-185. For asimilarly critical analysis ofthis
view, see Hart, supra note 49, at 77.
148Monism, in Berlin, The First and the Last, supra note 98, at 38.
149Kant, supra note 13, at 14. Kant ofcourse disagrees with the Enlightenment optimism that humans
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specificity they provide in spirit. The codified embodiment of the national law is of a
piece, whole and harmonious. 150 As a mathematician put it in analyzing the nature and

multifaceted functions of the concept of zero, "[niature abhors a vacuum and so do

we.", 5'
The traditional conception of the completeness of the civil-law codes has given way
in recent times to a recognition that they contain or may contain gaps.152 These gaps are
to be filled in by judges in accordance with the spirit of the codes, a directive often
found explicitly within the code itself, or, as Saleilles put it, "[b]eyond the Civil Code
53
but by means of the Civil Code" ("Au-delb du Code civil,maisparle Code civil').1
In
our effort to assess current French legal theory, it is noteworthy that the author of a
textbook for French law students published in its sixth edition as recently as 1999,
quotes Saleilles' statement above, citing it for the continuing principle of French legal
methodology that the Code remains even today the necessary, required means for

will be able to apprehend the system: "F]t does not follow from this that nature is a system comprehensible by
human cognition through empirical laws also, and that the complete systematic union ofits appearances in
one experience (hence experience as a system) is possible for mankind." Id. (emphasis in original). See also
id. at 15 (emphases in original), where Kant ascribes to fortuity the conclusion that "manifold empirical laws
happened to be fitted for the systematic unity of natural knowledge in a totally interconnected possible
experience, without, by means of an a priori principle, presupposing nature to have such a form."
150See Rend David, The French Concept of Law, in French Law: Its Structure, Sources and
Methodology 71 (Michael Kindred trans., 1972); Reimann, Toward a European Civil Code, supra note 6, at
1340 ("The uniform laws [of the United States], including the U.C.C., are not true codes in the European
sense because they do not aspire to create a comprehensive logical order. Neither [United States] uniform laws
nor restatements are designed as closed systems, the gaps of which can be filled by extrapolation from the
overall framework"); and Maxeiner, supra note 49, at 117, n. 19 ("[t]he [civil-law] legal order forms a unity")
(citing K. Engisch, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung (1987) (1935)). Contrary to my rendition ofthe civil law,
however, von Mehren has stated that, in Germany, "[i]t is ...clearly perceived that the codified law is neither
complete nor unambiguous." Von Mehren, supra note 54, at 74. Significantly, however, von Mehren qualifies
this assertion by describing the German judicial enterprise nevertheless as a search for "the true sense and
purpose of the text [i.e., the Code]." Id. at 74. Moreover, as von Mehren further points out, "German decisions
usually prefer to present the court's result as a logical deduction from authoritative starting points for
reasoning contained in the codified law." Id. at 75.
"' Kaplan, supra note 67, at 175. Cf. Charles Seife, Zero: The Biography of a Dangerous Idea 5 (2000)
(ancient abhorrence of zero due to its "power to shatter the framework of logic"); id. at 19 ("zero was
inexorably linked with the void - [tihere was a primal fear ofvoid and chaos'). Seife argues that abhorrence of
the void, as well as of the infinite, is a peculiarly western tradition, stemming from Aristotle, rather than a
human-wide one, and recounts the church's persecution of believers in zero, and of zero itself: "Zero was a
heretic." Id.at 9 1.
15'This is one of the main thrusts of Carl Baudenbacher's recent article. See Baudenbacher, supra note 6.
As I try to demonstrate here, however, the existence of lacunae isthe imperfection or exception to be filled in
according to the general spirit manifested and implied by the Code. In this sense, codes do remain organic and
coherent, at least at the level of legal theory. Baudenbacher also believes that modem hermeneutical theory
plays a significant role at least in German conceptions of the role of the judge. He refers specifically to
Gadamer's Truth and Method. This would militate against the traditional idea of the at least theoretical
capacity ofjudges to identify answers deducible on the sole basis of logic. See Baudenbacher, supra note 6.
See also Comparative Law 643-51 (Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al. eds., 1988) (1950) (difficulties civil-law
courts experience in reconciling a growing observance of precedents to still prevailing contrary legal theory).
"3 Saleilles, supra note 136, at xxv. Compare Jhering's "Through Roman law, beyond Roman law!,"
described as Jhering's "statement of purpose," in Whitman, supra note 12, at 225, and acknowledged by
Saleilles to be the origin of his own statement. See Saleilles, supra note 136, at xxv (7e ne sauraismieuxfaire
que par cette forte devise, inspirde d'un mot analogue d'Jhering..."). Accord, Eugen Ehrlich, Judicial

Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, in The Science of Legal Method, supra note 82, at 73
("Every species of legal science, consciously or unconsciously, tends to progress through the formulated law
beyond the formulated law").
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arriving at judicial results.m This is particularly significant and somewhat ironic
because Saleilles specified immediately after the words quoted above that the part of his
phrase on which he himself insisted was not "by the Civil Code," but, rather, "beyond
the Civil Code," thus privileging judicial freedom from
55 the Code, not subservience to it:
"Ce i quoi nous tenons le plus c est at'l'Au-deli."1
Saleilles' and Gdny's optic were not the prevalent French view. In the words of
their contemporary, the French scholar Esmein, "[c]ase law is the ...
expression of the
civil law ...
;"5 and, in the words of Hermann Kantorowicz, "[tihe law is not what the
courts administer but the courts are the institutions which administer the law.' 57
Kantorowicz, a founding figure of both the sociological and free law movement schools
of German legal theory, which inspired the American legal realist school, 53
nevertheless in some ways held a profoundly civilian conception of law. For
Kantorowicz, the science of law not only was a science, albeit a cultural rather than a
natural one, but also one whose purpose, as "a rational and normative science, [was to]
159
tr[y] to transform the given law into a more or less consistent system of rules."'
Referring to contemporary Germany, Professor Lundmark of the University of Manster
states that "the insistence ...
that judge-made law is not real law does not mean that
judge-made
norms
do
not
exist.
Rather, it means that judge-made norms should not
16
exist." 0
Code lacunae in civil-law legal cultures represent imperfections in the legislative
attempt to create a complete and coherent body of law. Still more importantly, the
judges who purport to fill in the gaps are to do so under the guidance of the Code itselfi.e., in keeping with the nation's legal spirit as expressed both explicitly and implicitly
in the text. While code lacunae necessitate active judges, the decisions reached by those
judges do not attain either a binding precedential value, or a legal authority comparable
to that of the Code's provisions, nor are they the norm:
[Judicial decision-making] in the continental tradition ...
goes one step further than
purposive interpretation in that it overtly extends an enacted rule to cases the legislature
had not foreseen. However, it is still part of its interpretation because it appliesthe legal
principlesinherent in the code instead of drawing them from other sources .... [F]irstly,
the judge must demonstrate that there is a lacuna in the code. Secondly, there must be
no constitutional restrictions which bar the analogy. Finally, he must establish a
relevant similarity between his case and the scope of the originalrule.'6'
Thus, Hermann Kantorowicz, although a primary figure in the German free law
- See Patrick Courbes, Introduction g~ndrale au droit 52 (6± ed., 1999).
'5"That which is most important to us is the 'beyond"'. Saleilles, supra note 136, at xxv (emphasis in
original).
1'6
A. Esmein, Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 5 (1902), quoted in and translated by Herman, supra note
75, at 33 (emphasis added). See also C. Civ., art. 4 (1804) (forbidding judges to refuse to adjudicate cases to
which no Code provision applies: "Lejuge qui refuseradejuger, sousprtextede silence, de lobscuritiou de
l'insuffisance de la loi.
pourra 6tre poursuivi comme coupable de deni de justice"); and C. Civ., art. 5
(forbidding judges from making pronouncements of law when deciding cases: "11
est dfendu auxjuges de
prononcerpar voie de disposition gdniraleet reglementairesur les causes qui leur sont soumises").

117
Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79, at 1250.
" See Herget & Wallace, supra note 76.
' 59 Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79, at 1248.
6 Thomas Lundmark, Book Review of Wemer F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., Introduction to

German Law, 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 677, 680 (1999).
16'Langenbucher,

supra note 28, at 482-83 (emphasis added).
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movement often associated as the model for American legal realism, criticized the
American legal realists for believing that "the law is not a body of rules, not an Ought,
but a factual reality, [and for believing that] [i]t is the real behavior of certain people,
especially of the officials of the Law, more especially of the judges who make the Law
through their decisions, which, therefore, constitutes the Law."' 62 Even Kantorowicz,
known for his departures from traditional German conceptions of law and legal theory,
considered the judge's task, whether in a common-law or a civil-law jurisdiction, to be
to form rules only "whenever the formal law has a gap."'63 The view ofjudges acting to
fill "gaps" implies that the norm is statutory law. 64 For Kantorowicz, judges fill in the
law's gaps, but they are not truly gaps because "free law" dictates to the judge how they
must be filled.165 Thus, free law in effect eliminates the gap, that unsettling vacuum in
the law, that absence signaling the deficiencies of legislative foresight.
Judicial creation of law in civil-law legal cultures remains the exceptional recourse
that endows the codes with the cohesive completeness that eluded their drafters. The
requirement that judges first establish the existence of a gap in the code is because civillaw "judges have to be prevented from legislating under the pretext of having
discovered a lacuna they intend to fill."'" In heading the commission that drafted the
French Civil Code, Portalis envisioned the judicial gap-filling function as follows: "It is
to judicial decision that we surrender 67
the rareandexceptional cases incapable of fitting
into a world of rational legislation."'
Portalis understood that legislation invariably fails to anticipate all future
162Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79, at 1243. By this time, the already

aging Kantorowicz, whose famous German writings dated from the early years ofthe twentieth century, was a
refugee in the United States. The article cited here was written while he held a position at the New School for
Social Research in New York. In 1935, he left the United States for England. He died in 1940. See Kartheinz
Muscheler, Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz: Eine Biographic 107-24 (1984); Thomas Raiser, Hermann Ulrich
Kantorowicz, in Der EinfluB deutscher Emigranten auf die Rechtsentwicklung in den USA und in
Deutschland, 365-81 (Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993); entry Hemann Kantorowicz, 10 EncyclopamdiaJudaica
746 (1971); and Monika Frommel, Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz (1877-1940): Ein streitharer Relativist, in
Streitbare Juristen: Eine andere Tradition 243-52 (Thomas Blanke et al. eds., 1988). For more information
about the University of Exile created by the New School for Social Research, see Gunther, supra note 51, at
443-44.
163Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79, at 1244 (emphasis added).
'6 Cf. A. L. Goodhart's characterization of Kantorowicz in his introduction to Kantorowicz's last book,
published posthumously: "The free law doctrine [of Kantorowicz] recognizes the importance ofthe so-called
gap, usually ignored by the other schools, which seem to assume that the law is complete and that every legal
question can therefore be answered automatically." A. L. Goodhart, Introduction, in Hermann Kantorowicz,
The Definition of Law xv-xvi (1980) (1958).
'65For a summary of what Kantorowicz means by "free law,"see Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Legal
Science - A Summary of Its Methodology, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 679,693-98 (1928).
"6 Langenbucher, supra note 28, at 485.
'67Portalis Excerpts, supra note 75, at 772-73 (emphasis added). On the other hand, Kantorowicz
suggested that the gap-filling cases also may be viewed as the most significant determinations of law from a
practical standpoint inasmuch as, even though, in his description, they have a"validity ... far less[er] than that
of the formal law and sometimes nil, ... their practical importance is even greater because, where the formal
[i.e., statutory] law is clear and complete, litigation is not likely to occur." Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism
About Realism, supra note 79, at 1241. Radbruch made the related point that English case law is a law of
strife rather than peace because, unlike Continental European law, it evolves from the matters in dispute that
reach the courts. See Radbruch, supra note 11, at 36 ("das englische Case-Law handelt nur vom Recht, daft
sich im Streit befindel, nicht yom Recht im Stande der Ruhe.") I have tried to emphasize the contrasts between
civilian and common-law legal mentalities in order to bring to light their underlying mechanisms. I do not
mean to suggest, however, a lack of overlap, including, for example, the reliance on precedential authority in
France of the Conseil d'Etat.
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eventualities. He wrote that he and his drafting committee "kept clear of the dangerous
ambition of wanting to forecast and regulate everything."' 168 Indeed, the failure to desist
from trying to micro-manage the future through detailed, comprehensive regulation had
caused the Allgemeines Landrecht, the Prussian Code of 1794, to prove unwieldy and
unworkable.' 69 Portalis conceived of the judge's role as both crucial and active: "A
code, however complete it may seem, is hardly finished before a thousand unexpected
to0 the province
issues come to face the judge ... A host of things is thus necessarily left 17
of custom, the discussion of learned men, and the decision of judges."'
Despite endorsing an active role for France's judges, necessitated by the Civil
Code's anticipated lacunae, Portalis nevertheless conceived that role as one of applying
the law, not creating it, even where a judge sought to fill gaps of silence in the Code, for
the drafters of the Napoleonic Code envisioned their own role as follows: "The role of
legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach, the general propositions of the law, to
establish principles which will be fertile in application, and not to get down to the
details of questions which may arise in particular instances."''7
By contrast, the common-law legislator drafts statutes with particularity, precisely
in order to "get down to the details of questions which may arise in particular
instances," so as to wrest from judicial control a particular situation for which the
legislator wants to alter the course ofjudicially created common law. Whereas commonlaw judges have dominion over all areas not removed from their purview by the
legislature, according to Portalis, "[i]t is for the [French] judge and ... jurist, imbued
with the general spirit of the laws, [only] to direct [the law's] application."' 172 He further
stated that "the judge's science is to put these [legislative] principles into effect, to
diversify them, and to extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application, to
private causes; [and] to examine closely the spirit of the law when the letter kills....
Thus, the traditional French theory of judicial conduct incorporates the idea that
judges will fill the code's gaps by case decisions, yet conceives of that conduct more as
law application than as law creation. Portalis suggested room for judicial creativity,
intelligence and analytical acuity, but only within the realm of remaining within the
spirit of enacted legislation, in order to apply what the legislators may not have had the
1" Portalis Excerpts, supra note 75, at 769.
169 See Glendon, supra note 107, at 52 ("The Prussian General Territorial Law of 1794 is chiefly
remembered today as a monument of legal hubris. In its ambition to foresee all possible contingencies and to
regulate the range of human conduct down to the most intimate details of family life, it was hampered in
operation both by its excessive detail and its failure to acknowledge the limits of law"); Whitman, supranote
12, at 55 ("Princely [German] jurists of the absolutist era had begun to see the value in a new ideal: the
making of complete codes that would provide positive commands for every possible legal eventuality from the
mouth of the prince himself, codes with no 'holes,' no 'interstices'..."); and Zimmermann, supra note 138, at
14 ("the fathers of the Prussian General Land Law ... were ... obsessed with the idea that they had to provide
an exhaustive regulation, from first principles down to the finest details, for every imaginable set of facts').
Accord Gny, supra note 29, at 82-84 (Grdny goes so far as to criticize the French Civil Code for similar
"naive blindness"), id. at 84, 118. See also Eugen Ehrlich, The Sociology of Law, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 130, 133
(1922) ("To embrace the whole variegated body of human activities in Legal Provisions is about as sensible as

trying to catch a stream and hold it in a pond; the part that may be caught is no longer a living stream but a
stagnant pool - and a great deal cannot be caught at all").
"o Portalis Excerpts, supra note 75, at 769.
171Id. See also Olivier Moreteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards and Alibis: The Experience of
the French Civil Code, 20 N.C. J. Int'l Law & Com. Reg. 273,274 (1995) (the French Civil Code is not a
straight-jacket because of the "general couching of terms within the Code").
172 Portalis Excerpts, supra note 75, at 274.
'73 Id. at 722.
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foresight to ordain, but which the texts they have enacted suggest through the filter of

the judiciary's understanding of their implicit import. 74 As Olivier Moreteau, a French
17
law professor, has put it, "[t]he judge contributes to the law, but does not create it.'
This outlook has remained current in France, at least inasmuch as Professor Moreteau
states "it has remained heretical to admit openly that judges can be lawmakers or that
they may have some normative powers."1 76 Moreover, Portalis' idea thatjudges should
have more than a merely mechanical role in applying the law predated the view that
later came to dominate in France; namely,
that the judiciary should be restricted to rote
77
application of legislative enactments.

By contrast, in common-law legal cultures, judicial creation of law traditionally has
been the norm, not the exception, and statutes "are conceded [by common-law judges]
to be applicable to certain cases ...
but are not conceived of as entering into the legal
system as an organic whole." 7 8 Still more importantly, the idea of an "organic whole"

does not underlie the common-law conception of law. However much progress statutes
may have made in winning judicial deference, statutes themselves purport to remedy
particular problems at particular times, rather than to proceed from an overweening,
cohesive legal schema. 179
Unlike the common-law judge, the task of the civil-law judge who searches for the
correct resolution to pending legal issues seeks an expression of that consistent body of
law that is the Code, a manifestation of the "organic whole," one that confirms,
strengthens and represents its harmony, eschewing any interpretation that might
undermine its cohesive, all-inclusive spirit. 80 Romanticism represents the converse. It
suggests pluralism, the concept that there are many truths.' 8' Romanticist value

pluralism also is an attribute of common-law legal culture inasmuch as the common-law
court's vision is primed on the mosaic of facts and circumstances presented in their
unicity with each case.
By contrast, the civil law focuses on codes, written texts designed to govern
throughout time, designed to embody the immutably true, to embody principles so
7 See id.
7 Moreteau, supra note 171, at 276 (emphasis added).
'76
Id.at 275. It should be noted that this tendency is far stronger in France than in Germany, where the
legal culture traditionally has been more comfortable with limited law-making potential for judges. The
specter of a government by judges threatening democracy is being raised again today in France by the
President of France's RPR party, Michtle Alliot-Marie. See Fabrice Lhomme, Je m'attends Ades mauvais
coups contre lesjuges, L'Express, Jan. 20, 2000, at 53.
'7See Dennis, supra note 6, at 5 ("the French Civil Code was adopted before the mechanical conception
ofjudicial process gained its greatest popularity"). For a detailed account of the history of this evolution, see
Ctny, supra note 29, especially at 23-26.
'7' Pound, supra note 77, at 386.
179
Judge Posner insists that the common law also develops from pre-existing theories, but the theories he
describes are those adopted by individual judges for unexplained reasons of personal preference, such that
they are subject to flux as the judges attempt to continue to keep the accumulating cases cohesive under the
theory, and as the cases themselves may modify the judges' theoretical outlook. See Posner, supra note 47, at
174-75.
18 By contrast, see Justice Scalia's analysis ofthe Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892), in which he decries any resort to the spirit of the law. See Scalia, supra note 77, at 18-23.
' One of Isaiah Berlin's contributions to the analysis of Romanticism is the distinction he draws
between pluralism and relativism. Although modern relativism may be seen as a later outgrowth of
Romanticism, it is value pluralism rather than relativism that characterized the Romantic movement. See
Berlin, Roots of Romanticism, supra note 21; see also John Gray's intellectual biography of Isaiah Berlin.
John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (1996). For a succinct account of Berlin's distinction between relativism and
pluralism, see Pluralism, in Berlin, The First and the Last, supra note 98, at 52.
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reliable that they supersede and can withstand the vicissitudes of the particular, of the
temporal, of the myriad contextual elements that connect human beings to the legal
The civil law poses as a "superstructure of theory
issues they ask courts to adjudicate.
18 2
valid for any time or place."
Accordingly, Wolfgang Oehler, educated in law in both Germany and the United
States, and a professor of law in Germany, notes that, "U]ust as reports and textbooks
full of cases are the staple diet of the common-law student, learned commentary on legal
norms and codes, condensing the systematic law, constitutes the primary tool of choice
for the legal apprentice in civil law."' 183 In privileging the system, the whole, the civil
law mirrors the Enlightenment which, according to Horkheimer and Adorno,
"recognizes as being and occurrence only what can be apprehended in unity: its ideal is
the system from which all and everything follows.""84
This does not, however, preclude doubt:
It was essential to guarantee the efficacy of the instruments of investigation before its
results could be trusted. This epistemological bias characterized European philosophy
from Descartes's formulation of his method of doubt until well into the nineteenth
century, and is still a strong tendency in it. The direct application of the results of this
investigation of the varieties and scope of human knowledge to such traditional
disciplines as politics, ethics, metaphysics, theology and so on, with a view to ending
their perplexities once and for all, is the program which philosophers of the eighteenth
This use of observation and experiment entailed
century attempted to carry through ...
the application of exact methods of measurement, and resulted in the linking together of
many diverse phenomena under laws of great precision, generally formulated in
mathematical terms. Consequently only the measurable aspects of reality were to be
treated as real ...5
The Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman traces the roots of this Enlightenment
methodology to Galileo.'86 Feynman couples the concept of scientific universality,
derived from the fact that all substances are composed of atoms ("our knowledge is in
fact universal"), 8 7 a concept he endorses, with the indispensable nature of doubt and
uncertainty to the scientific method: "[A]II our statements are approximate statements of
different degrees of certainty ...
when a statement is made, the question is not whether it
is true or false but rather how likely it is to be true or false."' 8
In his book on the French intellectual tradition, Tony Judt notes the influence in
182Dawson,

supra note 12, at 234.

Oehler, supra note 27, at 717.
'" Horkheimer & Adomo, supra note 142, at 7. My own view of the Enlightenment is far less critical
18

than that of Horkheimer and Adomo, who see in it the roots of the twentieth century's totalitarian and fascist
rtgimes.
8
1 3 Berlin, Age of Enlightenment, supra note 4, at 16-17. Thus, according to Berlin, skepticism is the
hallmark ofthe modem era, of the Enlightenment as well as ofRomanticism. Accord Kramer, supra note 95,
skeptical of all absolute answers. Not so the Sumerian thinker [of
at 76 ("modem thinking man is usually ...
were absolutely correct and that he knew exactly how
ca. 3000 B.C.]; he was convinced that his thoughts ...
the universe was created and operated.")
386 See Richard P. Feynman, The Role of Scientific Culture in Modem Society, in The Pleasure of
Finding Things Out 97 (1999).
"9Id. at 101. Plato thought this to be particularly true of mathematics: "[G]eometry is knowledge ofthe
eternally existent." Plato, The Republic 244 (Francis Macdonald Comford trans., 1967) (1941). See also id. at
241 ("the properties of number appear to have the power of leading us toward reality ... ").
"' Feynman, supra note 186, at 111.
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French intellectual circles of tendencies I have attributed to the Enlightenment and to
the civil-law mentality, but also comments on contrary tendencies.1 9 He refers to a
French "habit of abstraction,"' 9 that he associates at least in part with aspects of the
French Jesuit tradition. Describing the scholarship of the French sociologist tmile
Durkheim, Judt notes that Durkheim,
who did so much to help define the shape of intellectual practice in republican France,
was also one of the most astute commentators upon it, noting in l'Evolution
pidagogique de la France,19' the tendency to the impersonal and the abstract in French
thought and seeing in it a distinctively Gallic trait, dating at least to the seventeenth
century and attributable in part to Jesuit pedagogical habits. He might well have
invoked his own Dreyfusard colleagues as further evidence, since (in contrast with the
conservative, literary and anti-Dreyfusard "intellectuals" around Barrs, Brunetinre and
the Acaddmie franqaise) they showed a common temperamental aversion to the
concrete, the individual,the given, preferring to identify their commitment with ideas
and social values rather than the disruptive, divisive, and empirical claims of isolated
persons ... Durkheim and his friends had something of a horror of the "individual...... 92
Judt sums up Durkheim's circle as having a "genius for abstracting, reifying and
generalizing." 93 Judt comments also, however, on "an accompanying tendency to
reason by analogy ... , 94 a tendency I dissociate from the civilian-like mentality he
otherwise attributes to Durkheim.195
'

Judt, supra note 12, at 252.

190
Id.

191Emile Durkheim, L'dvolution pddagogique de ia France (1938).
192Judt, supra note 12, at 252-53 (emphasis added). But see Herget, supra note 11, at 73 (describing

Durkheim and Weber as "pursuing a kind of methodological individualism," as opposed to a theory of
systems).
19 Judt, supra note 12, at 253.
19 Id. For a detailed account of Durkheim's analysis oflaw, see Roger Cotterrell, Emile Durkheim: Law
in a Moral Domain (1999). Like Kantorowicz, Durkheim saw the vibrant, evolutionary, contextual nature of
law. Also like Kantorowicz, Durkheim curiously blends a vision of law as flux with detailed, allencompassing systematization that characterizes much continental scholarship. Perhaps reflecting my own
common-law legal training, my sense of their approaches is that their subject defies the degree of
systematization to which they submitted it. It brings to mind Wittgenstein's caution to "[r]emember that in
general we don't use language according to strict rules - it hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules,
either. We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding

according to exact rules." Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books 25 (1969).
'" Like many who have focused on judicial methodology, particularly since the Second World War,
Judt's study of the particulars of French intellectual discourse leads him to conclude that its processes
themselves are positively correlated to, and responsible for, condoning violence and fascism. See Judt, supra
note 12, at 253; and Horkheimer & Adomo, supranote 142, at 13 (attributing Nazism to Enlightenment roots).

For an examination of this issue inSouth African judicial conduct during apartheid, see David Dyzenhaus,
Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order (1998). For
reasons I have discussed elsewhere, my own study of the relation between judicial methodology and the
political valence of substantive judicial decisions has led me to conclude the opposite: namely, that

methodology isofnegligible relevance to the substantive outcome ofjudicial decisions. See Vivian Grosswald
Curran, The Legalization of Racism in A Constitutional State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50
Hastings L. J. 1 (1998); and Curran, Herder and the Holocaust, supra note 98 (arguing no credible correlation
between Herder's Romanticism and Nazism). For a discussion of the relation of Volksempfindung in Savigny
and in Nazi legal texts, see Joachim Ruckert, Das "gesunde Volksempfinden"- eine Erbschaft Savignys?, 59
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stitung fllr Rechtsgeschichte (germanistische Abteilung) 199 (1986). See also
Scoffoni, supra note 82, at 270 et seq. for a discussion of the judiciary in relation to institutional and social
ethical values. When I wrote my analysis of the law of Vichy France, see supra, I was aware ofthe debate
about positivism between Fuller and Hart, and addressed it, but was not familiar with Hart's Essays in
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By contrast, John Stuart Mill has been described as representative of a British focus
on the particular that Isaiah Berlin attributes to the empiricist tradition, and contrasts
with the Continental European perspective.'9 According to Berlin, Mill believed that
particular predicaments required each its own specific treatment; that the application of
correct judgment, in curing a social malady, mattered at least as much as knowledge of
the laws of anatomy or pharmacology. He was a British empiricist and not a French
rationalist,or a German metaphysician,sensitive to day-to-day play of circumstances,
differences of 'climate', as well as to the individual nature of each case, as Helvdtius or
Saint-Simon or Fichte, concerned as they were with thegrandeslignes of development,
were not

197

The Romantic de-emphasis ofrational justification and universal objectivity is not
compatible with the stated objective of most civil-law scholars. Justice Holmes' famous
statement that the life of the law has been experience rather than logic 19 is illustrative
of the common law's perspective, just as the reaction of the eminent French legal
scholar Andrd Tune is illustrative of the civil law's perspective.99 Commenting that the
Holmesian point is anathema to the civil-law lawyer, Tune makes clear that this is not
because of Holmes' emphasis on the importance of experience. 2o As Tune points out,
Portalis also stressed the importance of life experience, fully realizing that the success
of the French Civil Code depended on its consisting ofguidelines sufficiently general as
to provide the necessary flexibility to accommodate the inevitable significant changes
French society would undergo with the passage of time. 201 According to Tune, the
civilian's problem resides not in Holmes' emphasis of experience, but rather in his
disdain for logic. Tune takes the position that logic, albeit wedded to experience, is the
Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Hart's Essays contain a superb presentation ofthe analytical fallacies involved
in correlating positivism with unjust or immoral judicial decisions. See Hart, supra note 49, at 74. My only
difference with Hart lies in the harshness of his criticism of Radbruch. See id. at 75. Hart's opinion of
Radbruch is not unsubstantiated or entirely unpersuasive, but Radbruch in my opinion was a rare heroic
figure, deserving of the utmost admiration. A lifelong friend ofHermann Kantorowicz, mentioned elsewhere
in these pages, Radbruch had been a minister ofjustice before the Nazi takeover, and was of major assistance
to Kantorowicz (already the object of discrimination inWeimar Germany) in obtaining his professorship at
Kiel. For a portrayal of Radbruch through his friendship with Kantorowicz, see generally Muscheler, supra
note 162.
"96
See Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, supra note 4, at 193
'1 Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, one might attribute Braudel's famous innovation of the longue dure
as the appropriate focus of historical analysis as a contribution typical of the Continental European outlook.
"9 Holmes, supra note 43, at I ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience"); accord,
Judge Andrews' summary of causation theory in Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928) (dissenting opinion) ("This isn't logic. It ispractical politics.") Holmes may well have been aware of
the definition of "the life of the law" given by the German legal theorist Hermann Kantorowicz, and translated
into English by Roscoe Pound: "Mhe life of the law is in its enforcement." Hermann Kantorowicz,
Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie 8 (1911) (emphasis added), quoted in Roscoe Pound, The Scope and
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Harv. L.Rev. 513, 513-15 (1912). Kantorowicz's definition cane to
my attention in the overview of the German free law movement ofProfessors Herget and Wallace, supra note
76, at 424. For an insightful analysis of Holmes' statement as not historicist in nature, but merely positivistic,
see Harold J.Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence, 76 Calif L. Rev. 779, 788 (1988) ("Since judges
in [the common-law] tradition explain their decisions in terms of precedent, it was necessary for Holmes, as a
positivist, to analyze the meanings attributed to the rules at various times.")
See Tunc, supra note 12, at 468.
See id. ("If there is a sentence which the French lawyer has great difficulty in understanding, it is
Holmes' famous saying: 'The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.'")
201See id.
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very heart of the civilian's understanding of law.2 °2
To the extent that we can connect Romanticism to the Holmesian rendition of the
common law, to the examination of the lived before the examination of the law, it is
interesting to note that the German legal theorist Thering, from a civil-law legal system,
said precisely what Holmes did:
That particular cult of the logical, which tries to twist jurisprudence into a mathematics
of law, is an aberration and rests on ignorance about the nature of law. Life is not here
to be a servant of concepts, but concepts are here to serve life. What will come to pass
in the future is not postulated by logic but by life, by trade and commerce, and by the
human instinct for justice, be it deducible through logic or unlikely to happen at all
203

While this would suggest, as I in fact would predict, that German jurists will be
more adept than their French counterparts at making the mental leap towards grasping
common-law methodology, this conclusion may be undermined by statements of such
French legal luminaries as Saleilles and Gdny, who also viewed law as rooted in
experience rather than logic, mirroring Holmes' statement as closely as Jhering.2 4 In
her article on what she calls the Frenchjuristesinquiets (anxious jurists), Marie-Claire
Belleau describes her research into the writings of Saleilles, Gdny and other
contemporaries, revealing the considerable pluralism that existed in French legal theory
at the turn of the century.2°e Her work has been further confirmed and strengthened by
the research of Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, who has documented the unofficial and
invisible, but significant, role of case law and particularized, fact-oriented
legal
2 6
reasoning that occurs behind the scenes in French judicial methodology. 0
202 See id. at 468-69. For the argument that logic and experience inevitably are intertwined and

inextricable from each other, such that Holmes' statement, when probed, essentially is meaningless, see
Twining, supra note 77, at 16.
2
m Jhering, Geist des romischen Rechts, supra note 11, vol. 111, 321, translated by Konrad Zweigert &
Kurt Siehr, in Jhering's Influence on the Development of Comparative Legal Method, 19 Am. J. Comp. L.
215,226(1971). Cf. Christain Joerges, History as Non-History: Points of Divergence and Time Lags Between
Friedrich Kessler and German Jurisprudence, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 163,171 (1994) ("Holmes' polemic against
analytical jurisprudence might be compared with Jhering's derision of conceptual jurisprudence"); and
Kantorowicz, Legal Science, supra note 165, at 700, n. 63 (hering's Begriffsjurisprudenzand its influence on
Geny). For Jhering's sense of the importance of practical experience in law in the context of his criticism of
the highly abstract legal realm in which Savigny and the Pandectists were prone to dwell, see Jhering, Scherz
und Ernst, supra note 136, at 252-54; 258-60, reprinted in English translation in Arthur Taylor von Mehren &
James Russell Gordley, The Civil Law System 70-72 (1977) (1957).
mo'
See, e.g., Marie-Claire Belleau, The "Juristes Inquiets": Legal Classicism and Criticism in Early
Twentieth-Century France, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 379 (1997); Dennis, supra note 6, at6; and infra; Herget &
Wallace, supra note 76, at 409- 11. Herget and Wallace also set forth numerous quotes from the writings of
German free law movement scholars, such as Ehrlich, Kantorowicz and Fuchs, their French colleague Gdny,
and American legal realists such as Llewellyn, Frank and Cohen. See Comparative Index, in id., at 440.
20mSee Belleau, supra note 204.
2 See Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Comparative Law and Comparative Literature: A Lesson in
Progress, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 471 (1997); and Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judicial
Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 Yale L.J. 1325 (1995). Accord, Palmer, supra note 74, at 301. Cf.
Cardozo, supra note 144, at 16 (referring to the French Gny and the German Ehrlich for the propositions that
the 'judge [is] the interpreter for the community of its sense of law and order and must supply omissions,
correct uncertainty and harmonize results with justice through a method of free decision ...
;"and that the
individual judge is the only "'guaranty ofjustice,'" id. at 17, as well as for the view that it is an "abuse" to
"envisag[e] ideal conceptions provisional and purely subjective in their nature, as endowed with a permanent
objective reality. And this false point ofview, which, to my thinking, is a vestige of the absolute realism ofthe

2001]

ROMANTIC COMMON LAW, ENLIGHTENED CIVIL LAW

In terms of French judicial reliance on precedents, Lasser is in the tradition of John
Dawson in believing that the French courts' decisions mask an unarticulated and

unavowed attention to prior court adjudications. 2 7 While the unexpressed actions of
courts are of primordial importance in analyzing the French judicial system, it should be
remembered, however, that French and German attention to precedents remains highly
distinguishable from the sophisticated common-law analysis of precedents. The detailed
analysis and explication of precedents within common-law judicial opinions is without
equivalent in the civil-law legal culture. While the civil-law judicial systems have
developed and refined their methodology of statutory interpretation to a degree
unknown in the common-law legal world, the civil-law legal world has no equivalent to
the complex case-law
analytical methodology that common-law courts have evolved
28
centuries.
over
The similarity of the statements made by Holmes, Jhering, Saleilles and Gdny are,
however, instructive in suggesting the admixture of common-law and civil-law
attributes even in both legal systems. 209 Within the common-law legal system, for
example, by virtue of the courts' crafting of legal principles, each precedent stands for a
legal norm from which applications to future pending cases can be deduced. Commonlaw reasoning thus clearly contains a deductive component that is as intrinsic to its
nature as the analogical reasoning by similarity and dissimilarity which dominates the
comparative process of evaluating the legal significance of a pending case by weighing

it against prior case law. Moreover, Patrick Atiyah makes the case quite compellingly
that English judges are far less likely than their United States counterparts to decide a

pending case for the sake of justice of outcome if it means ignoring established
precedent. 2 0 According to Atiyah, British more than United States judicial
middle ages, ends in confining the entire system of'positive law, a priori, within a limited number of logical
categories, which are predetermined in essence, immovable in basis, governed by inflexible dogmas, and thus
incapable of adapting themselves to the ever varied and changing exigencies of life." Id. at 47. Cardozo also
quotes Saleilles as follows: "One wills at the beginning the result; one finds the principle afterwards; such is
the genesis of all juridical construction." Id. at 170 ( quoting Raymond Saleilles, De la personnalitdjuridique
45, 46). See also Palmer, supra note 74, at 299-300, and Baudenbacher, supra note 6, at 339 (discussing
Gdny's realist position in Mdthode d'interprdtation et sources en droit privd positif).
207
See Dawson, supra note 12, at 405; accord Merryman, The French Deviation, and How Others Do It,
supra note 108.
'0' See supra note 89, and surrounding text. Accord, Adams, supra note 29. Dawson also distinguished
French adherence to jurisprudence, or established case law, from the common-law use of case law. See
Dawson, supra note 12, at 337-38. For a most insightful historical analysis of the civilian need to equate law
with writing, and the common-law need to wrest law away from any immutable textual form, see Stein, supra
note 74, at 246-47.
2o It should be remembered, however, that while Holmes was ajudge with the ability to give judicial
voice to his views, Jhering, Saleilles and C6ny were not. Despite the influential role of legal scholars in civillaw legal culture, scholarly views are not always implemented by judges. Professor Tomlinson notes that
G ny's urging judges to go beyond mere statutory interpretation generally was not accepted or implemented
by French judges. See Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of Things: A Study of
Judicial Lawmaking, 48 La. L. Rev. 1299, 1358 (1988). For the focus on case law and legal methodology of
the influential Roman jurists up to ca. 235 A.D., see Dawson, supra note 12, at 117-118. On the other hand,
the mere reference to precedents need not signify the adoption of common-law methodology. See Adams,
supra note 29. For the pre-Revolutionary French legal tradition of privileging specific facts in judicial
decisions,
see generally Palmer, supra note 74, at 283.
2
10Patrick Atiyah, Lawyers and Rules: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 37 Sw. L.J. 545 (1983).
For a revealing and somewhat paradoxical comment about United States practice, see the recent case ofKimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,98-99 (2000) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Despite my respect for stare
decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent .... The kind ofjudicial activism
manifested in [that and other similar cases] represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this
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methodology treats precedents as establishing binding norms. 21' This would suggest a
considerable measure of deductive reasoning in English legal methodology, the

common-law methodology operating within the European Union. 212 Moreover, as Kant
put it, "the faculty ofjudgment ... is not simply a capacity of subsuming the particular
under the universal whose concept is given [as in typical civil-law
methodology], but
2 13
also the converse, of finding the universal for the particular.,
The question persists, however, as to how abstract such common-law norms are or
can be. Any norm derived from case law inevitably will be a function of the facts that
gave rise to the norm.214 Indeed, Justice Cardozo suggested in Palsgraf,as he attempted
a definition of negligence, that "[p]roof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not
216
do;" 215 i.e., "[itmay well be that there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract.,
217
Holmes concurred: "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." As Holmes
discussed in The Common Law, fact and law are not easily distinguishable from each
other in a system in which the two are inextricably intertwined and interdependent in a
dynamism of mutual interaction. 218 Melvin Eisenberg has concluded that common-law
Court that it should be opposed ...").
21 Atiyah, supra note 210. Atiyah and Summers also develop this theme in Atiyah & Summers, supra
note 26, at 267-297. Accord, In re Groffman, [19691 1 W.L.R. 733, [1969]2 All. E.R. 108 (wherein Judge
Simon of England's High Court of Justice notes that "I am bound by what was decided by the Court of
Appeal, even ifI were to disagree with it....") (reprinted in Jesse Dukemenier& Stanley M. Johanson, Wills,
trusts, and Estates, 227,231(2000)); ArthurL. Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, 15 Cornell L. Q.
173, 190-91 (1930) (Goodhart suggests that United States lawyers are less likely than their English
counterparts to "believe in the authority of precedents" because Americans are accustomed to a lack oflegal
uniformity among state jurisdictions. He implies that the leap from interstate diversity to nonuniformity within
a given jurisdiction is easily made.); Cf. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 42 ("[M]ost ofthe important constraints on
judicial discretion come ... from the process of grappling with previous decisions"); accord Dawson, supra
note 12, at 81 ("The conception of the force of precedent that now prevails in England is the most extreme of
any to be found in the modern world."); but see Herget, supra note 60, at 65 n. 12 ("[S]tudents of the common
law [of both England and the United States] know that precedents often fal to constrain future court
decisions"); Estate of Parsons, 163 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (1980) (Grodin, J., of the California Court of Appeal,
stating that "[w]e [i.e., judges] cannot ignore what the statute commands ... 'merely because we do not agree
that the statute as written is wise or beneficial legislation'") (quoting Estate ofCarter, 9Cal. App. 2d 714,718
(1935)). For an account that emphasizes the similarities between U.S. and English judicial practices, see The
Right212
Hon. Lord Irvine of Lairg, Common origins, Common Future, 86 A.B.A. J. 55-56 (2000).
While the deductive component in a system of strict adherence to stare decisismay seem to signal a
similarity between the common-law and civil-law legal systems, it should be remembered that it is precisely
the non-adherence to precedents that is the hallmark of the civil-law legal mentality; thus, despite the increase
in deductive reasoning necessitated by England's stricter version ofstaredecisis, its increased attachment to
precedent also constitutes a discordancewith the civil-law perspective that is more pronounced than in the
United States' less precedent-bound version of stare decisis.
213Kant, supra note 13, at IS.
214 Accord, Llewellyn, supra note 41, at 2; Reimann, supra note 6, at 1342 ("Common lawyers construe
[legal rules] narrowly and always with a view to the concrete facts that generated them in the first place - an
approach almost antithetical to the succinct and general rules of which the traditional civil codes have
consisted."); Contra Lon Fuller, The Law in Quest ofltself 52-54 (1940) (commenting on Holmes' statement
that "[tihe prophecies ofwhat the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what Imean by the
law." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461). Fuller points out that it is
impossible to state a rule of law that is merely a prediction ofjudicial action, excluding all reference to reasons
underlying and motivating the action: i.e., to norms. Fuller, supra, at 52-55.
"' Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (quoting Sir Frederick Pollock, The
Law of Torts: A Treatise on the Principles of Obligations arising from Civil Wrongs in the Common Law 455
(I 1 ed. 1920)).
216Id. at 102 (Andrews, J. dissenting).
217Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
218See Holmes, supra note 43, at 122-23. See also Habermas, supra note I1, at 199 ("If we consider a
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courts intentionally formulate legal norms that go beyond what the pending case strictly
necessitates. 219 He calls this the "enrichment model," 220 and contrasts it to the "byproduct model," 22' in which courts would establish normative propositions "only as an
incidental by-product of resolving disputes."' 2 Under both models, however, the rules
courts are capable of formulating are rooted in the facts from which they emanate.
Moreover, under the doctrine of stare decisis, normative propositions not necessitated
by the adjudicated case may carry persuasive weight, even significant persuasive
weight, but not binding legal authority. 2 As Learned Hand put it,
precedents will not have the force of instances of a general principle, but of precedents
upon precisely the questions which were decided. While there is perhaps nothing
inherently or inevitably necessary in such a result, since a court might extend the logical
consequences of a decision beyond the precise question which it decided, yet,2 in
4 fact,
the result has been otherwise, as may be shown by the decisions themselves. 2
Not only is the rule created by each common-law judicial decision a function of the
case's facts, an effort of "divin[ing] the underlying principles [from] the morass of
particulars," 225 but also, as Edward Levi demonstrated, the rules of prior cases change
with each new application. 226 Rules change as they are applied for various reasons,
including the evolution of social values that is the focus of Levi's attention,227 but they
also change with application of necessity because they are applied to new facts, by
virtue of the inevitable factual disparity between the pending case and each precedent.
Each case is thus like a new square in a mosaic, or a sculptor's stroke, changing the face
of the whole, altering its meaning through the addition of facts in its trajectory through
time.
The civil-law norm, by contrast, is loosened from factual specificity by virtue of its
generality of expression and anonymity of origin. Although arguably no norm can be so
general as to be completely free of factual baggage, at least implicitly, nevertheless one
sees the disconnectedness between civil-law norm and fact in, for example, the five
articles of the French Civil Code whose link to the entire field of French tort law they

case to be a state of affairs falling under a rule, then such a case is constituted only by being described in
terms of the norm applied to it. At the same time, the norm acquires a more accurate meaning precisely in
virtue of its application to a corresponding state of affairs, which is thereby transformed into a case. A norm
always 'takes in' a complex lifeworld situation only in a selective manner, in view ofrelevance prescribed by
the norm
2 9 itself.").
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 6.
'2 Id.; contra Posner, supra note 47, at 122 ("the ordinary judge ... is not interested in shaping the future
221Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 6.
2Id.; Cf. Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendorf, supra note 108, at 1115, describing the common-law
procedure of reaching rules as "ideas that come knocking on the door" ("iddes quifrappent6 la porte').
223See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 41, at 40-41 ("when [a court] speaks to the question before it, it
announces law, and if what it announces is new, it legislates, it makes the law. But when it speaks to any other
question at all, it says mere words, which no man needs to follow") (emphases in original).
224Hand, supra note 87, at 501.
22 Gunther, supra note 51, at 411.
226See Levi, supra note 42, at 3; see also Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 36 ("almost any rule employed in a
common law decision is new .... "'.
227
See id; see also Cardozo, supra note 44, at 23 ("every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted
rule which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.... ") (quoting
Munroe Smith, Jurisprudence, 21 (1909)).
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spawned is at best highly elusive if not utterly mysterious and ellipticalY 8 By contrast,
the common-law rule that emerges from each case may be conceivable only in terms of

numerous facts from the parties' lived experience, and the narrower the rule, the more
numerous those facts will be.
As Lon Fuller suggested in his powerful book, The Law In Quest Of Itself,written
in 1940 as an effort to identify and salvage the legal roots of democracy that were
withering in much of the western world, the common-law judge is unable to draw the
dividing line between fact and norm. 229 Fuller approved of the common law's
coalescence of fact with law, endorsing case law as more adept than legislation in
fostering public ethics. 230
Hermann Kantorowicz, the maverick German thinker who had inspired American
legal realism, hotly disagreed: "In the interpretation of American law, and for that
matter European law also, we must distinguish between law and facts." 23' By the time
Kantorowicz wrote those words, he had been thrust into the common-law legal world by
the forces of history, having been stripped in Nazi Germany in 1933 of his professorship
at the University of Kiel.232 The Nazi judicial system was to abuse ideas some found
reminiscent of those Kantorowicz had developed in his scholarship, in order to justify
judicial outcomes at odds with established German legal norms. 23'
228See Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 615-622 (3d ed. 1998); see
generally Tomlinson, supra note 209; see also id. at 1361-1362 apps. I and 2 (for English translations ofthe
French code tort articles). For a fascinating depiction of another example ofdisconnectedness of legal norm
from factual circumstance in French law, see John P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany,
57 U. Mich. L. Rev. 495 (1959).
229Fuller, supra note 77.
230 Fuller believed that the common-law judge "ought to be proud that his contribution is such that it
cannot be said with certainty whether it is something new or only the bettertelling ofan old story." Id. at 140;
accord, Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 18 ("it is extremely difficult to say in practice and in concepiualization
just where discovery gives way to creation") (emphasis added); Holmes, supra note 43, at 122-25; SchwarzLiebermann von Wahlendorf, supra note 108, at 1114 ("lesfrontihresentre precedent et principle peuvent 6tre
fluides"). See Fuller, supra, at 132 et seq. for the view that judicially created law promotes morality better
than legislative law, for "the greater moral persuasiveness ofjudge-made law.... Id. at 134. Cass Sunstein
agrees with Fuller inasmuch as he associates common-law methodology with democracy. See Sunstein, supra
note 5, at 24-45. In terms of U.S. constitutional law, Guy Scoffoni argues that it is the possibility of amending
the Constitution that reconciles constitutional justice with democratic theory and legitimizes the powerful role
of the judge in the United States' political system. See Scoffoni, supra note 82, at 265.
231Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79, at 1244. See also Kantorowicz,
Dualism of Facts and Rules, in Kantorowicz, Definition of Law, supra note 164, at 25-28; Jauffret-Spinosi,
supra note 13, at 756-757 (describing the failure of non-French court opinions to distinguish between facts and
law as highly confusing to French jurists reading such opinions).
232See Muscheler, supra note 162.
233See Herget & Wallace, supra note 76, at 418-19. As Professor Whitman has signaled, to say that Nazi
legal theory abused Kantorowicz's work is an oversimplification of complex facets of Nazi legal theory.
Letter from Professor James Q. Whitman (May 2,2000) (on file with author). My own sense is that the uses,
misuses, abuses or, more simply, the potential applications and interpretations of legal theory are so vast and
varied that legal theory often can be used in good faith for purposes antithetical to its original underlying
tenets and conceptualization. For an account of post-war criticism of Kantorowicz for having views in
common with Nazi jurisprudence, see the excellent article of Joerges, supra note 203, at 171. For a further
presentation of my own views, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Rethinking Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz: Free
Law, American Legal Realism, and the Legacy of Anti-Formalism in Rethinking the Masters of Comparative
Law (Annelise Riles ed., forthcoming). For an account ofNazi legal practice, see Legal and Political Science:
Hans Frank, Carl Schmitt and Others, in Max Weinreich, Hitler's Professors: The Part of Scholarship in
Germany's Crimes Against the Jewish People 36-40 (1999). For Gustav Radbruch's criticism of the Free Law
Movement as structurally indistinguishable from Carl Schmitt's nationalistic decisionism, see Fromrnmel, supra
note 162, at 61-62.
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Kantorowicz's sense of the separability of facts from substantive issues of law may
have stemmed from the traditional civil-law conception of the role of facts in civil-law
legal culture. The civil law delegates the search for facts to judges, such that facts do not
become subject to what Professor Langbein calls "[a]dversary domination," as they do
in common-law systems in which private parties dominate the investigation of facts.23
Since the facts in civil-law systems typically are ascertained preliminarily and primarily
by the court until such time as the judge believes the dossier to be factually accurate,
facts themselves are not conceived of as the focal trial issues to be argued and disputed
by the adversaries. 235
Although Kantorowicz disagreed with Fuller about the desirable relation between
fact and norm, Kantorowicz in 1934, like Fuller in 1940, reflected on law's tragic
potentials for rabid injustice.2 6 My sense is that Kantorowicz would have been a great
supporter of the European Union and an advocate for a single, all-encompassing judicial
methodology. In part, I believe this would have been an outgrowth of his ultimately, at
least partially, civilian legal perspective, of his sense that right answers exist, and that
there is a best way discoverable for, and applicable to, both common-law and civil-law
legal methodology, an outlook admittedly greatly mitigated and colored by his profound
insights into
the complexities of law as a vibrant social instrument in evolving
2

societies. 37
To the extent that Kantorowicz would have favored a common methodology for the
common- and civil-law judicial systems, it would have been by virtue ofbelieving them
to have enough shared attributes to warrant a single methodology, for he was a lifelong
critic of the view that objectively correct principles of law can be identified as common

2 See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 845 (1985). Accord,
Damalka, supra note 65, at 2 & n.3 (including references to others who have espoused this view). Damatka
also emphasizes the importance of "the peculiar organization of the trial court; [and] the temporal
concentrations of proceedings," as well as the control of the adversaries, in understanding Anglo-American
fact-finding. Id. at 4.
23s
See Langbein, supra note 234, at 845. See also Whitman, Legacy of Roman Law, supra note 12, at 38
(noting the widespread view in sixteenth-century Germany that "adversary justice [was] immoral"). For
modem criticism of the effects of the common-law's adversarial control and definition of facts,
see Daniatka,
supra note 65, at 100.
'3 See Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79.
37Indeed, in his conclusion to DerKampfum die Rechtswissenschaft,Kantorowicz portrayed his free
law movement as demanded by the times, and outlined the historical evolution that rendered free law
appropriate for the twentieth century. See Gnaeus Flavius (pseudonym for Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz), Der
Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaf 49 (1906). Kantorowicz had a very nuanced view. He rejected both the
traditional civilian perspective that legal principles can be adopted effectively in every legal system, but also
rejected the view that decisionism can lead codified laws to be instrumentalized to serve any goal; i.e., that
law is arbitrary because subject to unpredictable interpretation. See generally Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism
about Realism, supra note 79; Frommel, supra note 162, at 50-51 (for Kantorowicz's disagreement with
Gustav Radbruch and Ernst Fraenkel's belief that codified laws can be used to reach any purpose ajudge or
legislative system may have). See also Monika Frommel, Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz (1877-1940): Ein
streitharer Relativist, in Streithare Juristen: Eine andere Tradition, 243,247 (Thomas Blanke et al., eds., 1988)
("man kdnne nur beide Gesichtspunkte kombinieren - wissend, daft es kein 'richigesRecht, 'sondern nur
mehr oder wenigerplausibleRechtsaberzeugungen geben k6nne. '); see also id. ("Die Meinung,Zwecke und
Werte wissenschaftlich begrfindenzu k6nnen, hielter [Kantorowiczjfitreinenneuen Aberglauben. ").In part,
I suspect that Kantorowicz would have been a proponent of the European Union because of his antipathy to
nationalism. See Muscheler, supra note 162, at 119 (for the attraction that the idea of an international order
held for Kantorowicz, despite his ultimately abandoning the idea). For a thorough analysis ofKantorowicz's
legal theory, see Karlheinz Muscheler, Relativismus und Freirecht: Ein Versuch fiber
Hermann Kantorowicz
(1984).
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to all legal systems. 238 Kantorowicz was ahead of his time in signaling the contextuality
of meaning and in taking an anti-essentialist, semiotic approach to legal analysis, which

he called "conceptual pragmatism." 239
Nevertheless, like Isaiah Berlin, whose belief in value pluralism did not prevent
him from also believing that there was a "kernel of truth in the old a priori natural law

tradition, ' ,240 Kantorowicz also suggested that natural law concepts are not totally

invalid, despite his emphasis of cultural and anthropological approaches to
understanding the nature of law: "Ifonly positive law were 'law,' as is taught by many
authorities, Grotius' lus belli ac pacis (1625) should not be mentioned in a history of
legal science because its epoch-making ideas concerning natural law, like those of its
innumerable predecessors and successors, would not be ideas concerning 'law' .... ,241
This is how Kantorowicz concluded his article, published in 1934, five years before
Germany invaded Poland, and one year before the enactment of Hitler's Nuremberg

laws:
[S]ound methods without a sound methodology are dangerous, not so much in the
hands of the master as in the hands of his pupils. Here lies, it seems to me, a field for
fruitful cooperation. Perhaps the present events in Germany, like the even more
memorable accomplishments of the Turks in 1435, may facilitate this cooperation. Let
238The latter view had been endorsed by the German legal theoretician Staxnmler. For Kantorowicz's

criticism of Stammler, see Monika Frommel, Die Kritik am "Richtigen Recht" durch Gustav Radbruch und
Hermann Ulrich Kantorowicz," in Jenseits des Funktionalismus: Arthur Kaufmann zum 65. Geburtstag 53
(Lothar Philipps & Heinrich Scholler eds., 1989); Muscheler, Relativismus und Freirecht, supra note 237, at
29. Indeed, Frommel suggests that Kantorowicz's views corresponded to Lon Fuller's idea of the inner
morality of law. See Frommel, supra, at 60 (citing Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity in Law - A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630-705 (1958) and Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964)); see also
Kantorowicz, Legal Science, supra note 165, at 684-685 ("This universality [of legal values] is, indeed, certain
in the case of the theoretical value, since more than one truth is logically inconceivable; but it is only probable
in the case ofthe esthetical value, and it is highly improbable in the case of the practical values. The validity
of practical values, therefore, is only a relative one, i.e., different practical values are appropriate for different
types ofconscience, the types being distinguished by the recognition of different final aims."). In analyzing
methodologies for conducting comparative law, George Bermann concludes that "[i]t would be conlrary to the
appreciation of diversity that underlies the comparative law enterprise itselfto erect a single ... methodology
as, alone, worthy of the enterprise." George A. Bermann, The Discipline of Comparative Law in the United
States, 4 Revue intemationale de droit compart 1041, 1052 (1999).
239
See Kantorowicz, The Definition of Law, supra note 164, at 1-10; Kantorowicz, Legal Science, supra
note 165, at 684 ("The objective validity of the values does not necessarily imply their universality .... ").
Compare with integrative jurisprudence's definition of law, with less emphasis on the justiciable, but
otherwise with much in common with Kantorowicz's definition: "Law may be defined as the balancing of
justice and order in the light of experience." Berman, supra note 198, at 788.
2
'wHans Blokland, Berlin on Pluralism and Liberalism: A Defence, 4 The European Legacy 1,6 (1999)
(quoting
24 Isaiah Berlin, Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays, 166 (1980)).
Kantorowicz, Definition of Law, supra note 164, at 14. He also portrayed natural law affinatively in
contrast to nineteenth-century positivism, describing naturalism as a form of free law. See Gnaes Flavius,
supra note 237, at 10-l1. Indeed, Kantorowicz describes free law as the natural law of the twentieth century:
"UnserfreiesRecht also ist Naturrecht- des 20.Jahrhunderts."Id. at 12; see also id. at41-50 (forthe relation
of morality and quasi-morality to law); Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, supra note 79 (for his
general criticism of American legal realism as one-sided, distorted and, perhaps most of all, simplistically
extremist). I am in complete agreement with Professor Joerges' view that the different contexts in which the
free law, sociological and legal realist theories emerged in, respectively, Germany and the United States,
resulted in different underlying conceptions in each nation of the apparently similar legal theories. See
Christian Joerges, On the Context of German-American Debates on Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal
Criticism: A History ofTransadantic Misunderstandings and Missed Opportunities, 1993 European Yearbook
in the Sociology of Law 403, 414 (1993).
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us hope that American and German jurists may combine their specific gifts, which so
happily supplement each other, in order to create the jurisprudence of the future.242
CONJUGATING A FUTURE IMPERFECT

243

The homogenization of Europe's legal cultures may be analyzed as part of a wider
issue of progressive cultural uniformity within the European Union. This section
explores processes of leveling absorption occurring on multiple fronts within the
European Union, as well as some underlying assumptions that both may be unwarranted
and detrimental to the future development of the European Union.
The European Union aspires to reconcile respect for national identity and national
sovereignty with legal and economic uniformity. In an article that should be required
reading for anyone involved in formative aspects of the European Union, Nathaniel
Berman describes the efforts of international legal experts after World War I to
implement a "new world order." 2" Although Berman does not address the European
Union directly, the resemblances between the interwar era and the current era in Europe
are more than striking. They take on an eerily Cassandra-like resonance with respect to
the European Union's ability to reconcile national rights, aspirations, cultures and
sovereignty with a legal order that can unify disparate nations under an order governed
by a humane rule of law.
The Paris Peace Conference that followed the First World War and the turmoil of
the decline and fall of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires resulted, with respect
to Germany, in the Treaty of Versailles, which in turn culminated in the world
cataclysm known to us today as the Second World War and the holocaust. It
emphatically is not my purpose to suggest that analogies between the post-World War I
international law measures and the ongoing formation of the European Union would
justify a conclusion that the European Union is likely to culminate in similar human
catastrophe. Indeed, it is not my belief that the post-World War I attempts to establish a
new international legal order based on civilized, humanitarian liberal legal principles
caused the rise of Hitler or Nazism. An accumulation of the unlikeliest of coincidences
and tragic fortuities in my view was more responsible for Hitler's accession to power
than were the interwar events Berman describes in his compelling article.245
242

Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism. supra note 79, at 1253. The ironic reference to "the
memorable accomplishments ofthe Turks" is to the astonishing conquests ofMohammed I, most notably,
and starting with, his siege of Constantinople in 1453, which was followed by his conquests of Serbia,
Walachia, Bosnia, Albania and the Crimea, culminating only with his death in 1481, as he stood on the brink
of conquering Venice. Kantorowicz must principally have been comparing Hitler's rapid acquisition of a
stranglehold on power in Germany to Mohammed's siege of Constantinople, since Kantorowicz was writing
several years before Hiter's Blitzkrieg successes, but the latter also bear comparison to Mohammed's military
victories both in their breadth and speed. For an overview of Turkish history under Mohammed I, see 22
Encyclopaedia Britannica 588, 592 (1954) (entry for Turkey). Professor Whitman has pointed out to me that
many Greek scholars went into exile after the fall of Constantinople, and that "Kantorowicz was identifying
himself with them, and hoping for an American Renaissance" along the lines of the Italian Renaissance
arguably triggered by the exiled Greek intellectuals. Whitman, Letter, supra note 233. Kantorowicz's hopes
were realized in the field of comparative law, as it was the generation of refugees from fascist Europe that
triggered the greatest era of comparative law in the United States' history.
'43
This title was inspired in part by Judi, supra note 12
2
44
Nathaniel Berman, But the Alternative Is Despair: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal
of International Law, 106 Han'. L. Rev. 1792, 1794 (1993).
"4 See Curran, The Legalization of Racism, supra note 195, at 13-14; Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Hitler's
Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (1996).
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I do believe, however, that the interwar period has important instructive potential
for the European Union inasmuch as a shared fallacy suggests that extreme caution and
even skepticism are called for in the face of the widespread belief that the European
Union's current institutional and legal structures are capable of preventing renewed
political and social turmoil in Europe. An underlying assumption common in the
European Union today, also operative among international lawyers after the First World
War, is that a transition from barbarity to civilization has occurred, and that the new
legal order being created will assure the preservation in the European Union of a
harmonious reconciliation and coexistence of national rights and human rights. As in
the aftermath of the First World War, today, a half century after the Second World War,
the citizens of the former belligerent states share a sense that Europe will not regress
into the atrocities and upheavals of the past. 24
Just as in the period following the first World War, in Europe today, the European
Union assumes that "[t]he recognition of nationalism [is] ... the prerequisite to an order
marked by peace and liberty, 247 an order simultaneously capable of satisfying
nationalist longings and limiting nationalist excesses. Berman notes the paradox of the
interwar era, equally true of the European Union today, that the "law would be founded
on nationalist 'puissance' and yet stand in opposition to it.,' 2 4 Just as in the European
Union today, many in the interwar period wanted to replace the state by the individual
as the foundational principle of international law.249
The focus on supranational law as the autonomous link among the various nations,
and as a power acquiring independent force, so potent in the European Union today,
also characterized the interwar era: "The recognition of nationalism revitalized
international law, while the indirect and asymmetrical quality of the 'alliance' freed
international law to respond to the nationalist challenge with a wide range of innovative,
specifically 'legal' solutions." 2 0 From this new legal order it was thought that a new
Europe would arise, a Europe that would honor its civilized, enlightened heritage.
The alleged triumph of the Versailles Treaty, so evocative ofthe European Union's
current self-image and self-representation, was its creation of a "subtle system aimed at
the simultaneous preservation of sovereign prerogatives, national identities, and
individual and minority rights ....
As we know today, however, that system was not
able to
prevent the destruction of millions - state 'citizens,' ethnic 'nationals,' linguistic
'minorities,' and internationalized 'inhabitants' - in the name ofputatively national and
even European goals. Auschwitz is located in Upper Silesia, the very region in which
the interwar 'experiment' in attempting to resolve the 'chaos and violence' of
nationalist conflict through law had achieved its fullest expression.252

246 This

point was made with force by Professor Thierry Leterre, according to whom French youth

dismisses out of hand the idea of another war with Germany, so preposterous it seems to them. Thieny
Leterre, Lecture at the University of Pittsburgh, Center for West European Studies and European Union
Center (March 17, 1999).
247Berman, supra note 244, at 1802.
248Id. at 1803.
249See id. at 1807.
250 Id.

at 1820.

2s Id. at 1899.
2" Id. at 1899-1990.
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Another, earlier, analogy to the European Union is to be found in nineteenthcentury efforts within Germany to use Roman law as a unifying, universalizing force for
justice. a 3 Describing the ultimate failure of Savigny and Jhering's strivings to achieve
this, Professor Whitman poignantly summarizes as follows, in a comment equally
applicable to the more internationalist aspirations of the interwar era that is Berman's
focus: "Between the intention and the act ... fell the shadow. For better or for worse, the
history of Roman law in Germany proved to be a history of unrealized 2hopes and
miscalculated programs - as, sadly, has so much of modem legal history." 5
If the tradeoff between European Union measures constructing a new, uniform legal
order today, with a corollary, however much unavowed, diminution in cultural diversity
and autonomy, were a tradeoff between sacrificing diversity for the sake of future
peace; if the increasing bureaucratization of Europe, the finneling of the many into the
one, were the price to pay to preserve European life itself, to prevent definitively a
recurrence of the events that from 1933 to 1945 deprived millions of European victims
of human dignity and of life, and caused thousands of European victimizers to descend
into depraved savagery - if one could count on those being the terms of the tradeoff, the
price to pay would seem to many to be well worth it.
The horror of Europe's recent past defined the possibilities of what the European
Union undertook to seek to prevent in its future. The striking similarities between the
European Union's formative efforts to create a new legal order and those evoked above
that occurred during the interwar era, may give us cause for uneasiness today, however,
to the extent that the interwar measures in international law illuminate the inability of
law and democratic institutions to internalize mechanisms for self-perpetuation.
One of the lessons to be gleaned from the Second World War is the fragility of
constructs designed to achieve, not only democracy and the rule of law, but also, and
especially, the endurance of those constructs. It is perhaps of particular note in this
context to remember that, in 1940, France democraticallyended its own democracy, by
a process that punctiliously followed the Third Republic's prescribed legal procedure. 2 5
In June of 1940, an elected French parliament voluntarily and suicidally destroyed by
democratic vote an old and venerable democracy. With an overwhelming majority, the
legislature created in its place a dictatorship that was to demolish France's democratic
structures, and to stain the word "collaboration" with the sinister connotations it
acquired when France's new leader, Philippe Ptain, soon thereafter dedicated his nation
to collaborating with the goals and methods of Nazi Germany. 2 6
My study of the phenomenon of France's destruction of democracy by the very
institutional means its democratic structures had developed in order to perpetuate
democracy, has led me to doubt whether human institutions can be so structured as to
transcend contemporaneous values held by individuals and groups, values that fluctuate
over time with the hopes and fears of those who harbor them. Human values exist in
transient relations of mutual influence with the paths and choices that emerge as
253See

Whitman, Legacy of Roman Law, supra note 12; Rudolf von Jhering, Der Geist des romischen

Rechts, supra note 11.
2 Whitman, Legacy of Roman Law, supra note 12, at 234. Hein KOtz notes that Anselm von Feuerbach
predated hering by several decades in calling for legal unification and universalization. See Hein KOtz,
Comparative
Law in Germany Today, 4 Revue intemationale de droit compard 753, 753-54 (1999).
25 5
For adetailed discussion of that process, see Curran, The Legalization of Racism, supranote 195, at
15-24.

' See id.
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desirable and undesirable to populations and individuals reacting to evolving personal,
social, political, cultural and economic circumstances at given moments.
The concept I am trying to communicate, particularly the irreducible dependence of
political and institutional significance on the conduct and beliefs of those who people a
given society at a given point, was captured by Ernst Cassirer, writing in 1945:
The self-preservation of the state cannot be secured by its material prosperity nor can it
be guaranteed by the maintenance of certain constitutional laws. Written constitutions
or legal charters have no real binding force, if they are not the expression of a
constitution that is written in the citizens' minds.
Without this moral support the very
257
strength of a state becomes its inherent danger.

This is a reason to weigh the processes at work in the European Union in a new
light. It is not a reason to renounce the attempt to develop institutions that will foster
long-term respect for human rights and the rule of law. To the extent that the ineffable
interplay of individual and collective life with social, political, cultural, economic and
historical influences can reinforce human commitment to democratic, humane values,

the European Union's effort to construct institutions that promote and strengthen those
values is critically important. It is in its aspiration to construct such institutions that the
European Union is the greatest adventure of our time, properly invested with our hopes
for a civilized future. Less justified, however, is to invest in the European Union
assumptions that its aspirations
for a civilized future are an already accomplished part of
25 8
the acquis communautaire.
If we are to weigh the relative value of national cultural autonomy with legal and
economic uniformity, how do we arrive at the precise, or even imprecise, weights we
should assign each of those values? To believe that they are incommensurable does not
preclude the logic of trying to grasp and formulate the interests involved, at least
inasmuch as incommensurability does not eviscerate the logic of certain ultimate
judgments, such as the one suggested earlier, that loss of cultural specificity would be
worth the sacrifice if the preservation of the lives of millions were the result of such an
exchange. The dubious nature of any attempt to predict the future course of events as
the European Union's institutions take shape and evolve may make the weighing appear
less likely to assist ultimate judgment, yet, to the extent that we see legal and economic
uniformity as inversely correlated with cultural diversity, we should try to assess the
merits and importance of each, despite the inevitably profound limitations to our
historical foresight, limitations which Wittgenstein summarized as follows and which
may be helpful to remember: "When we think of the world's future, we always mean
the destination it will reach if it keeps going in the direction we can see it going in now;
157 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, 76 (1946); accord, Theory of Legal Change, in Wolfgang
Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society 3-62 (1988); Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 Ratio
Juris 31, 41 (2000) (success of constitutions "hinge[s] on the degree to which the political and social values
that animate the making of the constitution continue to be widely shared in the relevant society"); see also
Lovibond, supra note 144, at 54-58 (noting that obedience to rules emanates from preexisting communal
consensus as to rules, coupled with sanctions derived from those rules, rather than from an autonomous power
within rules to command obedience).
25s Cf. Paul Robert, Dictionnaire alphabdtique et analogique de la langue franqaise 618 (1972) ("Nos

espdrances mesurent notre bonheurprdsent bienplutdt que notre bonheur t, venir") (entry for "espdrance").

For an analysis of the concept of "acquiscommunautaire," see Roger J.Goebel, The European Union Grows:
The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 Fordham Int'l L. J.1092,
1140-57 (1995).
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to us that its path is not a straight line but a curve, constantly changing
it does not 2occur
59
direction.
Scholarly literature increasingly has been signaling the encroachment on cultural
26
0
diversity by European Court of Justice decisions promoting economic uniformity.
The European Union also exerts pressures that militate against cultural diversity in other
ways. A recent New York Times article reports turmoil in Spain as the Spanish cling to
their traditional midday siesta, resisting European Union pressures to relinquish a habit
thought to undermine efficiency and progress. 261 As the article states, "[t]he siesta
question is a big issue here because abandoning the midday snooze amounts to a radical
change in the traditional way of life. 262 The assault on the siesta follows a prior,
unsuccessful attempt by the European Union to eliminate the Spanish accent known as
the "tilde" from computer keyboards "in order to conform with the single [European]
market enshrined in the Treaty of Rome .... ,,263
What is the value of a tilde or of the siesta, or of the faces of a nation's historically
important literary, political and scientific figures on national currencies soon to
disappear into a single European currency? What is the value of culture to any society?
Can culture be generalized or must it retain national specificity to fulfill its purposes?
The inevitable imprecision of the answers to such questions will be exacerbated by the
existence of a wide range of answers within any nation-state, as well as by the fact that
2
different aspects of culture will be prized to varying degrees within different cultures. 6
At one extreme of the spectrum is the view of the British diplomat and writer,
Harold Nicolson, which Professor Merryman quoted in his article, Two Ways of
Thinking About CulturalProperty.265 Nicolson thought it reasonable to sacrifice human
life for Europe's artistic patrimony, for, in his words, "the loss of even the most valued
human life is ultimately less disastrous than the loss of something which in no
circumstances can be created again.,, 26 Nicolson more specifically declared himself
ready to sacrifice both his own life and his sons' lives: "I should assuredly be prepared
to be shot against a wall if I were certain that by such a sacrifice I could preserve the
Giotto frescoes nor should I hesitate for an instant ... to save St. Mark's even if I were
11267
aware that by so doing I should bring death to my sons ....
But who is the aggressor threatening national cultures? Europe's national cultures
are in battles of self-defense that are not solely reactions against the European Union. In

29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 3e (George H von Wright ed., Peter Winch trans., 1984).
2mSee Elies Steyger, National Traditions and Community Law: Margarine and Marriage (1997).
261See Suzanne Daley, Spain Rudely Awakened to Workaday World, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1999, at 1.
262Id.
2

Perhaps still more significantly, as Clifford Geertz puts it, "[tihe trouble is that no one is quitesure

what culture is. Not only is it an essentially contested concept, like democracy, religion, simplicity or social
justice; it is a multiply defined one, multiply employed, ineradicably imprecise. It is fugitive, unsteady,
encyclopedic, and normatively charged, and there are those, especially those for whom only the really real is
really real, who think it vacuous altogether, or even dangerous, and would ban it from the serious discourse of
serious persons." Clifford GCertz, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics, 11
(2000) (emphasis added). See also Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 61,
62-63 (2000) (difficulties involved in attempting to define the meaning of the concept of culture).
265John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 Am. J. Int'l. L. 831
(1986).
266
Sir Harold Nicolson, Marginal Comments, Spectator, Feb. 25, 1944 (quoted in Merryman, supra note
265, at26 840).
7 Id.
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ascribing respective weights to assess the balance of European economic uniformity, on
the positive side, against the leveling of European cultures, on the negative side, one
would want to avoid attributing blame to the European Union for progressive cultural
uniformity caused by forces other than the European Union, and for which the European
Union may not be responsible.
Some thirty years ago, I sat next to my mother at a play in a theater in France. Since
she was speaking to me in French during the intermission, my mother was surprised
when a young American woman needing assistance confidently addressed her in
English. My mother's English was fluent from decades of residence in the United States
and prior study of English, but audibly non-native. When asked, the young woman
explained that she unhesitatingly had identified my mother as an American because of
her unmistakably American shoes.
In the 1960's, I too had the impression that I could distinguish Americans from
Europeans based on their clothing. I further believed that, among Europeans, I could
distinguish people's countries of origin within Europe on the basis of clothing, at least
for some European countries. My evidence concededly is of minimal empirical value,
especially since I rarely verified my conclusions, let alone conducted anything remotely
resembling a controlled experiment. Nevertheless, it has been many years since any of
the distinctions which once struck me so forcibly have seemed to exist at all. Today,
especially among the young, not only do Europeans seem to me indistinguishable from
each other in their dress in terms of particular countries of origin, but, in addition,
European youth generally also seems to me to be indistinguishable from American
youth on the basis of dress.
The increasing similarity with American culture would suggest that the forces
engendering and promoting uniformity are not restricted to the European Union. After
all, the outspoken battle of France againstfranglaisis being waged against American,
not British, English. While there may be no official or discernible comparable linguistic
battle in Germany, a regular perusal of German news magazines or newspapers reveals
an influx of English words at a pace as rapid and of a magnitude as momentous as those
which France is experiencing.268 On the other hand, whatever the precise relative
measure of the leveling of cultural diversity by influences often grouped under the
general rubric of globalization, the European Union at the least also represents a force in
increasing cultural homogeneity, and is hastening, although not solely responsible for,
the demise of cultural specificity among its Member States.
In February of 1999, the French television program, Bouillon de culture, aired a
show about the European Union in the form of interviews with several authors who had
just published books dealing with the European Union.269 One of the authors had written
a book in "Europanto," humorously touted as the European language of the future. The
word "Europanto" evokes that other artificially constructed language, Esperanto,
replacing the etymological root for "hope" ("esperer" in French; "esperar"in Spanish;
"sperare"in Italian) in "Esperanto," with that for "Europe" in "Europanto."
This, again, is a report of my personal, nonscientific, observations, but I feel justified in describing
them because of the massive extent of the influx of English words into the standard spoken and written
vocabulary in both France and Germany. Acquaintances from Italy and Spain confirm a similar influx of
English words into their languages. Moreover, in France, at least some scholars argue that the American
influences threaten not only French vocabulary, but also traditional, and presumably far more deeply
entrenched, French syntactical structures.
269
Bouillon de culture (TV 5 television broadcast, Feb. 5, 1999).
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Esperanto was developed by Ludovic Zamenhof in the late nineteenth century as a
way of overcoming humanity's Tower of Babel, by demolishing the "language barriers
[that] can exacerbate national and racial antagonisms., 270 I was first introduced to
Esperanto at the age of eight or nine by a relative who has been a devoted advocate and
fluent speaker for most of his adult life. Conversant in French, German and English, I
had no trouble understanding Esperanto immediately, without having had any prior
exposure to it.
Piggybacking on the foundational ideas of Esperanto, Europanto poses as having
just one basic rule (as opposed to Esperanto's sixteen rules) 27 1 : namely, to be
comprehensible to any national of any European Union Member State.27 By February,
1999, the date of my first exposure to Europanto (on Bouillon de culture), in addition to
the three European Union Member State languages that I spoke, I had studied two other
Member State languages, although without having acquired fluency in either of the
latter. Paradoxically, in contrast to the instant comprehensibility of Esperanto, I could
not make heads or tails of Europanto when the author read excerpts of the book he had
written in it. I would estimate that I understood the gist of between five and seven
percent of the Europanto text he read.
The author also had translated la Marseillaise,the French national anthem, into
Europanto, and agreed to sing it on the show. Despite knowing the French lyrics, I once
again found myself at a loss to understand most of the strange sounds I was hearing. It
later became clear that this in part was because the putative translation involved a
Europeanizing alteration of a semantic nature. For example, the Europanto translation of
one of the more bellicose lines in the anthem, in which France's citizens are urged to
take up weapons, "Aux armes, citoyens!," was one ofthe few phrases I could understand
in Europanto, and this led to my discovery that the song had not been translated with a
goal to preserving semantic significance. The phrase had been transformed into a new
concept: "Las linguas, citoyens!"
The alleged translation had transmuted the national call to weapons into the
European promise of peace. 3 The Europanto version of la Marseillaise implicitly
extols language and communication as the European substitute for violence. Ironically,
in Europanto, the anthem stresses languages in the plural ("las linguae'), while
Europanto itself symbolizes an end to linguistic plurality, a replacement of one for the
multitude of European languages, as it purports to endorse communication through the
impenetrable veil of its own incomprehensibility.
In this, Europanto may be seen as a metaphor for the dilemma of the European
Union: on the one hand, its self-representation of encouraging plurality and diversity,

" Entry "Esperanto,"in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1968 Printing. I am grateful to my relative, Ulrich
Paul Ronald, who has been an active member of the movement to promote Esperanto, for sending me all of
the materials on Esperanto I have used in preparing this article, and for having introduced me to it in my
childhood.

'7'See The ABCs of Esperanto (Channing L. Bete Co. ed., 1971). Europanto's single grammatical rule
was in statement made by Europanto writer on Bouillon de culture, see supra note 269.
Statement made by Europanto writer on Bouillon de culture, supra note 269.
273In the shadow of the Second World War and the German Occupation, the Marseillaiseacquired a
symbolism of universality in the French popular consciousness, but one that preserved and incorporated,
rather than diluted, the significance of its French nature. See, for example, the poem by Louis Aragon, French
Resistance fighter and surrealist poet, Et sicctaithi refairejereferaice chemin, in which he evokes a French
Resistance member who, having refused to capitulate to the Gestapo, dies singing the Marseillaisenotjust for
the sake of France, but for the sake of all of humanity ("finissant la Marseillaisepour route I'humanitd").
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coupled on the other hand with its imposition of oneness over the many, the erasure of
difference through the artificial construction ofa new, unique and single format aspiring
to meet the needs of Europe's future.
The univocality of Europanto implicitly offers the image of an end to the Tower of
Babel, but, in its failure to be comprehensible, Europanto might appropriately be
described as contributing yet one more tongue to the confusion wrought by the already
existing mutually incomprehensible languages of Europe. Finally, in addition to being
universally incomprehensible, Europanto seems to have managed to eradicate the
lyricism that so profoundly marks the Romance languages of Europe, as well as to have
preserved no trace of the singular beauty and musicality of Europe's Germanic
languages.
The dilemma of Europe's striving to harmonize law and economics, to create the
foundations for a harmonious union of states without abolishing the cultural aspects
most emblematic of those states, is a serious dilemma. On the one hand, fulfilling the
dream of unifying Europe and of taking constructive steps towards achieving and
preserving the political and human ideals that more than once have been trampled in
Europe's past, is perhaps the most exciting, worthwhile and promising experiment being
conducted in the world today. On the other hand, the implications of the gradual, even
peaceful, decline of cultural specificity is an issue of grave proportions, for the
endangerment of cultural specificity is a threat that extends beyond the aesthetic
dimensions of European life.274
To the extent that convergence of national traditions or substitutions of new
European institutions occur, singularity replaces plurality. This tendency, if allowed to
proceed unreflectively and unchecked, ultimately may challenge the European Union's
ability to realize its most cherished ideals and goals. Democratic and liberal values may
be less likely to thrive in an increasingly homogeneous atmosphere. The efficiency of a
single computer keyboard, or of uniform waking and working hours throughout the
European Union, may contribute to making unanimity the rule, and individuality the
rare exception.
Innovation and tolerance may decline along with diversity in a culture that prizes
and promotes the efficiency uniformity can foster over the chaotic uncertainties of
difference, uncertainties that, however, may be correlated with disruptive intrusions
later understood to have been genius, just as the welter of chaos later may be understood
to have been synonymous with freedom. No matter, or despite, its inherent value, any
single perspective is in danger of self-impoverishment when not subject to contributions
from the outside, to visions and imaginations not contained within its own parameters.
As the European Union increasingly becomes institutionalized, an entity spreading everwider and deeper pools of uniformity into its Member States, it may find itself
undermining its own values by the very power it has acquired to promote them.
As I write these words, the New York Times reports the European Union's warning
to Austria against allowing Haider's nationalistic party into the Austrian government:
"The European Union warned today that its 14 other members would diplomatically
isolate the small country of Austria if its anti-immigrant Freedom Party led by Jdrg
Haider enters a coalition government." 275 Haider has become known for rejecting liberal
174For a discussion of related issues in the context of conducting international law, see Riles, supra note
11.
273Donald G. McNeil Jr., Europeans Move Against Austrians on Nativist Party, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
2000, at A-i. A subsequent New York Times article specified that there had been no vote by the European
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values of inclusiveness through anti-immigration positions, and by comments perceived
as reflecting support for Nazism.
The past looms as a warning that the institutions of democracy and the rule of law

are vulnerable to defeat from within, to implosion and transmutation. Gfinter
Verheugen, the unelected European Union Commissioner in charge of enlargement, has
been quoted as saying, "I don't believe in this wrong-headed notion that we can wait
and see what Haider really does. We must make it quite clear that in Europe, we will not
tolerate that you can win elections with anti-Europe, anti-foreigner, racist slogans." 276
Verheugen's views are echoed by many Austrian intellectuals and artists who foresee

repression of artistic and intellectual freedom of expression under Haider, and who are

11 1,277
articulating a sense of dej6 vu, of what will come again.
Verheugen and most of the European Union's Member States' populations were
educated after the war under the specter of the missed chances of their elders, the failure
to stop Hitler when it might still have been possible, whether in 1936, upon the
remilitarization of the Rhineland, or later, still before it was "too late." They were
educated to avoid what the historian Fritz Stem calls the evils of passivity.27 In
November 1999, the World Jewish Congress reported that threats to Austria's Jewish
population had "increased tenfold during
and following the successful campaign" of
279
Haider and hisfreiheitliche Partei.
In Paris, hundreds of people demonstrated in front of the Austrian Embassy on
February 5,2000, under a banner that read "Aujourd'huil'Autriche.Demainla France."
("Austria today. France tomorrow.") 28 0 Like Austria, France has a successful extremeright political party under the leadership of Jean-Marie LePen and, like Austria,
France's liberals have a memory, whether personal or historical, of the black years, les
anndes noires, as the German Occupation often is described.
Because of the past, many in Austria feel that they know what is coming, just as
many in European leadership positions must feel that the burden they carry today is
heavier because of the apparent resemblance of current events to those of the 1930's,
and perhaps because they may be experiencing
the present challenge as an opportunity
,,
281
to undo the past, to make "un-happen" what happened, to reverse the irreversible. In
the aftermath of the tragedy of the Second World War, one reaction was to try to wrest
meaning from the irremediable nature of the massive suffering and death. Perhaps
Europe today hopes that by applying the lessons of its elders, it will invest the tragedy
of the past with constructive significance. In acting against Austria, the Member States
technically are operating qua nations, but not only do they do so in concerted fashion,
and in their particular configuration as the European Union's Member States, but also

Parliament, suggesting that the warning issued by the fourteen Member States in unison and in the name of the

European Union at least implicitly reflected "an embryonic European government." Roger Cohen, If
Democracy
Is Not Enough, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2000, at A-12.
2
76 Gwynne Dyer, Haider, Not Hitler, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 6,2000, E-1, at E-4.
'f7 Interview with numerous artists and writers on German television, (transmitted to the United States
on Deutsche Welle - TV broadcast, Feb. 6, 2000).
278Fritz Stem, Einstein's German World, 10 (1999) ("No country, no society, is shielded from
the evils
that the passivity of decent citizens can bring about. That is a German lesson ofthe twentieth century - for all
of us").
279Dateline: World Jewry 3 (World Jewish Congress ed., 1999).

2goDeutsche Welle - TV broadcast, supra note 277.
281As H.L.A. Hart put it, "[tihe stink of [Nazi] society is still in our nostrils....

Hart, supranote 49, at
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by evoking the European Union expressly, despite the absence of a European legal
source of authority to so proceed.
If successful in excluding Haider's Freedom Party from the Austrian government,
would the European Union promote the liberal, humanistic values it cherishes and
believes Haider to revile, or would it pave the way for future exclusionism by its own
act of exclusion? Would it promote democracy by eliminating a perceived threat to
democracy, or would it promote repression by interfering with the internal freedoms of
a Member State's political processes? Would the European Union promote justice for
the perennial "other," symbolized by the immigrants some Austrians do not welcome,
by promoting the European Union's vision of justice, and its vision of the way to
justice, or would the European Union subvert its own values by failing to consider that a
different "other," even one as much at odds with its goals as Haider's political party,
also may have worth, or at least may have a right to be tolerated within the scope of
existing law, even if not endorsed? Aggressive action by the European Union against a
country as small and powerless as Austria, even for the best of motives, may also signal
the abandonment of the traditional European ideal of honor, which shuns the easy
victory of the strong over the weak and the small:
Trop peu d'honneurpour moi suivraitcette victoire:
A vaincre sans pdril,on triomphe sans gloire282

(I should derive too little honor from this victory:
To vanquish without peril is to triumph without glory)
The temptation to impose solutions grows to the extent that difference is not itself
prized as a value. As discussed in the next and last section, in a return to the context of
the European Union's converging methodologies and cultures of law, diversity's decline
may be the paradox lodged in the entrails of the European Union, ultimately
undermining from within the tolerance, individual rights and progress the European
Union seeks to realize and institutionalize.
CAUTIONARY CONCLUSIONS
The leap from civil-law conceptions of law to common-law conceptions, and vice
versa, is not small. A melding of the two signifies a profound alteration of each. The
question remains as to what consequences will result from the homogenization of
European legal culture already underway, and whether, ultimately, a single legal culture
is desirable. This question does not address the fairness of the relative strengths of
common-law versus civil-law components. The Europeanization of legal cultures
appears to be resulting in the relative domination of civil-law culture to the detriment of
common-law culture, but I intentionally do not address that concern because my focus is
on whether homogenization is possible and whether it is desirable, not whether the
result will reflect equal component parts of civil and common law.283
m Pierre Corneille, Le Cid, act I,scene ii (1637). For approving reactions to the European Union's
response to Austria, see I'Express, No. 2536, Feb. 10, 2000, 43-47 (especially Jacques Attali, Les postempires, at 44). For the view that the European Union's united stand against Austria signifies an important
political step towards the formation ofa future European Constitution, see id. at 44; and towards overcoming
"the logic
2 3 of sovereign nations" ("a logique de nations... souveraines'), see id. at 43.
1 Cf. Patrick Atiyah, Law and Modem Society, 63-64 (1983) ("it ishistorically true that minority legal
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On the one hand, as Eric Stein has pointed out in his article on the assimilation of
national laws as a function of European integration, the feasibility of a coherent
European economic system inevitably depends on a coherent European legal order. 2"
its goal of legal
To this end, the European Court of Justice has articulated
28 6 explicitly
uniformity. 285 It has been doing so for over thirty years.
It is difficult to quantify the amount of legal homogenization attributable
specifically to the European Union. Contacts between the common-law and civil-law
legal cultures have been increasing at a rapid pace due to the phenomenon generally
referred to as globalization. 28 7 Civilian-trained lawyers are studying in advanced law
degree programs in common-law countries in ever-greater numbers. The case-law
method is being adopted in bits and pieces by civil-law law professors who have studied
in the United States, thus exposing some subset of civil-law law students to it, and
diminishing what Judge Posner has described as "[t]he homogeneity of professional
288
Although assuredly not solely responsible for the increasing
training" in law.
methodological homogenization between the common and civil-law legal cultures, the

European Union nevertheless at the least is an important contributory factor in
accelerating the process, if not the primary catalyst in causing it.

Legal unification has had a long history in Europe, well beyond the unification of

law by Rome. 2 9 In pre-Revolutionary France, for instance, the legal uniformity
eventually achieved by Napoleon had been a goal of the Bourbon kings, deemed ever
29
more pressing as travel and communication increased among various parts of France. 0

The achievement of uniformity necessarily involves loss of diversity, of pluralism. A
loss in difference between the legal systems, cultures and traditions of the common and

systems in federal countries (e.g., Louisiana in the United States and Quebec in Canada) have tended over the
years to become greatly influenced by the majority systems and in the very long run this might also happen in
Europe"); and Glendon, supra note 107, at 487 n.3 (in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers, 3 ALL ER
316, 343 (1987), "the European Court seem[ed] to feel that the 'unwritten' common law may itself be unfair
to those it purports to govern.")
2" See Eric Stein, Assimilation ofNational Laws as a Function of European Integration, 58 Am. J. Int.
L. 1,29 (1964). See also John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and
the Common Law, 17 Stan. J .lnt'l Law 357, 363 (1981) ("differences between legal systems ... have
important practical consequences. They complicate and obstruct international communications, international
travel and international trade"); Kirchner, supra note 13, at 672-673 and sources cited therein ("there is a
common understanding that unification or harmonization of private law should be put on the agenda of the
European Union. The European Parliament has twice asked for a European civil code, which would mean not
only harmonization but unification ... ").
u See Stein, id. at 5 (discussing the use of terms such as "harmonization" and "coordination" in the
European treaties, and the European Court of Justice as initiating the use of the term "uniformity"); and Nial
Fennelly, The Area of "Freedom, Security and Justice" and the European Court of Justice - A Personal View,
49 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 1 (2000) (including numerous specific European Court of Justice references to its
aspirations of legal uniformity).
2' See Stein, supra note 284.
n7 Cf. John McCormick's reference to "the empirical fact of diminishing state ability to address issues of
bureaucratic accountability, economic regulation, and social justice under emerging conditions of what has
been variously referred to as internationalization, regionalization, multilateralism, Post-Fordism, and, most
fashionably, globalization." John P. McCormick, Max Weber and Jtrgen Habermas: The Sociology and
Philosophy of Law During Crises of the State, 9 Yale J.L. & Human. 297, 299 (1997); and Nora V.
Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 31 Ariz. St. L. J. 737, 746747 (1999) (describing legal systems' "mix[ing], intersect[ing] and cross-fertiliz[ing]").
21 Posner, supra note 47, at 58.
289See Jhering, Geist des romischen Rechts supra note 11 .
290See Levasseur, supra note 75, at 762-763; Moreteau, supranote 171 at 277; and Whitman, Legacy of
Roman Law, supra note 12, at 44-45.
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civil law militates against another goal of the European Union: namely, cultural
autonomy.
A growing literature is analyzing the European Court of Justice's encroachment on
cultural autonomy as it purports to adjudicate economic issues. 29' The word "purports"
may seem to suggest a disingenuousness on the part of the European Court of Justice
that I do not mean to convey. Rather, the nature of economic, political, legal and social
issues is such that they are too intertwined to be capable of the sort of separation and
isolation that would allow the Court to adjudicate one sort of issue without affecting the
others. Thus, whether or not the European Court of Justice intends to adjudicate issues
beyond its sphere of competence, we are seeing that such issues are inextricable from
those legitimately falling within European competence; consequently, they too are
subject to European homogenization.
I have used the word "homogenization" to describe the ongoing European blending
of civil-law and common-law legal methodology because it implies an admixture
resulting in a single, new product or byproduct, what we visualized earlier as the
intersection of two sets. This means that the resulting admixture does not preserve its
constitutive parts in their original composition. If the insights of Romanticism can be
applied to law, they surely teach us that the loss of the common-law and civil-law
perspectives, as they have existed for centuries and millennia, is the loss of two
perspectives of the world, of universes perceived, experienced and developed along
different paths.
The differentiations that human societies have developed, and, still more, the will to
differentiate, often are blamed for the extremism of virulent nationalism, with attendant
exclusion and persecution of minorities. 293 But the twin attributes of differentiation and
29' See, e.g., Steyger, supra note 260; Europe's Other: European Law between Modernity and
Postmodernity (Peter Fitzpatrick & James Henry Bergeron eds., 1998). See also EC Directive on TV,
requiring that 50% of TV time in the Member States be European-made programs. Council Directive 89/552
on Television Without Frontiers, art. 4, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23, cited in Laurance G.C. Kaplan, The European
Community's 'Television Without Frontiers' Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture, 8 Emory
Int'l L. Rev. 255, 280 (1994), which the United States criticized as "nothing more than economic
protectionism in cultural language." Kaplan, id. at 304.
292 The area of higher education is another instance of potentially huge significance and implications of
the subsumption of the cultural under the economic, by recategorizing cultural phenomena under the rubric of
an economic matter. The Presentation Paper of the European Socrates educational program declares that
education is of central importance to Europe's economic future. As a matter ofeconomics, education becomes
subject to harmonization. The description of education's importance as dwelling inthe realm ofthe economic
is not an untenable or unreasonable position inasmuch as the idea links education to the future economic
potential of Europe's youth. The Europeanization of education, however, also concerns the deepest issues of
the Member States' traditions and heritages, with massive cultural implications. See Presentation of the
Socrates Program, available at http://europa.eu.int/eucomm/dg22socrates.html. I am grateful to Nicole de
Montrichet of France's CNRS for bringing to my attention current European educational issues in her talk,
The Impact of Europeanization on Higher Education in France, Address at the University of Pittsburgh,
Center2 for West European Studies and European Union Center (Feb. 15, 2000).
93German enthusiasm for Europeanization has been attributed to Germans' associating the celebration
of cultural diversity with the horrors of the Nazi persecution of minorities: "By the end of their second World
War, the Germans had had their patriotism beaten out of them. Where other nations can look proudly back
upon their past, the Germans can see only the Third Reich which, like a gigantic and menacing boulder,
blocks from sight whatever good and noble events might have preceded it. Since they can't look back, the
Germans look ahead: they are the keenest Europeans .... Inga Markovits, Reconcilable Differences: On Peter
Quint's The Imperfect Union, 47 Am. J.Comp. L. 189,210 (1999) (book review). Some ofthe impressions I
garnered from teaching a summer course in a German law school in June-July, 1999, were confirmed by
Professor Markovits' account, which I read after my return from Germany. Colleagues and students in
Germany had expressed an enthusiasm for the European Union that struck me as both unalloyed and even
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belonging also have resulted in the infimite richness that the multitude of human cultures
provides. Both the philosopher of ideas, Isaiah Berlin, and the philosopher of language,
George Steiner, agree that the human need for differentiation has been a constant
throughout history. In analyzing the mystery of language multiplicity, Steiner has
questioned the phenomenon's seemingly dubious connection to the "Darwinian
paradigm ... of evolutionary benefit. ''294 Here is how he attributes evolutionary benefit
to the seemingly inexplicably un-Darwinian proliferation of mutually incomprehensible
languages on earth:
Even when it is spoken by a handful of the harried remnants of destroyed communities,
a language contains within itself the boundless potential of discovery, of re-composition
of reality, of articulated dreams, which are known
295 to us as myths, as poetry, as
metaphysical conjecture and the discourse of law.
Yves Duteil, the French poet, composer, singer and politician, wrote the following
lines, composed in the classical French tradition of alexandrins: 296
Dans cette langue belle aux couleurs de Provence
Oi la saveur des choses est ddjb darn les mots
C'estd'aborden parlantque lafete commence
Et 'on boit des paroles aussi bien que de ! 'eau
(In this beautiful language of the colors of Provence
Where the flavor of things already is in the words
It is first in speaking that the celebration begins
297
And one drinks of the spoken words as well as of the water)

naive, as though the European Union had an infallible formula for realizing a future of peace and prosperity.
They seemed uniformly undisturbed by the univocal quality of the European Union. Their apparent
unquestioning faith in its self-representation as a vehicle for humanitarian politics caused me to wonder if the
Nazi past might not be, as Professor Markovits has suggested, a factor in conclusions based more on
unreflective faith than on logic. My impressions differ significantly from Professor Markovits', however, in
that the German people I met did look backwards. I was greatly moved by my German students' active
concern about law's potential for preventing dictatorship and injustice. Their nation's past was an ever-present
frame of reference, often explicit, occasionally clearly implicit, for their analysis oflegal issues. While I fear
that some German enthusiasm for the European Union may be excessive and at times less than fully lucid, I
feel the highest regard for the earnest young people whom I taught. Nor was the willingness to look
backwards the exclusive province of the young. Among the memories I will treasure for life are the days I
spent with a retired professor of law and his wife, whose voices were of the Germany Hitler interrupted.
229'
9 George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation, xiii (2d.ed. 1992).
5 Id.at xiv. Accord, Umberto Eco, Mdonnaitre les langues produit de l'intolTrance, in I'Express, No.
2494, Apr. 22-28, 1999, at 12 ("Moije suispour lepolylinguisme.La diversitl des languesest une richesse."

["I support polylinguism. The diversity of languages is a richness.] ). See also id. at 11: "La langue a des
raisonsque la raisonne connaitpas."("Language has its reasons that reason ignores.") Eco's remark also is
an implicit reference to Pascal's "Le cur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaitpas"("The heart has its

reasons that reason ignores'). My colleague, George Taylor, has informed me that Steiner's view of
diversity's containing evolutionary benefit in and of itself has parallels in the scientific theory of the
contemporary biologist Ernst Mayr. For a study decrying the consequences of language extinction, and linking
the phenomenon to loss of diversity in the world's ecosystem, see Daniel Nettle & Suzanne Romaine,
Vanishing Voices: The Extinction of the World's Languages (2000).
26 In addition to being the mayor of a small town in France and one ofthe country's most popular songwriters, Yves Duteil also happens to be a descendant of Alfred Dreyfus.
297Yves Duteil, La langue de chez nous, in 18 Champs Ilysdes: Rdtrospective 2000, 13 (1999).
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Even the field of mathematics recognizes that there may be "different models of the
same set of axioms," an insight that generated exciting mathematical developments.298
In our era, Einstein substantiated the idea that we can perceive only from within our
particular frames of reference: "[W]hat one observe[s] from ... are private frames of
reference, each being its own center ... . As long as the frames [are] unmoving, or

move[] uniformly with respect to one another, each ... appear[s] at rest to its occupant...
11299

While Einstein's theory of relativity (not relativism) does not negate the concept of

truth, history teaches that monolithism may lead to absolutism, to the idea of a single
truth rather than multiple truths, and to the denial of value pluralism, including the
denial both of the validity of different paths leading to different answers, and ofvalue in
the survival of difference. The diversity of distinctive traditions may be compared to
what Richard Feynman has described as "the freedom to doubt," a freedom wrested3at
inestimable human cost over centuries of struggle with state and church institutions. 00

Isaiah Berlin predicted that "a unified answer in human affairs is likely to be

ruinous.' 3 0 1
From its beginnings, the European Union has recognized the vital importance of
cultural autonomy and diversity, and, thus, it also implicitly recognizes the
corresponding immensity of loss that would ensue if diversity were to succumb to
uniformity, a loss that may be of meaning and of meaningfulness: "No matter how few
or many, how ill or well conceived, distinctions everywhere and anywhere have made
for meaning .... Meaning needs a content set in a context, which needs in turn what
holds the two apart. 3 °2
The paradox of Europe, and perhaps the greatest challenge it faces today, may be

29SKaplan, supra note 67, at 173.
2" Kaplan, supra note 67, at 184 (emphasis omitted). For a rendition of a British judge's account,

published in the London Times on August 9, 1946, of what the common-law legal culture represents in terms
of larger values of tolerance and freedom, and the judge's fear that the common law would become
overwhelmed by the civil-law tradition in the post-war collectivist age, see Radbruch, supra note 11 at 30-31.
See also id. at 49-50, for the argument that the common-law legal system is correlated to disempowering
potential autocrats. Radbruch saw in the jury system and in the force precedents exert on judges, the
impossibility of undue judicial usurpation of power. Radbruch also believed that legal positivism in the
common-law legal culture signifies the affirmation of law ("Bejahungdes Rechts"), rather than, as in
Germany, an affirmation of enacted law, extending even to such laws as were enacted under Hitler ("Bejahung
des Gesetzes'). Id. at 49. The fear that the particular would succumb to the general at the cost ofnothing less
than the soul of British greatness also was voiced by John Stuart Mill: "The greatness of England is now all
collective; individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by combining; and with this our moral
and religious philanthropists are perfectly content. But it was men of another stamp that made England what it
has been; and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 86
(World Classics ed.) (quoted in John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, in Berlin, Four Essays On Liberty,
supra note 4, at 194).
300See Feynman, supra note 186, at 112. Cf. the recent characterization ofIsaiah Berlin as exemplifying
a "permanent readiness to doubt" that was both "steadfast... and rational .... " Blokland, supra note 240, at
19; and of Learned Hand as characterized by a"commitment to the doubting spirit." Gunther, supra note 5 1, at
552.
"' Berlin, Roots of Romanticism, supra note 21, at 146.
302
Kaplan, supra note 67, at 194. Cf. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, supra note 4, at lii : "To contract
the areas ofhuman choice is to do harm to man in an intrinsic, Kantian, not merely utilitarian, sense. The fact
that the maintenance of conditions making possible the widest choice must be adjusted - however imperfectly
- to other needs, for social stability, predictability, order, and so on, does not diminish their central
importance."
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that its goals are mutually incompatible.0 3 Conscious recognition and assessment of the
incompatibility and irreconcilability of Europe's twin goals of economic and legal
uniformity, on the one hand, and cultural pluralism, on the other hand, may be the first
steps towards formulating lucid compromises that would permit both objectives to be
realized at least partially, before either is sacrificed irretrievably.
Any thoughtful progression towards the future requires an understanding that the
decision-making methodologies of today will be confronting tomorrow's unforeseen
eventualities. However much the past and present can instruct as to the future, they
nevertheless are horizons that demarcate, defime and, inevitably, that also restrict, our
imagination. 30 4 According to Socrates, as recounted by Plato, insight or imagination is
needed not just for creativity, but to maintain reason itself.305 A univocal Europe may
provide no more than an illusion of certainty, its answers impoverished by the extent of
its loss of recourse to the once distinctive traditions that merged to form it. A plurality
of voices lacks certainty, or the ring of certainty, but unicity does not imply truth,
however much it may be mistaken for truth, just as multiplicity may be mistaken for

confusion, and confusion for ignorance. 306 It is perhaps useful in this context to
remember that, "[iln order to make progress, one must leave the door to the unknown

ajar.... ,,307 One should beware of according to any single entity what Habermas calls "a
monopoly on definition. '30 8
The idea of univocal certainty has been rejected even within that most universal and
formal of systems in which at least some active
3 ° participants believe that truths are
discovered, not invented; namely, mathematics: 0

o For a thoughtful attempt to resolve Europe's dilemma, see Neil MacCormick, Democracy,
Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the 'European Commonwealth," 16 Law & Phil'y 1 (1997). See also
Kirchner, supra note 13, at 678 ("The dilemma of the integration approach is that it has not yet developed the
valid theoretical framework necessary to determine the optimal degree of integration"); id. at 680-686
(describing possible analytical approaches to resolving the dilemma). For the optimistic suggestion that
intermediate solutions are feasible for the European Union, and that legal integrationism is not irreconcilable
with legal pluralism, see Carol Harlow, Voices of Difference in a Polyphonic Community, Harvard Jean
Monnet Working Papers 3/00, at 35, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/program/JeanMonnet (last
visited Aug. 9, 2000).
304
See Feynman, supra note 186, at 115. Cf. Kaplan, supra note 67, at 34 ("What facilitates thought
impoverishes imagination.")
3oSee Plato, Republic, supra note 187, at 242 (praising number theory for"forc[ing] the mind to arrive
at pure thought by the exercise of pure thought," and distinguishing pure thought from that which takes
cognizance of the "material things which can be seen and touched"). Id. See also id. at 236 ("Mathematical
knowledge might be ...
better achieved by a disembodied soul which had no sensible [i.e., of the senses]
realized that our faculty
experience.") Accord, Hampshire, supra note 68, at x-xi. According to Kant, "Plato ...
of knowledge feels a much higher need than merely to spell out appearances according to a synthetic unity, in
order to be able to read them as experience. He knew that our reason naturally exalts itself to modes of
knowledge which so far transcend the bounds of experience that no given empirical object can ever coincide
with them, but which must nonetheless be recognized as having their own reality, and which are by no means
mere fictions ofthe brain." Critique of Pure Reason, in Immanuel Kants Werke, 257 etseq. (Ernst Cassirer et
al. eds., 1918) (quoted in Ernst Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, 252 (trans. James Haden, 1981)).
306
One might also evoke in this context Habermas' reminder that "because no one has direct access to
uninterpreted conditions of validity, 'validity' (Gultigkeir)must be understood in epistemic terms as 'validity
(Geltung) proven for us."' Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note II , at 14.
307
Feynman supra note 186, at 115. See also Geertz, supra note 264, at 64 (the "history [of modem
times] has ...
consisted of one field of thought after another having to discover how to live on without the
certainties that launched it').
'o,
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 1i,at 426. Accord, Hampshire, supra note 68, at 52
(decrying what he calls "mono-moralism").
'09See my discussion of the issue of whether mathematical truths are invented or discovered in Curran,
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There is no denying the great advantages that rich formal systems have to offer us. They
chase false insights away and bring those that cohere with our axioms into a language
where they can be spoken of with their peers. Here new linguistic structures may
coalesce that will contribute to further insights .... The sense of a single truth grew from
the prior half of doing mathematics, grown apart from its legislative twin. There those
insights were gained in ways that we cannot describe and indeed hardly grasp, and
which by their very nature cannot be formalized. The answer to Bishop Berkeley's
query is that in fact we do best proceed at first when our ends, objects and methods are
still pliable, lollygagging around within green precincts of certainty: for the idea of a
single way that things are belongs to this morning half- so of course we cannot expect
it to survive the serious afternoon. The world may not only be more singular than we
think, it may be more singular than we can think.31 0
The corollary point that Isaiah Berlin made throughout his life's work is that "ends
collide ... one cannot have everything. Whence it follows that the very concept of... a
life in which nothing of value need ever be lost or sacrificed ... is not merely utopian,
but incoherent., 311 Montesquieu suggested some two centuries ago in De 'esprit des
lois that the greatness of genius may reside in knowing which circumstances call for
uniformity, and which for differences. 312 Still greater genius may be required to
accommodate the goals of uniformity and difference simultaneously in the European
Union, or to acknowledge that they are not amenable to simultaneous accommodation.

Cultural Immersion, supra note 11, at 49 n.12.
310Kaplan, supra note 67,at 160. Cf. John Burdon Sanders Haldane, Possible Worlds (1927), in John
Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 821 (1980) (1855): "The universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but
queerer than we can suppose."
31 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, supra note 4, at li.
3 See Montesquieu, supra note 1.

